Message ID | 20200629125400.13968-1-Quirin.Gylstorff@siemens.com (mailing list archive) |
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Headers | show
Return-Path: <SRS0=O5Z5=AK=lists.cip-project.org=bounce+64572+4858+4520428+8129116@kernel.org> Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E702C6C1 for <patchwork-cip-dev@patchwork.kernel.org>; Mon, 29 Jun 2020 12:54:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from web01.groups.io (web01.groups.io [66.175.222.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7FD3F23CD4 for <patchwork-cip-dev@patchwork.kernel.org>; Mon, 29 Jun 2020 12:54:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=lists.cip-project.org header.i=@lists.cip-project.org header.b="Ae+ew7v4" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 7FD3F23CD4 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=siemens.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=bounce+64572+4858+4520428+8129116@lists.cip-project.org X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id GB5tYY4521763xhtuT0FxB9O; Mon, 29 Jun 2020 05:54:05 -0700 X-Received: from thoth.sbs.de (thoth.sbs.de [192.35.17.2]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web11.17924.1593435243031914011 for <cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org>; Mon, 29 Jun 2020 05:54:03 -0700 X-Received: from mail2.sbs.de (mail2.sbs.de [192.129.41.66]) by thoth.sbs.de (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTPS id 05TCs1U0023549 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK) for <cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org>; Mon, 29 Jun 2020 14:54:01 +0200 X-Received: from md2dvrtc.ad001.siemens.net ([167.87.4.33]) by mail2.sbs.de (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 05TCs0cd027155; Mon, 29 Jun 2020 14:54:00 +0200 From: "Quirin Gylstorff" <quirin.gylstorff@siemens.com> To: Jan.Kiszka@siemens.com, cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org Cc: Quirin Gylstorff <quirin.gylstorff@siemens.com> Subject: [cip-dev] [isar-cip-core PATCH v2 0/6] secureboot with efibootguard Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 14:53:54 +0200 Message-Id: <20200629125400.13968-1-Quirin.Gylstorff@siemens.com> In-Reply-To: <20200625141015.31719-1-Quirin.Gylstorff@siemens.com> References: <20200625141015.31719-1-Quirin.Gylstorff@siemens.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.cip-project.org/g/cip-dev/unsub> Sender: cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org List-Id: <cip-dev.lists.cip-project.org> Mailing-List: list cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org; contact cip-dev+owner@lists.cip-project.org Delivered-To: mailing list cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org Reply-To: cip-dev@lists.cip-project.org X-Gm-Message-State: ZmnlSPeA6SITmyztVFyLnUfRx4520428AA= Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="IPuamLQgKE3P1NNnaGR8" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=lists.cip-project.org; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1593435245; bh=sjfyf1JG1iEttsuzUKIwwEye6WwFuwrb/RAGGpWiyUc=; h=Cc:Content-Type:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=Ae+ew7v4/rOqySC7FodZP5ldOnhOEgORWjNWWntHesl4XmmjCRTOeJ5B/fehjjr8m4r Ol+iIloeom3AtigsMOjODJGxeUCrB4egyqBsAIAu/6KpZ+NGzVQQHjKlcW0eHTOyH0Rvx kFE1S72oVgO4XPkUgvwac6DK1RlTb/7SuCM= |
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secureboot with efibootguard
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From: Quirin Gylstorff <quirin.gylstorff@siemens.com> This patchset adds secureboot with efibootguard to cip-core. The image build signs the efibootguard bootloader (bootx64.efi) and generates a signed [unified kernel image](https://systemd.io/BOOT_LOADER_SPECIFICATION/). A unified kernel image packs the kernel, initramfs and the kernel command-line in one binary object. As the kernel command-line is immutable after the build process, the previous selection of the root file system with a command-line parameter is no longer possible. Therefore the selection of the root file-system occurs now in the initramfs. The image uses an A/B partition layout to update the root file system. The sample implementation to select the root file system generates a uuid and stores the id in /etc/os-release and in the initramfs. During boot the initramfs compares its own uuid with the uuid stored in /etc/os-release of each rootfs. If a match is found the rootfs is used for the boot. Changes V2: - rebase to [1] - removed luahandler patch as it now part of [1] - add handling for sw-description [1]: a/b rootfsupdate with software update Quirin Gylstorff (6): kernel: add fat for qemu-amd64 isar-patch: Add initramfs-config patch secure-boot: select boot partition in initramfs secure-boot: Add secure boot with unified kernel image secure-boot: Add Debian snakeoil keys for ease-of-use doc: Add README for secureboot classes/image_uuid.bbclass | 29 +++ conf/distro/debian-buster-backports.list | 1 + conf/distro/preferences.ovmf-snakeoil.conf | 3 + doc/README.secureboot.md | 188 ++++++++++++++++ ...-support-Generate-a-custom-initramfs.patch | 207 ++++++++++++++++++ kas-cip.yml | 3 + kas/opt/ebg-secure-boot-base.yml | 17 ++ kas/opt/ebg-secure-boot-snakeoil.yml | 27 +++ kas/opt/ebg-swu.yml | 2 +- recipes-core/images/cip-core-image.bb | 2 +- recipes-core/images/files/sw-description.tmpl | 6 +- .../ebg-secure-boot-secrets_0.1.bb | 51 +++++ .../ebg-secure-boot-secrets/files/README.md | 1 + .../files/control.tmpl | 12 + .../files/sign_secure_image.sh.tmpl | 22 ++ .../ebg-secure-boot-snakeoil_0.1.bb | 35 +++ .../files/control.tmpl | 12 + .../files/sign_secure_image.sh | 36 +++ .../ovmf-binaries/files/control.tmpl | 11 + .../ovmf-binaries/ovmf-binaries_0.1.bb | 30 +++ .../linux/files/qemu-amd64_defconfig | 6 + .../files/initramfs.image_uuid.hook | 33 +++ .../files/initramfs.lsblk.hook | 29 +++ .../initramfs-config/files/postinst.ext | 3 + .../files/secure-boot-debian-local-patch | 77 +++++++ .../initramfs-abrootfs-secureboot_0.1.bb | 38 ++++ ...enerate-sb-db-from-existing-certificate.sh | 16 ++ scripts/generate_secure_boot_keys.sh | 51 +++++ .../wic/plugins/source/efibootguard-boot.py | 87 +++++++- .../wic/plugins/source/efibootguard-efi.py | 40 +++- scripts/start-efishell.sh | 12 + start-qemu.sh | 54 ++++- wic/ebg-signed-bootloader.inc | 2 + wic/qemu-amd64-efibootguard.wks | 6 +- 34 files changed, 1119 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) create mode 100644 classes/image_uuid.bbclass create mode 100644 conf/distro/debian-buster-backports.list create mode 100644 conf/distro/preferences.ovmf-snakeoil.conf create mode 100644 doc/README.secureboot.md create mode 100644 isar-patches/v7-0001-meta-support-Generate-a-custom-initramfs.patch create mode 100644 kas/opt/ebg-secure-boot-base.yml create mode 100644 kas/opt/ebg-secure-boot-snakeoil.yml create mode 100644 recipes-devtools/ebg-secure-boot-secrets/ebg-secure-boot-secrets_0.1.bb create mode 100644 recipes-devtools/ebg-secure-boot-secrets/files/README.md create mode 100644 recipes-devtools/ebg-secure-boot-secrets/files/control.tmpl create mode 100644 recipes-devtools/ebg-secure-boot-secrets/files/sign_secure_image.sh.tmpl create mode 100644 recipes-devtools/ebg-secure-boot-snakeoil/ebg-secure-boot-snakeoil_0.1.bb create mode 100644 recipes-devtools/ebg-secure-boot-snakeoil/files/control.tmpl create mode 100644 recipes-devtools/ebg-secure-boot-snakeoil/files/sign_secure_image.sh create mode 100644 recipes-devtools/ovmf-binaries/files/control.tmpl create mode 100644 recipes-devtools/ovmf-binaries/ovmf-binaries_0.1.bb create mode 100644 recipes-support/initramfs-config/files/initramfs.image_uuid.hook create mode 100644 recipes-support/initramfs-config/files/initramfs.lsblk.hook create mode 100644 recipes-support/initramfs-config/files/postinst.ext create mode 100644 recipes-support/initramfs-config/files/secure-boot-debian-local-patch create mode 100644 recipes-support/initramfs-config/initramfs-abrootfs-secureboot_0.1.bb create mode 100755 scripts/generate-sb-db-from-existing-certificate.sh create mode 100755 scripts/generate_secure_boot_keys.sh create mode 100755 scripts/start-efishell.sh create mode 100644 wic/ebg-signed-bootloader.inc