| Message ID | 1490706772-8013-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Tue, 2017-03-28 at 22:12 +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote: > This patch is a preparation for getting rid of task_create hook > because > task_create hook task_alloc hook? > which can do what task_create hook can do was revived. > > Creating a new thread is unlikely prohibited by security policy, for > fork()/execve()/exit() is fundamental of how processes are managed in > Unix. If a program is known to create a new thread, it is likely that > permission to create a new thread is given to that program. > Therefore, > a situation where security_task_create() returns an error is likely > that > the program was exploited and lost control. Even if SELinux failed to > check permission to create a thread at security_task_create(), > SELinux > can later check it at security_task_alloc(). Since the new thread is > not > yet visible from the rest of the system, nobody can do bad things > using > the new thread. What we waste will be limited to some initialization > steps such as dup_task_struct(), copy_creds() and audit_alloc() in > copy_process(). We can tolerate these overhead for unlikely > situation. > > Therefore, this patch changes SELinux to use task_alloc hook rather > than > task_create hook so that we can remove task_create hook. Aside from the nit on the patch description above, Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > > Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> > --- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +++-- > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index d37a723..d850b7f 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -3710,7 +3710,8 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, > const struct cred *cred) > > /* task security operations */ > > -static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) > +static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, > + unsigned long clone_flags) > { > u32 sid = current_sid(); > > @@ -6205,7 +6206,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key > *key, char **_buffer) > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open), > > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create, selinux_task_create), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index d37a723..d850b7f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3710,7 +3710,8 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) /* task security operations */ -static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) +static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long clone_flags) { u32 sid = current_sid(); @@ -6205,7 +6206,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create, selinux_task_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
This patch is a preparation for getting rid of task_create hook because task_create hook which can do what task_create hook can do was revived. Creating a new thread is unlikely prohibited by security policy, for fork()/execve()/exit() is fundamental of how processes are managed in Unix. If a program is known to create a new thread, it is likely that permission to create a new thread is given to that program. Therefore, a situation where security_task_create() returns an error is likely that the program was exploited and lost control. Even if SELinux failed to check permission to create a thread at security_task_create(), SELinux can later check it at security_task_alloc(). Since the new thread is not yet visible from the rest of the system, nobody can do bad things using the new thread. What we waste will be limited to some initialization steps such as dup_task_struct(), copy_creds() and audit_alloc() in copy_process(). We can tolerate these overhead for unlikely situation. Therefore, this patch changes SELinux to use task_alloc hook rather than task_create hook so that we can remove task_create hook. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)