@@ -588,7 +588,8 @@ parsing_err:
}
static int open_cred_file(char *file_name,
- struct parsed_mount_info *parsed_info)
+ struct parsed_mount_info *parsed_info,
+ char **saved_username)
{
char *line_buf = NULL;
char *temp_val = NULL;
@@ -637,9 +638,11 @@ static int open_cred_file(char *file_name,
/* parse next token */
switch (parse_cred_line(line_buf + i, &temp_val)) {
case CRED_USER:
- i = parse_username(temp_val, parsed_info);
- if (i)
+ *saved_username = strdup(temp_val);
+ if (!*saved_username) {
+ i = EX_SYSERR;
goto return_i;
+ }
break;
case CRED_PASS:
i = set_password(parsed_info, temp_val);
@@ -827,6 +830,8 @@ parse_options(const char *data, struct parsed_mount_info *parsed_info)
char *ep;
struct passwd *pw;
struct group *gr;
+ char *saved_username = NULL;
+ bool krb5_auth = false;
/*
* max 32-bit uint in decimal is 4294967295 which is 10 chars wide
* +1 for NULL, and +1 for good measure
@@ -894,11 +899,10 @@ parse_options(const char *data, struct parsed_mount_info *parsed_info)
fprintf(stderr, "username too long\n");
return EX_USAGE;
}
- rc = parse_username(value, parsed_info);
- if (rc) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "problem parsing username\n");
- return rc;
+ saved_username = strdup(value);
+ if (!saved_username) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unable to allocate memory!\n");
+ return EX_SYSERR;
}
goto nocopy;
}
@@ -920,9 +924,12 @@ parse_options(const char *data, struct parsed_mount_info *parsed_info)
case OPT_SEC:
if (value) {
- if (!strncmp(value, "none", 4) ||
- !strncmp(value, "krb5", 4))
+ if (!strncmp(value, "none", 4)) {
+ parsed_info->got_password = 1;
+ } else if (!strncmp(value, "krb5", 4)) {
parsed_info->got_password = 1;
+ krb5_auth = true;
+ }
}
break;
@@ -978,7 +985,7 @@ parse_options(const char *data, struct parsed_mount_info *parsed_info)
"invalid credential file name specified\n");
return EX_USAGE;
}
- rc = open_cred_file(value, parsed_info);
+ rc = open_cred_file(value, parsed_info, &saved_username);
if (rc) {
fprintf(stderr,
"error %d (%s) opening credential file %s\n",
@@ -1197,6 +1204,22 @@ nocopy:
data = next_keyword;
}
+ if (saved_username) {
+ if (krb5_auth) {
+ strlcpy(parsed_info->username, saved_username,
+ sizeof(parsed_info->username));
+ parsed_info->got_user = 1;
+ } else {
+ rc = parse_username(saved_username, parsed_info);
+ free(saved_username);
+ if (rc) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unable to parse username!\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
/* special-case the uid and gid */
if (got_uid) {
word_len = snprintf(txtbuf, sizeof(txtbuf), "%u", uid);
This patch is intended as a temporary workaround for krb5 users that need to specify usernames with '/' in them. I intend to remove this hack from mount.cifs once the legacy username handling code is removed. The idea here is to save off the raw username string while we're parsing options. If the mount options specify "sec=krb5" or "sec=krb5i" then we'll not do the legacy username parsing and will instead just pass in the username string as-is. Obviously, this is a nasty hack and we don't really want to carry this in perpetuity, so this can go away once the "legacy" username parsing has gone away. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> --- mount.cifs.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)