From patchwork Wed Apr 19 03:45:26 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Matt Brown X-Patchwork-Id: 9686799 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9548460383 for ; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 03:46:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8153F2621D for ; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 03:46:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 748F32832D; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 03:46:22 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 873BE2621D for ; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 03:46:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 24241 invoked by uid 550); 19 Apr 2017 03:46:19 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 24204 invoked from network); 19 Apr 2017 03:46:17 -0000 X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at mfilter2-d.gandi.net X-Originating-IP: 72.66.113.207 From: Matt Brown To: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jslaby@suse.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, jannh@google.com, keescook@chromium.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matt Brown Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 23:45:26 -0400 Message-Id: <20170419034526.18565-1-matt@nmatt.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.10.2 Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This patch reproduces GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY functionality from the grsecurity project in-kernel. This will create the Kconfig SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT and the corresponding sysctl kernel.tiocsti_restrict that, when activated, restrict all TIOCSTI ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users. Possible effects on userland: There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this change. See: notable programs are: agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh However, I still believe that this change is worth it given that the Kconfig defaults to n. This will be a feature that is turned on for the same reason that people activate it when using grsecurity. Users of this opt-in feature will realize that they are choosing security over some OS features like unprivileged TIOCSTI ioctls, as should be clear in the Kconfig help message. Threat Model/Patch Rational: From grsecurity's config for GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY. | There are very few legitimate uses for this functionality and it | has made vulnerabilities in several 'su'-like programs possible in | the past. Even without these vulnerabilities, it provides an | attacker with an easy mechanism to move laterally among other | processes within the same user's compromised session. So if one process within a tty session becomes compromised it can follow that additional processes, that are thought to be in different security boundaries, can be compromised as a result. When using a program like su or sudo, these additional processes could be in a tty session where TTY file descriptors are indeed shared over privilege boundaries. This is also an excellent writeup about the issue: Signed-off-by: Matt Brown --- drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/tty.h | 2 ++ kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ security/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c index e6d1a65..31894e8 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c @@ -2296,11 +2296,15 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) * FIXME: may race normal receive processing */ +int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT); + static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p) { char ch, mbz = 0; struct tty_ldisc *ld; + if (tiocsti_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (get_user(ch, p)) diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h index 1017e904..7011102 100644 --- a/include/linux/tty.h +++ b/include/linux/tty.h @@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ struct tty_file_private { struct list_head list; }; +extern int tiocsti_restrict; + /* tty magic number */ #define TTY_MAGIC 0x5401 diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index acf0a5a..68d1363 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -833,6 +834,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .extra2 = &two, }, #endif +#if defined CONFIG_TTY + { + .procname = "tiocsti_restrict", + .data = &tiocsti_restrict, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &one, + }, +#endif { .procname = "ngroups_max", .data = &ngroups_max, diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 3ff1bf9..7d13331 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT + bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection" + default n + help + This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands + into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI + ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. + + If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced + unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS