diff mbox

[05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook

Message ID 1497286620-15027-6-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Headers show

Commit Message

Salvatore Mesoraca June 12, 2017, 4:56 p.m. UTC
Creation of a new LSM hook to check if a given configuration of vmflags,
for a new memory allocation request, should be allowed or not.
It's placed in "do_mmap", "do_brk_flags" and "__install_special_mapping".

Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++
 include/linux/security.h  | 6 ++++++
 mm/mmap.c                 | 9 +++++++++
 security/security.c       | 5 +++++
 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

Comments

Casey Schaufler June 12, 2017, 9:31 p.m. UTC | #1
On 6/12/2017 9:56 AM, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
> Creation of a new LSM hook to check if a given configuration of vmflags,
> for a new memory allocation request, should be allowed or not.
> It's placed in "do_mmap", "do_brk_flags" and "__install_special_mapping".
>
> Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++
>  include/linux/security.h  | 6 ++++++
>  mm/mmap.c                 | 9 +++++++++
>  security/security.c       | 5 +++++
>  4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index cc0937e..6934cc5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -483,6 +483,10 @@
>   *	@reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
>   *	@prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @check_vmflags:
> + *	Check if the requested @vmflags are allowed.
> + *	@vmflags contains requested the vmflags.
> + *	Return 0 if the operation is allowed to continue.
>   * @file_lock:
>   *	Check permission before performing file locking operations.
>   *	Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
> @@ -1482,6 +1486,7 @@
>  				unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
>  	int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
>  				unsigned long prot);
> +	int (*check_vmflags)(vm_flags_t vmflags);
>  	int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
>  	int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
>  				unsigned long arg);
> @@ -1753,6 +1758,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>  	struct list_head mmap_addr;
>  	struct list_head mmap_file;
>  	struct list_head file_mprotect;
> +	struct list_head check_vmflags;
>  	struct list_head file_lock;
>  	struct list_head file_fcntl;
>  	struct list_head file_set_fowner;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 19bc364..67e33b6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
>  int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
>  int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
>  			   unsigned long prot);
> +int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags);
>  int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
>  int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
>  void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file);
> @@ -830,6 +831,11 @@ static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static inline int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
>  {
>  	return 0;
> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> index f82741e..e19f04e 100644
> --- a/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -1363,6 +1363,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
>  	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
>  			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
>  
> +	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
> +		return -EPERM;
> +

Have the hook return a value and return that rather
than -EPERM. That way a security module can choose an
error that it determines is appropriate. It is possible
that a module might want to deny the access for a reason
other than lack of privilege. 

>  	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
>  		if (!can_do_mlock())
>  			return -EPERM;
> @@ -2833,6 +2836,9 @@ static int do_brk_flags(unsigned long addr, unsigned long request, unsigned long
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	flags |= VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
>  
> +	if (security_check_vmflags(flags))
> +		return -EPERM;
> +

Same here

>  	error = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, len, 0, MAP_FIXED);
>  	if (offset_in_page(error))
>  		return error;
> @@ -3208,6 +3214,9 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *__install_special_mapping(
>  	int ret;
>  	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
>  
> +	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
> +		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
> +

And here.

>  	vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (unlikely(vma == NULL))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index e390f99..25d58f0 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -905,6 +905,11 @@ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
>  	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
>  }
>  
> +int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(check_vmflags, 0, vmflags);
> +}
> +
>  int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
>  {
>  	return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);

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Christoph Hellwig June 13, 2017, 6:34 a.m. UTC | #2
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 06:56:54PM +0200, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
> Creation of a new LSM hook to check if a given configuration of vmflags,
> for a new memory allocation request, should be allowed or not.
> It's placed in "do_mmap", "do_brk_flags" and "__install_special_mapping".

Please always post the whole series including the users, thanks.
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Salvatore Mesoraca June 13, 2017, 7:52 a.m. UTC | #3
2017-06-13 8:34 GMT+02:00 Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>:
> Please always post the whole series including the users, thanks.

I'm sorry for the inconvenience, it won't happen again.
Thank you for your comment.
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Salvatore Mesoraca June 13, 2017, 7:55 a.m. UTC | #4
2017-06-12 23:31 GMT+02:00 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>:
> Have the hook return a value and return that rather
> than -EPERM. That way a security module can choose an
> error that it determines is appropriate. It is possible
> that a module might want to deny the access for a reason
> other than lack of privilege.
> [...]
>
> Same here
>
> [...]
>
> And here.

Yes, I think you are right. I'll fix it in the next version.
Thank you very much for taking the time to review my patch.
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diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index cc0937e..6934cc5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -483,6 +483,10 @@ 
  *	@reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
  *	@prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @check_vmflags:
+ *	Check if the requested @vmflags are allowed.
+ *	@vmflags contains requested the vmflags.
+ *	Return 0 if the operation is allowed to continue.
  * @file_lock:
  *	Check permission before performing file locking operations.
  *	Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
@@ -1482,6 +1486,7 @@ 
 				unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
 	int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 				unsigned long prot);
+	int (*check_vmflags)(vm_flags_t vmflags);
 	int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
 	int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 				unsigned long arg);
@@ -1753,6 +1758,7 @@  struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head mmap_addr;
 	struct list_head mmap_file;
 	struct list_head file_mprotect;
+	struct list_head check_vmflags;
 	struct list_head file_lock;
 	struct list_head file_fcntl;
 	struct list_head file_set_fowner;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 19bc364..67e33b6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@  int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot);
+int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags);
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file);
@@ -830,6 +831,11 @@  static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index f82741e..e19f04e 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1363,6 +1363,9 @@  unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
 			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
 		if (!can_do_mlock())
 			return -EPERM;
@@ -2833,6 +2836,9 @@  static int do_brk_flags(unsigned long addr, unsigned long request, unsigned long
 		return -EINVAL;
 	flags |= VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	error = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, len, 0, MAP_FIXED);
 	if (offset_in_page(error))
 		return error;
@@ -3208,6 +3214,9 @@  static struct vm_area_struct *__install_special_mapping(
 	int ret;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
 	vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (unlikely(vma == NULL))
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e390f99..25d58f0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -905,6 +905,11 @@  int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
+int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(check_vmflags, 0, vmflags);
+}
+
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);