From patchwork Tue Dec 31 22:35:14 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Pali_Roh=C3=A1r?= X-Patchwork-Id: 13924009 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 54D1C1B423F; Tue, 31 Dec 2024 22:35:52 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1735684552; cv=none; b=YFzFJ7Jf1ilYR15/mXYtIi44CzY9FAkw/AjFFGXoWr0KRhQcHk0WTEhhOAKMd8FHLmBCSzZ9Ieqgwv1tRRtkMfC+jqh/0204tHkH95nVussuyhzsx8jV5ntznDFytsx1F21PL18M79Qkc90SQ+UeB4LM6FMXUyXAN/8UsmdK5gA= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1735684552; c=relaxed/simple; bh=5FhqwMpNh+GxOZdVjCIrqXAW5O5GZC6ckTBgwbfr7cQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=Visbnz3414R07xcD//9U3fQXVyqokridGWuTrOMZF/X+955sA8PW0q03SIbLz8fhl1UhB2dwAwDZQFjTnfFqy85HERth9G7vANV1a5yCxfhisI1KnYLoC9ul6SxNTZWCszigU/phyRvCWs6ZKm3XZCm3warb0n3AFGJgrSBr2PE= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=V3QUSnri; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="V3QUSnri" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AC3DFC4CEDD; Tue, 31 Dec 2024 22:35:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1735684552; bh=5FhqwMpNh+GxOZdVjCIrqXAW5O5GZC6ckTBgwbfr7cQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=V3QUSnrioqsKnghsxySA5s/sCe3DPnLFpVqdiwmzF29unI7Mb8STDfnWREgBzxfZP pCxx5/Io4a58SQC8tjeC+E1hetIuCPVtd6KCs2JU/wMsu47qQ4c2ABVSMIR0AzuFc7 aro6vUuMD1B8zeP8+O6fU2xAFa9clj38knV4oMlZGFavS94npQmXOUDclR5p2skJBd V644n3L1Bln4qyEJG3O3aPDDTnhmdyS/dMuXcyluNCqzaPBojXlSfAmBAO0T33gagx M9PL+DvOoJ03t0cd9FrjbkB+JRavr4rhKh8PG3rMQGRWHDbzS7dRYMlZWN8kTaFc/q ytEJEvW9tvc0g== Received: by pali.im (Postfix) id 682F9D12; Tue, 31 Dec 2024 23:35:41 +0100 (CET) From: =?utf-8?q?Pali_Roh=C3=A1r?= To: Steve French , Paulo Alcantara Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 5/5] cifs: Improve detect_directory_symlink_target() function Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2024 23:35:14 +0100 Message-Id: <20241231223514.15595-5-pali@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 In-Reply-To: <20241231223514.15595-1-pali@kernel.org> References: <20241231223514.15595-1-pali@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Function detect_directory_symlink_target() is not curruntly able to detect if the target path is directory in case the path is in the DELETE_PENDING state or the user has not granted FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES permission on the path. This limitation is written in TODO comment. Resolve this problem by replacing code which determinate path type by the query_path_info() callback, which now is able to handle all these cases. Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár --- fs/smb/client/reparse.c | 75 ++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/reparse.c b/fs/smb/client/reparse.c index 69efbcae6683..ad53b9b4a238 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/reparse.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/reparse.c @@ -248,18 +248,16 @@ static int detect_directory_symlink_target(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, bool *directory) { char sep = CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb); - struct cifs_open_parms oparms; + struct cifs_open_info_data query_info; struct tcon_link *tlink; struct cifs_tcon *tcon; const char *basename; - struct cifs_fid fid; char *resolved_path; int full_path_len; int basename_len; int symname_len; char *path_sep; - __u32 oplock; - int open_rc; + int query_rc; /* * First do some simple check. If the original Linux symlink target ends @@ -282,7 +280,8 @@ static int detect_directory_symlink_target(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, if (symname[0] == '/') { cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: cannot determinate if the symlink target path '%s' " - "is directory or not, creating '%s' as file symlink\n", + "is directory or not because path is absolute, " + "creating '%s' as file symlink\n", __func__, symname, full_path); return 0; } @@ -320,58 +319,34 @@ static int detect_directory_symlink_target(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, if (sep == '\\') convert_delimiter(path_sep, sep); + /* + * Query resolved SMB symlink path and check if it is a directory or not. + * Callback query_path_info() already handles cases when the server does + * not grant FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES permission for object, or when server + * denies opening the object (e.g. because of DELETE_PENDING state). + */ tcon = tlink_tcon(tlink); - oparms = CIFS_OPARMS(cifs_sb, tcon, resolved_path, - FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES, FILE_OPEN, 0, ACL_NO_MODE); - oparms.fid = &fid; - - /* Try to open as a directory (NOT_FILE) */ - oplock = 0; - oparms.create_options = cifs_create_options(cifs_sb, - CREATE_NOT_FILE | OPEN_REPARSE_POINT); - open_rc = tcon->ses->server->ops->open(xid, &oparms, &oplock, NULL); - if (open_rc == 0) { - /* Successful open means that the target path is definitely a directory. */ - *directory = true; - tcon->ses->server->ops->close(xid, tcon, &fid); - } else if (open_rc == -ENOTDIR) { - /* -ENOTDIR means that the target path is definitely a file. */ - *directory = false; - } else if (open_rc == -ENOENT) { + query_rc = tcon->ses->server->ops->query_path_info(xid, tcon, cifs_sb, + resolved_path, &query_info); + if (query_rc == 0) { + /* Query on path was successful, so just check for directory attr. */ + *directory = le32_to_cpu(query_info.fi.Attributes) & ATTR_DIRECTORY; + } else if (query_rc == -ENOENT) { /* -ENOENT means that the target path does not exist. */ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: symlink target path '%s' does not exist, " "creating '%s' as file symlink\n", __func__, symname, full_path); } else { - /* Try to open as a file (NOT_DIR) */ - oplock = 0; - oparms.create_options = cifs_create_options(cifs_sb, - CREATE_NOT_DIR | OPEN_REPARSE_POINT); - open_rc = tcon->ses->server->ops->open(xid, &oparms, &oplock, NULL); - if (open_rc == 0) { - /* Successful open means that the target path is definitely a file. */ - *directory = false; - tcon->ses->server->ops->close(xid, tcon, &fid); - } else if (open_rc == -EISDIR) { - /* -EISDIR means that the target path is definitely a directory. */ - *directory = true; - } else { - /* - * This code branch is called when we do not have a permission to - * open the resolved_path or some other client/process denied - * opening the resolved_path. - * - * TODO: Try to use ops->query_dir_first on the parent directory - * of resolved_path, search for basename of resolved_path and - * check if the ATTR_DIRECTORY is set in fi.Attributes. In some - * case this could work also when opening of the path is denied. - */ - cifs_dbg(FYI, - "%s: cannot determinate if the symlink target path '%s' " - "is directory or not, creating '%s' as file symlink\n", - __func__, symname, full_path); - } + /* + * This code branch is called when we do not have a permission to + * query the resolved_path or some other error occurred during query. + */ + cifs_dbg(FYI, + "%s: cannot determinate if the symlink target path '%s' " + "is directory or not because query path failed (%d), " + "creating '%s' as file symlink\n", + __func__, symname, query_rc, full_path); } kfree(resolved_path);