@@ -56,16 +56,25 @@ module_param_named(dm_op_buf_max_size, privcmd_dm_op_buf_max_size, uint,
MODULE_PARM_DESC(dm_op_buf_max_size,
"Maximum size of a dm_op hypercall buffer");
+struct privcmd_data {
+ domid_t domid;
+};
+
static int privcmd_vma_range_is_mapped(
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long nr_pages);
-static long privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(void __user *udata)
+static long privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
{
+ struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
struct privcmd_hypercall hypercall;
long ret;
+ /* Disallow arbitrary hypercalls if restricted */
+ if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID)
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (copy_from_user(&hypercall, udata, sizeof(hypercall)))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -242,8 +251,9 @@ static int mmap_gfn_range(void *data, void *state)
return 0;
}
-static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(void __user *udata)
+static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
{
+ struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
struct privcmd_mmap mmapcmd;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
@@ -258,6 +268,10 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(void __user *udata)
if (copy_from_user(&mmapcmd, udata, sizeof(mmapcmd)))
return -EFAULT;
+ /* If restriction is in place, check the domid matches */
+ if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID && data->domid != mmapcmd.dom)
+ return -EPERM;
+
rc = gather_array(&pagelist,
mmapcmd.num, sizeof(struct privcmd_mmap_entry),
mmapcmd.entry);
@@ -429,8 +443,10 @@ static int alloc_empty_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int numpgs)
static const struct vm_operations_struct privcmd_vm_ops;
-static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(void __user *udata, int version)
+static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(
+ struct file *file, void __user *udata, int version)
{
+ struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
int ret;
struct privcmd_mmapbatch_v2 m;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
@@ -459,6 +475,10 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(void __user *udata, int version)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* If restriction is in place, check the domid matches */
+ if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID && data->domid != m.dom)
+ return -EPERM;
+
nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(m.num, XEN_PFN_PER_PAGE);
if ((m.num <= 0) || (nr_pages > (LONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT)))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -603,8 +623,9 @@ static void unlock_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned int nr_pages)
}
}
-static long privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(void __user *udata)
+static long privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
{
+ struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
struct privcmd_dm_op kdata;
struct privcmd_dm_op_buf *kbufs;
unsigned int nr_pages = 0;
@@ -616,6 +637,10 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(void __user *udata)
if (copy_from_user(&kdata, udata, sizeof(kdata)))
return -EFAULT;
+ /* If restriction is in place, check the domid matches */
+ if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID && data->domid != kdata.dom)
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (kdata.num == 0)
return 0;
@@ -683,6 +708,23 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(void __user *udata)
return rc;
}
+static long privcmd_ioctl_restrict(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
+{
+ struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
+ domid_t dom;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&dom, udata, sizeof(dom)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /* Set restriction to the specified domain, or check it matches */
+ if (data->domid == DOMID_INVALID)
+ data->domid = dom;
+ else if (data->domid != dom)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long data)
{
@@ -691,23 +733,27 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file,
switch (cmd) {
case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_HYPERCALL:
- ret = privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(udata);
+ ret = privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(file, udata);
break;
case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP:
- ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap(udata);
+ ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap(file, udata);
break;
case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAPBATCH:
- ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(udata, 1);
+ ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(file, udata, 1);
break;
case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAPBATCH_V2:
- ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(udata, 2);
+ ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(file, udata, 2);
break;
case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_DM_OP:
- ret = privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(udata);
+ ret = privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(file, udata);
+ break;
+
+ case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_RESTRICT:
+ ret = privcmd_ioctl_restrict(file, udata);
break;
default:
@@ -717,6 +763,28 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file,
return ret;
}
+static int privcmd_open(struct inode *ino, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct privcmd_data *data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* DOMID_INVALID implies no restriction */
+ data->domid = DOMID_INVALID;
+
+ file->private_data = data;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int privcmd_release(struct inode *ino, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
+
+ kfree(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void privcmd_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct page **pages = vma->vm_private_data;
@@ -785,6 +853,8 @@ static int privcmd_vma_range_is_mapped(
const struct file_operations xen_privcmd_fops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.unlocked_ioctl = privcmd_ioctl,
+ .open = privcmd_open,
+ .release = privcmd_release,
.mmap = privcmd_mmap,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_privcmd_fops);
@@ -111,5 +111,7 @@ struct privcmd_dm_op {
_IOC(_IOC_NONE, 'P', 4, sizeof(struct privcmd_mmapbatch_v2))
#define IOCTL_PRIVCMD_DM_OP \
_IOC(_IOC_NONE, 'P', 5, sizeof(struct privcmd_dm_op))
+#define IOCTL_PRIVCMD_RESTRICT \
+ _IOC(_IOC_NONE, 'P', 6, sizeof(domid_t))
#endif /* __LINUX_PUBLIC_PRIVCMD_H__ */
The purpose if this ioctl is to allow a user of privcmd to restrict its operation such that it will no longer service arbitrary hypercalls via IOCTL_PRIVCMD_HYPERCALL, and will check for a matching domid when servicing IOCTL_PRIVCMD_DM_OP. The aim of this is to limit the attack surface for a compromised device model. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com> --- Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> v3: - Extend restriction to mapping ioctls v2: - Make sure that a restriction cannot be cleared --- drivers/xen/privcmd.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- include/uapi/xen/privcmd.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)