| Message ID | 1481575740-1834-5-git-send-email-idryomov@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Mon, 12 Dec 2016, Ilya Dryomov wrote: > Starting with 4.9, kernel stacks may be vmalloced and therefore not > guaranteed to be physically contiguous; the new CONFIG_VMAP_STACK > option is enabled by default on x86. This makes it invalid to use > on-stack buffers with the crypto scatterlist API, as sg_set_buf() > expects a logical address and won't work with vmalloced addresses. > > There isn't a different (e.g. kvec-based) crypto API we could switch > net/ceph/crypto.c to and the current scatterlist.h API isn't getting > updated to accommodate this use case. Allocating a new header and > padding for each operation is a non-starter, so do the en/decryption > in-place on a single pre-assembled (header + data + padding) heap > buffer. This is explicitly supported by the crypto API: > > "... the caller may provide the same scatter/gather list for the > plaintext and cipher text. After the completion of the cipher > operation, the plaintext data is replaced with the ciphertext data > in case of an encryption and vice versa for a decryption." > > Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> > --- > net/ceph/crypto.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > net/ceph/crypto.h | 2 ++ > 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c > index db2847ac5f12..32099c5c4c75 100644 > --- a/net/ceph/crypto.c > +++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c > @@ -526,6 +526,93 @@ int ceph_encrypt2(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *dst, size_t *dst_len, > } > } > > +static int ceph_aes_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, > + void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len) > +{ > + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ceph_crypto_alloc_cipher(); > + SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm); > + struct sg_table sgt; > + struct scatterlist prealloc_sg; > + char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; > + int pad_byte = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (in_len & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)); nit: pad_bytes? > + int crypt_len = encrypt ? in_len + pad_byte : in_len; > + int ret; > + > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) > + return PTR_ERR(tfm); > + > + WARN_ON(crypt_len > buf_len); > + if (encrypt) > + memset(buf + in_len, pad_byte, pad_byte); > + ret = setup_sgtable(&sgt, &prealloc_sg, buf, crypt_len); > + if (ret) > + goto out_tfm; > + > + crypto_skcipher_setkey((void *)tfm, key->key, key->len); > + memcpy(iv, aes_iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); > + > + skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, tfm); > + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); > + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sgt.sgl, sgt.sgl, crypt_len, iv); > + > + /* > + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "key: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, > + key->key, key->len, 1); > + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, " in: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, > + buf, crypt_len, 1); > + */ > + if (encrypt) > + ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); > + else > + ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); > + skcipher_request_zero(req); > + if (ret) { > + pr_err("%s %scrypt failed: %d\n", __func__, > + encrypt ? "en" : "de", ret); > + goto out_sgt; > + } > + /* > + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "out: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, > + buf, crypt_len, 1); > + */ > + > + if (encrypt) { > + *pout_len = crypt_len; > + } else { > + pad_byte = *(char *)(buf + in_len - 1); > + if (pad_byte > 0 && pad_byte <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE && > + in_len >= pad_byte) { > + *pout_len = in_len - pad_byte; > + } else { > + pr_err("%s got bad padding %d on in_len %d\n", > + __func__, pad_byte, in_len); > + ret = -EPERM; > + goto out_sgt; > + } > + } > + > +out_sgt: > + teardown_sgtable(&sgt); > +out_tfm: > + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm); > + return ret; > +} > + > +int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, > + void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len) > +{ > + switch (key->type) { > + case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE: > + *pout_len = in_len; > + return 0; > + case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES: > + return ceph_aes_crypt(key, encrypt, buf, buf_len, in_len, > + pout_len); > + default: > + return -ENOTSUPP; > + } > +} > + > static int ceph_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) > { > struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey; > diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.h b/net/ceph/crypto.h > index 2e9cab09f37b..73da34e8c62e 100644 > --- a/net/ceph/crypto.h > +++ b/net/ceph/crypto.h > @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ int ceph_encrypt2(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, > void *dst, size_t *dst_len, > const void *src1, size_t src1_len, > const void *src2, size_t src2_len); > +int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, > + void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len); > int ceph_crypto_init(void); > void ceph_crypto_shutdown(void); > > -- > 2.4.3 > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe ceph-devel" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe ceph-devel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 10:11 PM, Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net> wrote: > On Mon, 12 Dec 2016, Ilya Dryomov wrote: >> Starting with 4.9, kernel stacks may be vmalloced and therefore not >> guaranteed to be physically contiguous; the new CONFIG_VMAP_STACK >> option is enabled by default on x86. This makes it invalid to use >> on-stack buffers with the crypto scatterlist API, as sg_set_buf() >> expects a logical address and won't work with vmalloced addresses. >> >> There isn't a different (e.g. kvec-based) crypto API we could switch >> net/ceph/crypto.c to and the current scatterlist.h API isn't getting >> updated to accommodate this use case. Allocating a new header and >> padding for each operation is a non-starter, so do the en/decryption >> in-place on a single pre-assembled (header + data + padding) heap >> buffer. This is explicitly supported by the crypto API: >> >> "... the caller may provide the same scatter/gather list for the >> plaintext and cipher text. After the completion of the cipher >> operation, the plaintext data is replaced with the ciphertext data >> in case of an encryption and vice versa for a decryption." >> >> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> >> --- >> net/ceph/crypto.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> net/ceph/crypto.h | 2 ++ >> 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c >> index db2847ac5f12..32099c5c4c75 100644 >> --- a/net/ceph/crypto.c >> +++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c >> @@ -526,6 +526,93 @@ int ceph_encrypt2(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *dst, size_t *dst_len, >> } >> } >> >> +static int ceph_aes_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, >> + void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len) >> +{ >> + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ceph_crypto_alloc_cipher(); >> + SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm); >> + struct sg_table sgt; >> + struct scatterlist prealloc_sg; >> + char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; >> + int pad_byte = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (in_len & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)); > > nit: pad_bytes? It's also used as a PKCS7 pad *byte* > >> + int crypt_len = encrypt ? in_len + pad_byte : in_len; >> + int ret; >> + >> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) >> + return PTR_ERR(tfm); >> + >> + WARN_ON(crypt_len > buf_len); >> + if (encrypt) >> + memset(buf + in_len, pad_byte, pad_byte); here, so I went with byte. Thanks, Ilya -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe ceph-devel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c index db2847ac5f12..32099c5c4c75 100644 --- a/net/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c @@ -526,6 +526,93 @@ int ceph_encrypt2(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *dst, size_t *dst_len, } } +static int ceph_aes_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, + void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ceph_crypto_alloc_cipher(); + SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm); + struct sg_table sgt; + struct scatterlist prealloc_sg; + char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int pad_byte = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (in_len & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)); + int crypt_len = encrypt ? in_len + pad_byte : in_len; + int ret; + + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + WARN_ON(crypt_len > buf_len); + if (encrypt) + memset(buf + in_len, pad_byte, pad_byte); + ret = setup_sgtable(&sgt, &prealloc_sg, buf, crypt_len); + if (ret) + goto out_tfm; + + crypto_skcipher_setkey((void *)tfm, key->key, key->len); + memcpy(iv, aes_iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, tfm); + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sgt.sgl, sgt.sgl, crypt_len, iv); + + /* + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "key: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, + key->key, key->len, 1); + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, " in: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, + buf, crypt_len, 1); + */ + if (encrypt) + ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + else + ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); + skcipher_request_zero(req); + if (ret) { + pr_err("%s %scrypt failed: %d\n", __func__, + encrypt ? "en" : "de", ret); + goto out_sgt; + } + /* + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "out: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, + buf, crypt_len, 1); + */ + + if (encrypt) { + *pout_len = crypt_len; + } else { + pad_byte = *(char *)(buf + in_len - 1); + if (pad_byte > 0 && pad_byte <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE && + in_len >= pad_byte) { + *pout_len = in_len - pad_byte; + } else { + pr_err("%s got bad padding %d on in_len %d\n", + __func__, pad_byte, in_len); + ret = -EPERM; + goto out_sgt; + } + } + +out_sgt: + teardown_sgtable(&sgt); +out_tfm: + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm); + return ret; +} + +int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, + void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len) +{ + switch (key->type) { + case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE: + *pout_len = in_len; + return 0; + case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES: + return ceph_aes_crypt(key, encrypt, buf, buf_len, in_len, + pout_len); + default: + return -ENOTSUPP; + } +} + static int ceph_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey; diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.h b/net/ceph/crypto.h index 2e9cab09f37b..73da34e8c62e 100644 --- a/net/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/net/ceph/crypto.h @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ int ceph_encrypt2(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *dst, size_t *dst_len, const void *src1, size_t src1_len, const void *src2, size_t src2_len); +int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt, + void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len); int ceph_crypto_init(void); void ceph_crypto_shutdown(void);
Starting with 4.9, kernel stacks may be vmalloced and therefore not guaranteed to be physically contiguous; the new CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option is enabled by default on x86. This makes it invalid to use on-stack buffers with the crypto scatterlist API, as sg_set_buf() expects a logical address and won't work with vmalloced addresses. There isn't a different (e.g. kvec-based) crypto API we could switch net/ceph/crypto.c to and the current scatterlist.h API isn't getting updated to accommodate this use case. Allocating a new header and padding for each operation is a non-starter, so do the en/decryption in-place on a single pre-assembled (header + data + padding) heap buffer. This is explicitly supported by the crypto API: "... the caller may provide the same scatter/gather list for the plaintext and cipher text. After the completion of the cipher operation, the plaintext data is replaced with the ciphertext data in case of an encryption and vice versa for a decryption." Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> --- net/ceph/crypto.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ceph/crypto.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+)