Patchwork [RFC,v3,1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls

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Submitter Alexander Popov
Date July 12, 2017, 6:17 p.m.
Message ID <1499883471-23822-1-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com>
Download mbox | patch
Permalink /patch/9837231/
State New
Headers show

Comments

Alexander Popov - July 12, 2017, 6:17 p.m.
This is the third version of the patch introducing STACKLEAK to the
mainline kernel. STACKLEAK is a security feature developed by Grsecurity/PaX
(kudos to them again), which:
 - reduces the information that can be revealed by some kernel stack leak bugs
    (e.g. CVE-2016-4569 and CVE-2016-4578);
 - blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2010-2963);
 - introduces some runtime checks for kernel stack overflow detection.

Changes in v3 (rebased on the recent rc)

1. Added the detailed comments describing the STACKLEAK gcc plugin.
   Read the plugin from bottom up, like you do for Linux kernel drivers.
   Additional information:
    - gcc internals documentation, which is available from gcc sources;
    - wonderful slides by Diego Novillo
       https://www.airs.com/dnovillo/200711-GCC-Internals/
    - nice introduction to gcc plugins at LWN
       https://lwn.net/Articles/457543/

2. Improved the commit message and Kconfig description according the
   feedback from Kees Cook. Also added the original notice describing
   the performance impact of the STACKLEAK feature.

3. Removed arch-specific ix86_cmodel check from stackleak_track_stack_gate().
   It caused skipping the kernel code instrumentation for i386.

4. Fixed a minor mistake in stackleak_tree_instrument_execute().
   First versions of the plugin used ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(cfun)->next_bb
   to get the basic block with the function prologue. That was not correct
   since the control flow graph edge from the ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR doesn't always
   go to that basic block.

   So later it was changed it to single_succ(ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(cfun)),
   but not completely. next_bb was still used for entry_bb assignment,
   which could cause the wrong value of the prologue_instrumented variable.

   I've reported this issue to Grsecurity and proposed the fix for it, but
   unfortunately didn't get any reply.

5. Introduced the STACKLEAK_POISON macro and renamed the config option
   according the feedback from Kees Cook.

More things to be done:
 - carefully look into the assertions in track_stack() and check_alloca();
 - find answers to the questions marked with TODO in the comments;
 - think of erasing the kernel stack after invoking EFI runtime services;
 - update self-protection.rst.

Parallel work (thanks for that!):
 - Tycho Andersen is developing tests for STACKLEAK;
 - Laura Abbott is working on porting STACKLEAK to arm64.

-- >8 --

The stackleak feature erases the kernel stack before returning from syscalls.
That reduces the information which a kernel stack leak bug can reveal and
blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks. Moreover, stackleak
provides runtime checks for kernel stack overflow detection.

This feature consists of:
 - the architecture-specific code filling the used part of the kernel stack
    with a poison value before returning to the userspace;
 - the stackleak gcc plugin. It instruments the kernel code inserting the
    track_stack() call for tracking the lowest border of the kernel stack
    and check_alloca() call for checking alloca size.

The stackleak feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. For more information see:
  https://grsecurity.net/
  https://pax.grsecurity.net/

This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public
patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code. Changes or
omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect the original
grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
---
 arch/Kconfig                           |  27 +++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                       |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/common.c                |  17 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S              |  71 ++++++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S              |  99 ++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S       |   8 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h       |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c          |   9 +
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c         |  12 +
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c         |  33 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c           |   5 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c           |   5 +
 fs/exec.c                              |  17 ++
 include/linux/compiler.h               |   4 +
 scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins           |   3 +
 scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c | 397 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 16 files changed, 709 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
Laura Abbott - July 14, 2017, 9:44 p.m.
On 07/12/2017 11:17 AM, Alexander Popov wrote:
> This is the third version of the patch introducing STACKLEAK to the
> mainline kernel. STACKLEAK is a security feature developed by Grsecurity/PaX
> (kudos to them again), which:
>  - reduces the information that can be revealed by some kernel stack leak bugs
>     (e.g. CVE-2016-4569 and CVE-2016-4578);
>  - blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2010-2963);
>  - introduces some runtime checks for kernel stack overflow detection.
> 
> Changes in v3 (rebased on the recent rc)
> 
> 1. Added the detailed comments describing the STACKLEAK gcc plugin.
>    Read the plugin from bottom up, like you do for Linux kernel drivers.
>    Additional information:
>     - gcc internals documentation, which is available from gcc sources;
>     - wonderful slides by Diego Novillo
>        https://www.airs.com/dnovillo/200711-GCC-Internals/
>     - nice introduction to gcc plugins at LWN
>        https://lwn.net/Articles/457543/
> 
> 2. Improved the commit message and Kconfig description according the
>    feedback from Kees Cook. Also added the original notice describing
>    the performance impact of the STACKLEAK feature.
> 
> 3. Removed arch-specific ix86_cmodel check from stackleak_track_stack_gate().
>    It caused skipping the kernel code instrumentation for i386.
> 
> 4. Fixed a minor mistake in stackleak_tree_instrument_execute().
>    First versions of the plugin used ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(cfun)->next_bb
>    to get the basic block with the function prologue. That was not correct
>    since the control flow graph edge from the ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR doesn't always
>    go to that basic block.
> 
>    So later it was changed it to single_succ(ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(cfun)),
>    but not completely. next_bb was still used for entry_bb assignment,
>    which could cause the wrong value of the prologue_instrumented variable.
> 
>    I've reported this issue to Grsecurity and proposed the fix for it, but
>    unfortunately didn't get any reply.
> 
> 5. Introduced the STACKLEAK_POISON macro and renamed the config option
>    according the feedback from Kees Cook.
> 
> More things to be done:
>  - carefully look into the assertions in track_stack() and check_alloca();
>  - find answers to the questions marked with TODO in the comments;
>  - think of erasing the kernel stack after invoking EFI runtime services;
>  - update self-protection.rst.
> 
> Parallel work (thanks for that!):
>  - Tycho Andersen is developing tests for STACKLEAK;
>  - Laura Abbott is working on porting STACKLEAK to arm64.
> 
> -- >8 --
> 
> The stackleak feature erases the kernel stack before returning from syscalls.
> That reduces the information which a kernel stack leak bug can reveal and
> blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks. Moreover, stackleak
> provides runtime checks for kernel stack overflow detection.
> 
> This feature consists of:
>  - the architecture-specific code filling the used part of the kernel stack
>     with a poison value before returning to the userspace;
>  - the stackleak gcc plugin. It instruments the kernel code inserting the
>     track_stack() call for tracking the lowest border of the kernel stack
>     and check_alloca() call for checking alloca size.
> 
> The stackleak feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. For more information see:
>   https://grsecurity.net/
>   https://pax.grsecurity.net/
> 
> This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public
> patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code. Changes or
> omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect the original
> grsecurity/PaX code.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
> ---
>  arch/Kconfig                           |  27 +++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                       |   1 +
>  arch/x86/entry/common.c                |  17 +-
>  arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S              |  71 ++++++
>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S              |  99 ++++++++
>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S       |   8 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h       |   4 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c          |   9 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c         |  12 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c         |  33 +++
>  arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c           |   5 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c           |   5 +
>  fs/exec.c                              |  17 ++
>  include/linux/compiler.h               |   4 +
>  scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins           |   3 +
>  scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c | 397 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  16 files changed, 709 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
> 
> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> index cae0958..0c9a0f5 100644
> --- a/arch/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> @@ -361,6 +361,13 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER
>  
>  	  See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details.
>  
> +config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
> +	bool
> +	help
> +	  An architecture should select this if it has the code which
> +	  fills the used part of the kernel stack with the STACKLEAK_POISON
> +	  value before returning from system calls.
> +
>  config HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
>  	bool
>  	help
> @@ -482,6 +489,26 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
>  	  in structures.  This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
>  	  at the cost of weakened randomization.
>  
> +config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +	bool "Erase the kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
> +	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> +	depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
> +	help
> +	  This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before it
> +	  returns from a system call. That reduces the information which
> +	  a kernel stack leak bug can reveal and blocks some uninitialized
> +	  stack variable attacks. This option also provides runtime checks
> +	  for kernel stack overflow detection.
> +
> +	  The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
> +	  compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary
> +	  and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload
> +	  before deploying it.
> +
> +	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
> +	   * https://grsecurity.net/
> +	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
> +
>  config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
>  	bool
>  	help
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 94a1868..1359e01 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ config X86
>  	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS	if MMU && COMPAT
>  	select HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES	if MMU && COMPAT
>  	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
> +	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
>  	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
>  	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
>  	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
> index cdefcfd..5e9cd0a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
> @@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ __visible inline void enter_from_user_mode(void)
>  static inline void enter_from_user_mode(void) {}
>  #endif
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void);
> +#else
> +static void erase_kstack(void) {}
> +#endif
> +
>  static void do_audit_syscall_entry(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
>  {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> @@ -80,8 +86,10 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  		emulated = true;
>  
>  	if ((emulated || (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) &&
> -	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
> +	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
> +		erase_kstack();
>  		return -1L;
> +	}
>  
>  	if (emulated)
>  		return -1L;
> @@ -115,9 +123,11 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  			sd.args[5] = regs->bp;
>  		}
>  
> -		ret = __secure_computing(&sd);
> -		if (ret == -1)
> +		ret = secure_computing(&sd);
> +		if (ret == -1) {
> +			erase_kstack();
>  			return ret;
> +		}
>  	}
>  #endif
>  
> @@ -126,6 +136,7 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  
>  	do_audit_syscall_entry(regs, arch);
>  
> +	erase_kstack();
>  	return ret ?: regs->orig_ax;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
> index 48ef7bb..f3d2666 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
> @@ -75,6 +75,73 @@
>  #endif
>  .endm
>  
> +.macro erase_kstack
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +	call erase_kstack
> +#endif
> +.endm
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +/*
> + * ebp: thread_info
> + */
> +ENTRY(erase_kstack)
> +	pushl	%edi
> +	pushl	%ecx
> +	pushl	%eax
> +	pushl	%ebp
> +
> +	movl	PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %ebp
> +	mov	TASK_lowest_stack(%ebp), %edi
> +	mov	$STACKLEAK_POISON, %eax
> +	std
> +
> +1:
> +	mov	%edi, %ecx
> +	and	$THREAD_SIZE_asm - 1, %ecx
> +	shr	$2, %ecx
> +	repne	scasl
> +	jecxz	2f
> +
> +	cmp	$2*16, %ecx
> +	jc	2f
> +
> +	mov	$2*16, %ecx
> +	repe	scasl
> +	jecxz	2f
> +	jne	1b
> +
> +2:
> +	cld
> +	or	$2*4, %edi
> +	mov	%esp, %ecx
> +	sub	%edi, %ecx
> +
> +	cmp	$THREAD_SIZE_asm, %ecx
> +	jb	3f
> +	ud2
> +
> +3:
> +	shr	$2, %ecx
> +	rep	stosl
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * TODO: sp0 on x86_32 is not reliable, right?
> +	 * Doubt because of the definition of cpu_current_top_of_stack
> +	 * in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c.
> +	 */
> +	mov	TASK_thread_sp0(%ebp), %edi
> +	sub	$128, %edi
> +	mov	%edi, TASK_lowest_stack(%ebp)
> +
> +	popl	%ebp
> +	popl	%eax
> +	popl	%ecx
> +	popl	%edi
> +	ret
> +ENDPROC(erase_kstack)
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   * User gs save/restore
>   *
> @@ -445,6 +512,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_32)
>  	ALTERNATIVE "testl %eax, %eax; jz .Lsyscall_32_done", \
>  		    "jmp .Lsyscall_32_done", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
>  
> +	erase_kstack
> +
>  /* Opportunistic SYSEXIT */
>  	TRACE_IRQS_ON			/* User mode traces as IRQs on. */
>  	movl	PT_EIP(%esp), %edx	/* pt_regs->ip */
> @@ -531,6 +600,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_32)
>  	call	do_int80_syscall_32
>  .Lsyscall_32_done:
>  
> +	erase_kstack
> +
>  restore_all:
>  	TRACE_IRQS_IRET
>  .Lrestore_all_notrace:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> index a9a8027..c106925 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> @@ -57,6 +57,94 @@ ENDPROC(native_usergs_sysret64)
>  #endif
>  .endm
>  
> +.macro erase_kstack
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +	call erase_kstack
> +#endif
> +.endm
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +ENTRY(erase_kstack)
> +	pushq	%rdi
> +	pushq	%rcx
> +	pushq	%rax
> +	pushq	%r11
> +
> +	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11
> +	mov	TASK_lowest_stack(%r11), %rdi
> +	mov	$STACKLEAK_POISON, %rax
> +	std
> +
> +1:
> +	/*
> +	 * Let's search for the poison value in the stack.
> +	 * Start from the lowest_stack and go to the bottom (see std above).
> +	 */
> +	mov	%edi, %ecx
> +	and	$THREAD_SIZE_asm - 1, %ecx
> +	shr	$3, %ecx
> +	repne	scasq
> +	jecxz	2f	/* Didn't find it. Go to poisoning. */
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Found the poison value in the stack. Go to poisoning if there are
> +	 * less than 16 qwords left.
> +	 */
> +	cmp	$2*8, %ecx
> +	jc	2f
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Check that 16 further qwords contain poison (avoid false positives).
> +	 * If so, the part of the stack below the address in %rdi is likely
> +	 * to be poisoned. Otherwise we need to search deeper.
> +	 */
> +	mov	$2*8, %ecx
> +	repe	scasq
> +	jecxz	2f	/* Poison the upper part of the stack. */
> +	jne	1b	/* Search deeper. */
> +
> +2:
> +	/*
> +	 * Prepare the counter for poisoning the kernel stack between
> +	 * %rdi and %rsp.
> +	 *
> +	 * TODO: Sorry, don't understand why the following OR instruction is
> +	 * needed. That may be connected to the thread.lowest_stack
> +	 * initialization in arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c, where it is set
> +	 * to the task_stack_page address + 2 * sizeof(unsigned long).
> +	 */
> +	cld
> +	or	$2*8, %rdi
> +	mov	%esp, %ecx
> +	sub	%edi, %ecx
> +
> +	/* Check that the counter value is sane. */
> +	cmp	$THREAD_SIZE_asm, %rcx
> +	jb	3f
> +	ud2
> +
> +3:
> +	/*
> +	 * So let's write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from the
> +	 * address in %rdi and move up (see cld above) to the address in %rsp
> +	 * (not included, used memory).
> +	 */
> +	shr	$3, %ecx
> +	rep	stosq
> +
> +	/* Set the lowest_stack value to the top_of_stack - 256. */
> +	mov	TASK_thread_sp0(%r11), %rdi
> +	sub	$256, %rdi
> +	mov	%rdi, TASK_lowest_stack(%r11)
> +
> +	popq	%r11
> +	popq	%rax
> +	popq	%rcx
> +	popq	%rdi
> +	ret
> +ENDPROC(erase_kstack)
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   * When dynamic function tracer is enabled it will add a breakpoint
>   * to all locations that it is about to modify, sync CPUs, update
> @@ -217,6 +305,8 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
>  	testl	$_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11)
>  	jnz	1f
>  
> +	erase_kstack
> +
>  	LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT
>  	TRACE_IRQS_ON		/* user mode is traced as IRQs on */
>  	movq	RIP(%rsp), %rcx
> @@ -245,6 +335,8 @@ entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path:
>  	call	do_syscall_64		/* returns with IRQs disabled */
>  
>  return_from_SYSCALL_64:
> +	erase_kstack
> +
>  	RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
>  	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ		/* we're about to change IF */
>  
> @@ -415,6 +507,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
>  2:
>  	movq	%rsp, %rdi
>  	call	syscall_return_slowpath	/* returns with IRQs disabled */
> +	erase_kstack
>  	TRACE_IRQS_ON			/* user mode is traced as IRQS on */
>  	SWAPGS
>  	jmp	restore_regs_and_iret
> @@ -527,6 +620,12 @@ ret_from_intr:
>  GLOBAL(retint_user)
>  	mov	%rsp,%rdi
>  	call	prepare_exit_to_usermode
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * TODO: Do we need to call erase_kstack here?
> +	 * The PaX patch has it here commented out.
> +	 */
> +
>  	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
>  	SWAPGS
>  	jmp	restore_regs_and_iret
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
> index e1721da..05a75a6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
> @@ -18,6 +18,12 @@
>  
>  	.section .entry.text, "ax"
>  
> +	.macro erase_kstack
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +	call erase_kstack
> +#endif
> +	.endm
> +
>  /*
>   * 32-bit SYSENTER entry.
>   *
> @@ -229,6 +235,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
>  
>  	/* Opportunistic SYSRET */
>  sysret32_from_system_call:
> +	erase_kstack
>  	TRACE_IRQS_ON			/* User mode traces as IRQs on. */
>  	movq	RBX(%rsp), %rbx		/* pt_regs->rbx */
>  	movq	RBP(%rsp), %rbp		/* pt_regs->rbp */
> @@ -337,6 +344,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
>  .Lsyscall_32_done:
>  
>  	/* Go back to user mode. */
> +	erase_kstack
>  	TRACE_IRQS_ON
>  	SWAPGS
>  	jmp	restore_regs_and_iret
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index 6a79547..f67417d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -470,6 +470,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
>  
>  	mm_segment_t		addr_limit;
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +	unsigned long		lowest_stack;
> +#endif
> +
>  	unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
>  	unsigned int		uaccess_err:1;	/* uaccess failed */
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> index de827d6..4ed7451 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> @@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ void common(void) {
>  	BLANK();
>  	OFFSET(TASK_TI_flags, task_struct, thread_info.flags);
>  	OFFSET(TASK_addr_limit, task_struct, thread.addr_limit);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +	OFFSET(TASK_lowest_stack, task_struct, thread.lowest_stack);
> +	OFFSET(TASK_thread_sp0, task_struct, thread.sp0);
> +#endif
>  
>  	BLANK();
>  	OFFSET(crypto_tfm_ctx_offset, crypto_tfm, __crt_ctx);
> @@ -73,6 +77,11 @@ void common(void) {
>  	OFFSET(PV_MMU_read_cr2, pv_mmu_ops, read_cr2);
>  #endif
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +	BLANK();
> +	DEFINE(THREAD_SIZE_asm, THREAD_SIZE);
> +#endif
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_XEN
>  	BLANK();
>  	OFFSET(XEN_vcpu_info_mask, vcpu_info, evtchn_upcall_mask);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c
> index e5f0b40..2eaa810 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c
> @@ -162,3 +162,15 @@ void show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  	}
>  	pr_cont("\n");
>  }
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp, stack_left;
> +
> +	/* all kernel stacks are of the same size */
> +	stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
> +	BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca);
> +#endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
> index 3e1471d..dc1bb0b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
> @@ -178,3 +178,36 @@ void show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  	}
>  	pr_cont("\n");
>  }
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	struct stack_info stack_info = {0};
> +	unsigned long visit_mask = 0;
> +	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
> +	unsigned long stack_left;
> +
> +	BUG_ON(get_stack_info(&sp, current, &stack_info, &visit_mask));
> +
> +	switch (stack_info.type) {
> +	case STACK_TYPE_TASK:
> +		stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
> +		break;
> +
> +	case STACK_TYPE_IRQ:
> +		stack_left = sp & (IRQ_STACK_SIZE - 1);
> +		break;
> +
> +	case STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION ... STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION_LAST:
> +		stack_left = sp & (EXCEPTION_STKSZ - 1);
> +		break;
> +
> +	case STACK_TYPE_SOFTIRQ:
> +	default:
> +		BUG();
> +	}
> +
> +	BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca);
> +#endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
> index c6d6dc5..26f7301 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
> @@ -136,6 +136,11 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
>  	p->thread.sp0 = (unsigned long) (childregs+1);
>  	memset(p->thread.ptrace_bps, 0, sizeof(p->thread.ptrace_bps));
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +	p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) +
> +						2 * sizeof(unsigned long);
> +#endif
> +
>  	if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
>  		/* kernel thread */
>  		memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> index c3169be..8cdee97 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> @@ -167,6 +167,11 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
>  	p->thread.sp = (unsigned long) fork_frame;
>  	p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = NULL;
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +	p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) +
> +						2 * sizeof(unsigned long);
> +#endif
> +

Do you know why this initialization value was chosen? In clear_kstack,
this gets reset to sp0. It seems like this forces a clear of the entire
stack on the first call of clear_kstack?

>  	savesegment(gs, p->thread.gsindex);
>  	p->thread.gsbase = p->thread.gsindex ? 0 : me->thread.gsbase;
>  	savesegment(fs, p->thread.fsindex);
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index 62175cb..22ba66d 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1949,3 +1949,20 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat, int, fd,
>  				  argv, envp, flags);
>  }
>  #endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +void __used track_stack(void)
> +{
> +	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
> +

Mark Rutland pointed out in the review of my arm64 draft that
using current_stack_pointer() is cleaner.

> +	if (sp < current->thread.lowest_stack &&
> +	    sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
> +					2 * sizeof(unsigned long)) {
> +		current->thread.lowest_stack = sp;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (unlikely((sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) < (THREAD_SIZE / 16)))
> +		BUG();
> +}

All of the above checks have the x86-isms. Can this either be
cleaned up or made architecture specific?

> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(track_stack);
> +#endif
> diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
> index 219f82f..a97d334 100644
> --- a/include/linux/compiler.h
> +++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
> @@ -585,4 +585,8 @@ static __always_inline void __write_once_size(volatile void *p, void *res, int s
>  	(_________p1); \
>  })
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +# define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF
> +#endif
> +

Pulling out the poison to be common is certainly good, compiler.h doesn't seem
quite right though. I don't have a strong opinion if there are no other
objections or better ideas.

>  #endif /* __LINUX_COMPILER_H */
> diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
> index 2e0e2ea..aab824d 100644
> --- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
> +++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
> @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS
>    gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)	+= -DRANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
>    gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE)	+= -fplugin-arg-randomize_layout_plugin-performance-mode
>  
> +  gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)	+= stackleak_plugin.so
> +  gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)	+= -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-lowest-sp=100
> +

Might be useful to make the bytes limit a Kconfig
for tuning.

Thanks,
Laura
Alexander Popov - July 24, 2017, 12:15 p.m.
Hello Laura,

On 15.07.2017 00:44, Laura Abbott wrote:
> On 07/12/2017 11:17 AM, Alexander Popov wrote:
>> This is the third version of the patch introducing STACKLEAK to the
>> mainline kernel. STACKLEAK is a security feature developed by Grsecurity/PaX
>> (kudos to them again), which:
>>  - reduces the information that can be revealed by some kernel stack leak bugs
>>     (e.g. CVE-2016-4569 and CVE-2016-4578);
>>  - blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2010-2963);
>>  - introduces some runtime checks for kernel stack overflow detection.
>>
>> Changes in v3 (rebased on the recent rc)
>>
>> 1. Added the detailed comments describing the STACKLEAK gcc plugin.
>>    Read the plugin from bottom up, like you do for Linux kernel drivers.
>>    Additional information:
>>     - gcc internals documentation, which is available from gcc sources;
>>     - wonderful slides by Diego Novillo
>>        https://www.airs.com/dnovillo/200711-GCC-Internals/
>>     - nice introduction to gcc plugins at LWN
>>        https://lwn.net/Articles/457543/
>>
>> 2. Improved the commit message and Kconfig description according the
>>    feedback from Kees Cook. Also added the original notice describing
>>    the performance impact of the STACKLEAK feature.
>>
>> 3. Removed arch-specific ix86_cmodel check from stackleak_track_stack_gate().
>>    It caused skipping the kernel code instrumentation for i386.
>>
>> 4. Fixed a minor mistake in stackleak_tree_instrument_execute().
>>    First versions of the plugin used ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(cfun)->next_bb
>>    to get the basic block with the function prologue. That was not correct
>>    since the control flow graph edge from the ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR doesn't always
>>    go to that basic block.
>>
>>    So later it was changed it to single_succ(ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(cfun)),
>>    but not completely. next_bb was still used for entry_bb assignment,
>>    which could cause the wrong value of the prologue_instrumented variable.
>>
>>    I've reported this issue to Grsecurity and proposed the fix for it, but
>>    unfortunately didn't get any reply.
>>
>> 5. Introduced the STACKLEAK_POISON macro and renamed the config option
>>    according the feedback from Kees Cook.
>>
>> More things to be done:
>>  - carefully look into the assertions in track_stack() and check_alloca();
>>  - find answers to the questions marked with TODO in the comments;
>>  - think of erasing the kernel stack after invoking EFI runtime services;
>>  - update self-protection.rst.
>>
>> Parallel work (thanks for that!):
>>  - Tycho Andersen is developing tests for STACKLEAK;
>>  - Laura Abbott is working on porting STACKLEAK to arm64.
>>
>> -- >8 --

[...]

>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> +	p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) +
>> +						2 * sizeof(unsigned long);
>> +#endif
>> +
> 
> Do you know why this initialization value was chosen? In clear_kstack,
> this gets reset to sp0. It seems like this forces a clear of the entire
> stack on the first call of clear_kstack?

Do you mean erase_kstack()?

The first erase_kstack() call will clear almost whole stack anyway. But
initializing lowest_stack with that value helps to skip first useless searching
for STACKLEAK_POISON.

>>  	savesegment(gs, p->thread.gsindex);
>>  	p->thread.gsbase = p->thread.gsindex ? 0 : me->thread.gsbase;
>>  	savesegment(fs, p->thread.fsindex);
>> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
>> index 62175cb..22ba66d 100644
>> --- a/fs/exec.c
>> +++ b/fs/exec.c
>> @@ -1949,3 +1949,20 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat, int, fd,
>>  				  argv, envp, flags);
>>  }
>>  #endif
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> +void __used track_stack(void)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
>> +
> 
> Mark Rutland pointed out in the review of my arm64 draft that
> using current_stack_pointer() is cleaner.

Ok.

>> +	if (sp < current->thread.lowest_stack &&
>> +	    sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
>> +					2 * sizeof(unsigned long)) {
>> +		current->thread.lowest_stack = sp;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (unlikely((sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) < (THREAD_SIZE / 16)))
>> +		BUG();
>> +}
> 
> All of the above checks have the x86-isms. Can this either be
> cleaned up or made architecture specific?

Excuse me, I didn't understand what you mean. I can describe these checks a bit.

The conditions on setting lowest_stack are caused by the fact that x86 has some
specialized stacks associated with each CPU in addition to the per thread stacks
(see Documentation/x86/kernel-stacks for more info).

As I understand, the following assertion detects stack exhaustion. It's
important, although I don't like how it looks: it is checked for different
kernel stacks (which have different size), but involves THREAD_SIZE macro.

>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(track_stack);
>> +#endif
>> diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
>> index 219f82f..a97d334 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/compiler.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
>> @@ -585,4 +585,8 @@ static __always_inline void __write_once_size(volatile void *p, void *res, int s
>>  	(_________p1); \
>>  })
>>  
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> +# define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF
>> +#endif
>> +
> 
> Pulling out the poison to be common is certainly good, compiler.h doesn't seem
> quite right though. I don't have a strong opinion if there are no other
> objections or better ideas.

Ok.

>>  #endif /* __LINUX_COMPILER_H */
>> diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
>> index 2e0e2ea..aab824d 100644
>> --- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
>> +++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
>> @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS
>>    gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)	+= -DRANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
>>    gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE)	+= -fplugin-arg-randomize_layout_plugin-performance-mode
>>  
>> +  gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)	+= stackleak_plugin.so
>> +  gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)	+= -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-lowest-sp=100
>> +
> 
> Might be useful to make the bytes limit a Kconfig
> for tuning.

Nice idea, thanks! Added to TODO for the next version.

Best regards,
Alexander
Tycho Andersen - Aug. 15, 2017, 3:38 a.m.
On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 09:17:51PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> +void __used track_stack(void)
> +{
> +	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
> +
> +	if (sp < current->thread.lowest_stack &&
> +	    sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
> +					2 * sizeof(unsigned long)) {
> +		current->thread.lowest_stack = sp;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (unlikely((sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) < (THREAD_SIZE / 16)))

I think this check is wrong, the lhs should be
(sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1)). Otherwise, we just check that the upper bits
of the stack are < THREAD_SIZE / 16, which they never will be.

Tycho
Alexander Popov - Aug. 16, 2017, 8:47 p.m.
Hello Tycho,

On 15.08.2017 06:38, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 09:17:51PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> +void __used track_stack(void)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
>> +
>> +	if (sp < current->thread.lowest_stack &&
>> +	    sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
>> +					2 * sizeof(unsigned long)) {
>> +		current->thread.lowest_stack = sp;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (unlikely((sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) < (THREAD_SIZE / 16)))
> 
> I think this check is wrong, the lhs should be
> (sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1)). Otherwise, we just check that the upper bits
> of the stack are < THREAD_SIZE / 16, which they never will be.

Thank you, I think you are right!

I can additionally notice that this erroneous check is not a part of PaX patch,
it is introduced by Grsecurity patch.

Thanks again, I'll fix and annotate it in the next version of the patch.

Did you manage to create a test for the correct check which hits the BUG()?

Best regards,
Alexander

Patch

diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index cae0958..0c9a0f5 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -361,6 +361,13 @@  config SECCOMP_FILTER
 
 	  See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details.
 
+config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this if it has the code which
+	  fills the used part of the kernel stack with the STACKLEAK_POISON
+	  value before returning from system calls.
+
 config HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
 	bool
 	help
@@ -482,6 +489,26 @@  config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
 	  in structures.  This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
 	  at the cost of weakened randomization.
 
+config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	bool "Erase the kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
+	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
+	help
+	  This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before it
+	  returns from a system call. That reduces the information which
+	  a kernel stack leak bug can reveal and blocks some uninitialized
+	  stack variable attacks. This option also provides runtime checks
+	  for kernel stack overflow detection.
+
+	  The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
+	  compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary
+	  and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload
+	  before deploying it.
+
+	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
+	   * https://grsecurity.net/
+	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
+
 config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	bool
 	help
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 94a1868..1359e01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@  config X86
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS	if MMU && COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES	if MMU && COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index cdefcfd..5e9cd0a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@  __visible inline void enter_from_user_mode(void)
 static inline void enter_from_user_mode(void) {}
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void);
+#else
+static void erase_kstack(void) {}
+#endif
+
 static void do_audit_syscall_entry(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -80,8 +86,10 @@  static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		emulated = true;
 
 	if ((emulated || (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) &&
-	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+		erase_kstack();
 		return -1L;
+	}
 
 	if (emulated)
 		return -1L;
@@ -115,9 +123,11 @@  static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 			sd.args[5] = regs->bp;
 		}
 
-		ret = __secure_computing(&sd);
-		if (ret == -1)
+		ret = secure_computing(&sd);
+		if (ret == -1) {
+			erase_kstack();
 			return ret;
+		}
 	}
 #endif
 
@@ -126,6 +136,7 @@  static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	do_audit_syscall_entry(regs, arch);
 
+	erase_kstack();
 	return ret ?: regs->orig_ax;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index 48ef7bb..f3d2666 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -75,6 +75,73 @@ 
 #endif
 .endm
 
+.macro erase_kstack
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	call erase_kstack
+#endif
+.endm
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+/*
+ * ebp: thread_info
+ */
+ENTRY(erase_kstack)
+	pushl	%edi
+	pushl	%ecx
+	pushl	%eax
+	pushl	%ebp
+
+	movl	PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %ebp
+	mov	TASK_lowest_stack(%ebp), %edi
+	mov	$STACKLEAK_POISON, %eax
+	std
+
+1:
+	mov	%edi, %ecx
+	and	$THREAD_SIZE_asm - 1, %ecx
+	shr	$2, %ecx
+	repne	scasl
+	jecxz	2f
+
+	cmp	$2*16, %ecx
+	jc	2f
+
+	mov	$2*16, %ecx
+	repe	scasl
+	jecxz	2f
+	jne	1b
+
+2:
+	cld
+	or	$2*4, %edi
+	mov	%esp, %ecx
+	sub	%edi, %ecx
+
+	cmp	$THREAD_SIZE_asm, %ecx
+	jb	3f
+	ud2
+
+3:
+	shr	$2, %ecx
+	rep	stosl
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: sp0 on x86_32 is not reliable, right?
+	 * Doubt because of the definition of cpu_current_top_of_stack
+	 * in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c.
+	 */
+	mov	TASK_thread_sp0(%ebp), %edi
+	sub	$128, %edi
+	mov	%edi, TASK_lowest_stack(%ebp)
+
+	popl	%ebp
+	popl	%eax
+	popl	%ecx
+	popl	%edi
+	ret
+ENDPROC(erase_kstack)
+#endif
+
 /*
  * User gs save/restore
  *
@@ -445,6 +512,8 @@  ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_32)
 	ALTERNATIVE "testl %eax, %eax; jz .Lsyscall_32_done", \
 		    "jmp .Lsyscall_32_done", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
 
+	erase_kstack
+
 /* Opportunistic SYSEXIT */
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON			/* User mode traces as IRQs on. */
 	movl	PT_EIP(%esp), %edx	/* pt_regs->ip */
@@ -531,6 +600,8 @@  ENTRY(entry_INT80_32)
 	call	do_int80_syscall_32
 .Lsyscall_32_done:
 
+	erase_kstack
+
 restore_all:
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRET
 .Lrestore_all_notrace:
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index a9a8027..c106925 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -57,6 +57,94 @@  ENDPROC(native_usergs_sysret64)
 #endif
 .endm
 
+.macro erase_kstack
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	call erase_kstack
+#endif
+.endm
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+ENTRY(erase_kstack)
+	pushq	%rdi
+	pushq	%rcx
+	pushq	%rax
+	pushq	%r11
+
+	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %r11
+	mov	TASK_lowest_stack(%r11), %rdi
+	mov	$STACKLEAK_POISON, %rax
+	std
+
+1:
+	/*
+	 * Let's search for the poison value in the stack.
+	 * Start from the lowest_stack and go to the bottom (see std above).
+	 */
+	mov	%edi, %ecx
+	and	$THREAD_SIZE_asm - 1, %ecx
+	shr	$3, %ecx
+	repne	scasq
+	jecxz	2f	/* Didn't find it. Go to poisoning. */
+
+	/*
+	 * Found the poison value in the stack. Go to poisoning if there are
+	 * less than 16 qwords left.
+	 */
+	cmp	$2*8, %ecx
+	jc	2f
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that 16 further qwords contain poison (avoid false positives).
+	 * If so, the part of the stack below the address in %rdi is likely
+	 * to be poisoned. Otherwise we need to search deeper.
+	 */
+	mov	$2*8, %ecx
+	repe	scasq
+	jecxz	2f	/* Poison the upper part of the stack. */
+	jne	1b	/* Search deeper. */
+
+2:
+	/*
+	 * Prepare the counter for poisoning the kernel stack between
+	 * %rdi and %rsp.
+	 *
+	 * TODO: Sorry, don't understand why the following OR instruction is
+	 * needed. That may be connected to the thread.lowest_stack
+	 * initialization in arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c, where it is set
+	 * to the task_stack_page address + 2 * sizeof(unsigned long).
+	 */
+	cld
+	or	$2*8, %rdi
+	mov	%esp, %ecx
+	sub	%edi, %ecx
+
+	/* Check that the counter value is sane. */
+	cmp	$THREAD_SIZE_asm, %rcx
+	jb	3f
+	ud2
+
+3:
+	/*
+	 * So let's write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from the
+	 * address in %rdi and move up (see cld above) to the address in %rsp
+	 * (not included, used memory).
+	 */
+	shr	$3, %ecx
+	rep	stosq
+
+	/* Set the lowest_stack value to the top_of_stack - 256. */
+	mov	TASK_thread_sp0(%r11), %rdi
+	sub	$256, %rdi
+	mov	%rdi, TASK_lowest_stack(%r11)
+
+	popq	%r11
+	popq	%rax
+	popq	%rcx
+	popq	%rdi
+	ret
+ENDPROC(erase_kstack)
+#endif
+
 /*
  * When dynamic function tracer is enabled it will add a breakpoint
  * to all locations that it is about to modify, sync CPUs, update
@@ -217,6 +305,8 @@  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
 	testl	$_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11)
 	jnz	1f
 
+	erase_kstack
+
 	LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON		/* user mode is traced as IRQs on */
 	movq	RIP(%rsp), %rcx
@@ -245,6 +335,8 @@  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path:
 	call	do_syscall_64		/* returns with IRQs disabled */
 
 return_from_SYSCALL_64:
+	erase_kstack
+
 	RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ		/* we're about to change IF */
 
@@ -415,6 +507,7 @@  ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
 2:
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
 	call	syscall_return_slowpath	/* returns with IRQs disabled */
+	erase_kstack
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON			/* user mode is traced as IRQS on */
 	SWAPGS
 	jmp	restore_regs_and_iret
@@ -527,6 +620,12 @@  ret_from_intr:
 GLOBAL(retint_user)
 	mov	%rsp,%rdi
 	call	prepare_exit_to_usermode
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: Do we need to call erase_kstack here?
+	 * The PaX patch has it here commented out.
+	 */
+
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
 	SWAPGS
 	jmp	restore_regs_and_iret
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index e1721da..05a75a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -18,6 +18,12 @@ 
 
 	.section .entry.text, "ax"
 
+	.macro erase_kstack
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	call erase_kstack
+#endif
+	.endm
+
 /*
  * 32-bit SYSENTER entry.
  *
@@ -229,6 +235,7 @@  ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
 
 	/* Opportunistic SYSRET */
 sysret32_from_system_call:
+	erase_kstack
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON			/* User mode traces as IRQs on. */
 	movq	RBX(%rsp), %rbx		/* pt_regs->rbx */
 	movq	RBP(%rsp), %rbp		/* pt_regs->rbp */
@@ -337,6 +344,7 @@  ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
 .Lsyscall_32_done:
 
 	/* Go back to user mode. */
+	erase_kstack
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON
 	SWAPGS
 	jmp	restore_regs_and_iret
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 6a79547..f67417d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -470,6 +470,10 @@  struct thread_struct {
 
 	mm_segment_t		addr_limit;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	unsigned long		lowest_stack;
+#endif
+
 	unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
 	unsigned int		uaccess_err:1;	/* uaccess failed */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index de827d6..4ed7451 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@  void common(void) {
 	BLANK();
 	OFFSET(TASK_TI_flags, task_struct, thread_info.flags);
 	OFFSET(TASK_addr_limit, task_struct, thread.addr_limit);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	OFFSET(TASK_lowest_stack, task_struct, thread.lowest_stack);
+	OFFSET(TASK_thread_sp0, task_struct, thread.sp0);
+#endif
 
 	BLANK();
 	OFFSET(crypto_tfm_ctx_offset, crypto_tfm, __crt_ctx);
@@ -73,6 +77,11 @@  void common(void) {
 	OFFSET(PV_MMU_read_cr2, pv_mmu_ops, read_cr2);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	BLANK();
+	DEFINE(THREAD_SIZE_asm, THREAD_SIZE);
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN
 	BLANK();
 	OFFSET(XEN_vcpu_info_mask, vcpu_info, evtchn_upcall_mask);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c
index e5f0b40..2eaa810 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_32.c
@@ -162,3 +162,15 @@  void show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	}
 	pr_cont("\n");
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp, stack_left;
+
+	/* all kernel stacks are of the same size */
+	stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
+	BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca);
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
index 3e1471d..dc1bb0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
@@ -178,3 +178,36 @@  void show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	}
 	pr_cont("\n");
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size)
+{
+	struct stack_info stack_info = {0};
+	unsigned long visit_mask = 0;
+	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
+	unsigned long stack_left;
+
+	BUG_ON(get_stack_info(&sp, current, &stack_info, &visit_mask));
+
+	switch (stack_info.type) {
+	case STACK_TYPE_TASK:
+		stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
+		break;
+
+	case STACK_TYPE_IRQ:
+		stack_left = sp & (IRQ_STACK_SIZE - 1);
+		break;
+
+	case STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION ... STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION_LAST:
+		stack_left = sp & (EXCEPTION_STKSZ - 1);
+		break;
+
+	case STACK_TYPE_SOFTIRQ:
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+	BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca);
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
index c6d6dc5..26f7301 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
@@ -136,6 +136,11 @@  int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
 	p->thread.sp0 = (unsigned long) (childregs+1);
 	memset(p->thread.ptrace_bps, 0, sizeof(p->thread.ptrace_bps));
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) +
+						2 * sizeof(unsigned long);
+#endif
+
 	if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
 		/* kernel thread */
 		memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index c3169be..8cdee97 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -167,6 +167,11 @@  int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
 	p->thread.sp = (unsigned long) fork_frame;
 	p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = NULL;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) +
+						2 * sizeof(unsigned long);
+#endif
+
 	savesegment(gs, p->thread.gsindex);
 	p->thread.gsbase = p->thread.gsindex ? 0 : me->thread.gsbase;
 	savesegment(fs, p->thread.fsindex);
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 62175cb..22ba66d 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1949,3 +1949,20 @@  COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat, int, fd,
 				  argv, envp, flags);
 }
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+void __used track_stack(void)
+{
+	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
+
+	if (sp < current->thread.lowest_stack &&
+	    sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
+					2 * sizeof(unsigned long)) {
+		current->thread.lowest_stack = sp;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely((sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) < (THREAD_SIZE / 16)))
+		BUG();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(track_stack);
+#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index 219f82f..a97d334 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -585,4 +585,8 @@  static __always_inline void __write_once_size(volatile void *p, void *res, int s
 	(_________p1); \
 })
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+# define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __LINUX_COMPILER_H */
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
index 2e0e2ea..aab824d 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@  ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS
   gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)	+= -DRANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
   gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE)	+= -fplugin-arg-randomize_layout_plugin-performance-mode
 
+  gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)	+= stackleak_plugin.so
+  gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)	+= -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-lowest-sp=100
+
   GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y))
 
   export PLUGINCC GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS GCC_PLUGIN GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..715a3b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@ 
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2017 by the PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
+ * Licensed under the GPL v2
+ *
+ * Note: the choice of the license means that the compilation process is
+ *       NOT 'eligible' as defined by gcc's library exception to the GPL v3,
+ *       but for the kernel it doesn't matter since it doesn't link against
+ *       any of the gcc libraries
+ *
+ * This gcc plugin is needed for tracking the lowest border of the kernel stack
+ * and checking that alloca calls don't cause stack overflow. It instruments
+ * the kernel code inserting:
+ *  - the check_alloca() call before alloca and track_stack() call after it;
+ *  - the track_stack() call for the functions with a stack frame size over
+ *     a specified limit.
+ *
+ * This plugin is ported from grsecurity/PaX. For more information see:
+ *   https://grsecurity.net/
+ *   https://pax.grsecurity.net/
+ *
+ * Debugging:
+ *  - use fprintf() to stderr, debug_generic_expr(), debug_gimple_stmt()
+ *     and print_rtl();
+ *  - add "-fdump-tree-all -fdump-rtl-all" to the plugin CFLAGS in
+ *     Makefile.gcc-plugins to see the verbose dumps of the gcc passes;
+ *  - use gcc -E to understand the preprocessing shenanigans;
+ *  - use gcc with enabled CFG/GIMPLE/SSA verification (--enable-checking).
+ */
+
+#include "gcc-common.h"
+
+__visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible;
+
+static int track_frame_size = -1;
+static const char track_function[] = "track_stack";
+static const char check_function[] = "check_alloca";
+
+// Mark these global variables (roots) for gcc garbage collector since
+// they point to the garbage-collected memory.
+static GTY(()) tree track_function_decl;
+static GTY(()) tree check_function_decl;
+
+static struct plugin_info stackleak_plugin_info = {
+	.version	= "201707101337",
+	.help		= "track-lowest-sp=nn\ttrack sp in functions whose stack frame size is at least nn bytes\n"
+};
+
+static void stackleak_check_alloca(gimple_stmt_iterator *gsi)
+{
+	gimple stmt;
+	gcall *check_alloca;
+	tree alloca_size;
+	cgraph_node_ptr node;
+	int frequency;
+	basic_block bb;
+
+	// insert call to void check_alloca(unsigned long size)
+	alloca_size = gimple_call_arg(gsi_stmt(*gsi), 0);
+	stmt = gimple_build_call(check_function_decl, 1, alloca_size);
+	check_alloca = as_a_gcall(stmt);
+	gsi_insert_before(gsi, check_alloca, GSI_SAME_STMT);
+
+	// update the cgraph
+	bb = gimple_bb(check_alloca);
+	node = cgraph_get_create_node(check_function_decl);
+	gcc_assert(node);
+	frequency = compute_call_stmt_bb_frequency(current_function_decl, bb);
+	cgraph_create_edge(cgraph_get_node(current_function_decl), node, check_alloca, bb->count, frequency, bb->loop_depth);
+}
+
+static void stackleak_add_instrumentation(gimple_stmt_iterator *gsi, bool after)
+{
+	gimple stmt;
+	gcall *track_stack;
+	cgraph_node_ptr node;
+	int frequency;
+	basic_block bb;
+
+	// insert call to void track_stack(void)
+	stmt = gimple_build_call(track_function_decl, 0);
+	track_stack = as_a_gcall(stmt);
+	if (after)
+		gsi_insert_after(gsi, track_stack, GSI_CONTINUE_LINKING);
+	else
+		gsi_insert_before(gsi, track_stack, GSI_SAME_STMT);
+
+	// update the cgraph
+	bb = gimple_bb(track_stack);
+	node = cgraph_get_create_node(track_function_decl);
+	gcc_assert(node);
+	frequency = compute_call_stmt_bb_frequency(current_function_decl, bb);
+	cgraph_create_edge(cgraph_get_node(current_function_decl), node, track_stack, bb->count, frequency, bb->loop_depth);
+}
+
+static bool is_alloca(gimple stmt)
+{
+	if (gimple_call_builtin_p(stmt, BUILT_IN_ALLOCA))
+		return true;
+
+#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 4007
+	if (gimple_call_builtin_p(stmt, BUILT_IN_ALLOCA_WITH_ALIGN))
+		return true;
+#endif
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+// Work with the GIMPLE representation of the code.
+// Insert the check_alloca() call before alloca and track_stack() call after
+// it. Also insert track_stack() call into the beginning of the function
+// if it is not instrumented.
+static unsigned int stackleak_tree_instrument_execute(void)
+{
+	basic_block bb, entry_bb;
+	bool prologue_instrumented = false, is_leaf = true;
+
+	// ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR is a basic block which represents possible entry
+	// point of a function. This block does not contain any code and
+	// has a CFG edge to its successor.
+	gcc_assert(single_succ_p(ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(cfun)));
+	entry_bb = single_succ(ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(cfun));
+
+	// 1. Loop through the GIMPLE statements in each of cfun basic blocks.
+	// cfun is a global variable which represents the function that is
+	// currently processed.
+	FOR_EACH_BB_FN(bb, cfun) {
+		gimple_stmt_iterator gsi;
+
+		for (gsi = gsi_start_bb(bb); !gsi_end_p(gsi); gsi_next(&gsi)) {
+			gimple stmt;
+
+			stmt = gsi_stmt(gsi);
+
+			// Leaf function is a function which makes no calls
+			if (is_gimple_call(stmt))
+				is_leaf = false;
+
+			// gimple match: align 8 built-in BUILT_IN_NORMAL:BUILT_IN_ALLOCA attributes <tree_list 0xb7576450>
+			if (!is_alloca(stmt))
+				continue;
+
+			// 2. insert stack overflow check before each alloca call
+			stackleak_check_alloca(&gsi);
+
+			// 3. insert track_stack() call after each alloca call
+			stackleak_add_instrumentation(&gsi, true);
+			if (bb == entry_bb)
+				prologue_instrumented = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	// special cases for some Linux code: taking the address of static inline functions will materialize them
+	// but we mustn't instrument some of them as the resulting stack alignment required by the function call ABI
+	// will break other assumptions regarding the expected (but not otherwise enforced) register clobbering ABI.
+	// case in point: native_save_fl on amd64 when optimized for size clobbers rdx if it were instrumented here.
+	//
+	// TODO: any more special cases?
+	if (is_leaf && !TREE_PUBLIC(current_function_decl) && DECL_DECLARED_INLINE_P(current_function_decl))
+		return 0;
+	if (is_leaf && !strncmp(IDENTIFIER_POINTER(DECL_NAME(current_function_decl)), "_paravirt_", 10))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!prologue_instrumented) {
+		// 4. insert track_stack() call at the beginning of the function
+		gimple_stmt_iterator gsi;
+
+		bb = entry_bb;
+		if (!single_pred_p(bb)) {
+//			gcc_assert(bb_loop_depth(bb) || (bb->flags & BB_IRREDUCIBLE_LOOP));
+			split_edge(single_succ_edge(ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(cfun)));
+			gcc_assert(single_succ_p(ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(cfun)));
+			bb = single_succ(ENTRY_BLOCK_PTR_FOR_FN(cfun));
+		}
+		gsi = gsi_after_labels(bb);
+		stackleak_add_instrumentation(&gsi, false);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+// Work with the RTL representation of the code.
+// Remove the unneeded track_stack() calls from the functions which
+// don't call alloca and have the stack frame size below the limit.
+static unsigned int stackleak_final_execute(void)
+{
+	rtx_insn *insn, *next;
+
+	if (cfun->calls_alloca)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (get_frame_size() >= track_frame_size)
+		return 0;
+
+	// 1. Find track_stack() calls. Loop through the chain of insns,
+	// which is an RTL representation of the code for a function.
+	for (insn = get_insns(); insn; insn = next) {
+		// rtl match: (call_insn 8 7 9 3 (call (mem (symbol_ref ("track_stack") [flags 0x41] <function_decl 0xb7470e80 track_stack>) [0 S1 A8]) (4)) -1 (nil) (nil))
+		rtx body;
+
+		next = NEXT_INSN(insn);
+
+		// Check the expression code of the insn.
+		if (!CALL_P(insn))
+			continue;
+
+		// Check the expression code of the insn body, which is an RTL
+		// Expression (RTX) describing the side effect performed by
+		// that insn.
+		body = PATTERN(insn);
+		if (GET_CODE(body) != CALL)
+			continue;
+
+		// Check the first operand of the call expression. It should
+		// be a mem RTX describing the needed subroutine with a
+		// symbol_ref RTX.
+		body = XEXP(body, 0);
+		if (GET_CODE(body) != MEM)
+			continue;
+
+		body = XEXP(body, 0);
+		if (GET_CODE(body) != SYMBOL_REF)
+			continue;
+
+		if (SYMBOL_REF_DECL(body) != track_function_decl)
+			continue;
+
+		// 2. delete call
+		delete_insn_and_edges(insn);
+#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 4007
+		if (GET_CODE(next) == NOTE && NOTE_KIND(next) == NOTE_INSN_CALL_ARG_LOCATION) {
+			insn = next;
+			next = NEXT_INSN(insn);
+			delete_insn_and_edges(insn);
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+	// Uncomment the following to see the code which was cleaned.
+	// It should not contain check_alloca() and track_stack() calls.
+	// The stack frame size should be less than track_frame_size.
+	//
+	// warning(0, "cleaned from check_alloca and track_stack calls, stack frame size: %ld", get_frame_size());
+	// print_simple_rtl(stderr, get_insns());
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool stackleak_track_stack_gate(void)
+{
+	tree section;
+
+	section = lookup_attribute("section", DECL_ATTRIBUTES(current_function_decl));
+	if (section && TREE_VALUE(section)) {
+		section = TREE_VALUE(TREE_VALUE(section));
+
+		if (!strncmp(TREE_STRING_POINTER(section), ".init.text", 10))
+			return false;
+		if (!strncmp(TREE_STRING_POINTER(section), ".devinit.text", 13))
+			return false;
+		if (!strncmp(TREE_STRING_POINTER(section), ".cpuinit.text", 13))
+			return false;
+		if (!strncmp(TREE_STRING_POINTER(section), ".meminit.text", 13))
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	return track_frame_size >= 0;
+}
+
+// Build function declarations for track_stack() and check_alloca()
+static void stackleak_start_unit(void *gcc_data __unused, void *user_data __unused)
+{
+	tree fntype;
+
+	// void track_stack(void)
+	fntype = build_function_type_list(void_type_node, NULL_TREE);
+	track_function_decl = build_fn_decl(track_function, fntype);
+	DECL_ASSEMBLER_NAME(track_function_decl); // for LTO
+	TREE_PUBLIC(track_function_decl) = 1;
+	TREE_USED(track_function_decl) = 1;
+	DECL_EXTERNAL(track_function_decl) = 1;
+	DECL_ARTIFICIAL(track_function_decl) = 1;
+	DECL_PRESERVE_P(track_function_decl) = 1;
+
+	// void check_alloca(unsigned long)
+	fntype = build_function_type_list(void_type_node, long_unsigned_type_node, NULL_TREE);
+	check_function_decl = build_fn_decl(check_function, fntype);
+	DECL_ASSEMBLER_NAME(check_function_decl); // for LTO
+	TREE_PUBLIC(check_function_decl) = 1;
+	TREE_USED(check_function_decl) = 1;
+	DECL_EXTERNAL(check_function_decl) = 1;
+	DECL_ARTIFICIAL(check_function_decl) = 1;
+	DECL_PRESERVE_P(check_function_decl) = 1;
+}
+
+// Pass gate function is a predicate function that gets executed before the
+// corresponding pass. If the return value is 'true' the pass gets executed,
+// otherwise, it is skipped.
+static bool stackleak_tree_instrument_gate(void)
+{
+	return stackleak_track_stack_gate();
+}
+
+#define PASS_NAME stackleak_tree_instrument
+#define PROPERTIES_REQUIRED PROP_gimple_leh | PROP_cfg
+#define TODO_FLAGS_START TODO_verify_ssa | TODO_verify_flow | TODO_verify_stmts
+#define TODO_FLAGS_FINISH TODO_verify_ssa | TODO_verify_stmts | TODO_dump_func | TODO_update_ssa | TODO_rebuild_cgraph_edges
+#include "gcc-generate-gimple-pass.h"
+
+static bool stackleak_final_gate(void)
+{
+	return stackleak_track_stack_gate();
+}
+
+#define PASS_NAME stackleak_final
+#define TODO_FLAGS_FINISH TODO_dump_func
+#include "gcc-generate-rtl-pass.h"
+
+// Every gcc plugin exports a plugin_init() function that is called right
+// after the plugin is loaded. This function is responsible for registering
+// the plugin callbacks and doing other required initialization.
+__visible int plugin_init(struct plugin_name_args *plugin_info, struct plugin_gcc_version *version)
+{
+	const char * const plugin_name = plugin_info->base_name;
+	const int argc = plugin_info->argc;
+	const struct plugin_argument * const argv = plugin_info->argv;
+	int i;
+
+	// Extra GGC root tables describing our GTY-ed data.
+	static const struct ggc_root_tab gt_ggc_r_gt_stackleak[] = {
+		{
+			.base = &track_function_decl,
+			.nelt = 1,
+			.stride = sizeof(track_function_decl),
+			.cb = &gt_ggc_mx_tree_node,
+			.pchw = &gt_pch_nx_tree_node
+		},
+		{
+			.base = &check_function_decl,
+			.nelt = 1,
+			.stride = sizeof(check_function_decl),
+			.cb = &gt_ggc_mx_tree_node,
+			.pchw = &gt_pch_nx_tree_node
+		},
+		LAST_GGC_ROOT_TAB
+	};
+
+	// The stackleak_tree_instrument pass should be executed before the
+	// "optimized" pass, which is the control flow graph cleanup that is
+	// performed just before expanding gcc trees to the RTL. In former
+	// versions of the plugin this new pass was inserted before the
+	// "tree_profile" pass, which is currently called "profile".
+	PASS_INFO(stackleak_tree_instrument, "optimized", 1, PASS_POS_INSERT_BEFORE);
+
+	// The stackleak_final pass should be executed before the "final" pass,
+	// which turns the RTL (Register Transfer Language) into assembly.
+	PASS_INFO(stackleak_final, "final", 1, PASS_POS_INSERT_BEFORE);
+
+	if (!plugin_default_version_check(version, &gcc_version)) {
+		error(G_("incompatible gcc/plugin versions"));
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	// Give the information about the plugin
+	register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_INFO, NULL, &stackleak_plugin_info);
+
+	// Parse the plugin arguments
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; ++i) {
+		if (!strcmp(argv[i].key, "track-lowest-sp")) {
+			if (!argv[i].value) {
+				error(G_("no value supplied for option '-fplugin-arg-%s-%s'"), plugin_name, argv[i].key);
+				continue;
+			}
+			track_frame_size = atoi(argv[i].value);
+			if (argv[i].value[0] < '0' || argv[i].value[0] > '9' || track_frame_size < 0)
+				error(G_("invalid option argument '-fplugin-arg-%s-%s=%s'"), plugin_name, argv[i].key, argv[i].value);
+			continue;
+		}
+		error(G_("unknown option '-fplugin-arg-%s-%s'"), plugin_name, argv[i].key);
+	}
+
+	// Register to be called before processing a translation unit
+	register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_START_UNIT, &stackleak_start_unit, NULL);
+
+	// Register an extra GCC garbage collector (GGC) root table
+	register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_REGISTER_GGC_ROOTS, NULL, (void *)&gt_ggc_r_gt_stackleak);
+
+	// Hook into the Pass Manager to register new gcc passes.
+	//
+	// The stack frame size info is available only at the last RTL pass,
+	// when it's too late to insert complex code like a function call.
+	// So we register two gcc passes to instrument every function at first
+	// and remove the unneeded instrumentation later.
+	register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_PASS_MANAGER_SETUP, NULL, &stackleak_tree_instrument_pass_info);
+	register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_PASS_MANAGER_SETUP, NULL, &stackleak_final_pass_info);
+
+	return 0;
+}