@@ -2340,14 +2340,19 @@ int snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl(int clientid, unsigned int cmd, void *arg)
{
const struct ioctl_handler *handler;
struct snd_seq_client *client;
+ int err;
client = clientptr(clientid);
if (client == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
for (handler = ioctl_handlers; handler->cmd > 0; ++handler) {
- if (handler->cmd == cmd)
- return handler->func(client, arg);
+ if (handler->cmd == cmd) {
+ mutex_lock(&client->ioctl_mutex);
+ err = handler->func(client, arg);
+ mutex_unlock(&client->ioctl_mutex);
+ return err;
+ }
}
pr_debug("ALSA: seq unknown ioctl() 0x%x (type='%c', number=0x%02x)\n",
ALSA OSS sequencer calls the ioctl function indirectly via snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl(). While we already applied the protection against races between the normal ioctls and writes via the client's ioctl_mutex, this code path was left untouched. And this seems to be the cause of still remaining some rare UAF as spontaneously triggered by syzkaller. For the sake of robustness, wrap the ioctl_mutex also for the call via snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl(), too. Reported-by: syzbot+e4c8abb920efa77bace9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> --- sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)