From patchwork Wed Feb 17 04:09:58 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ben Widawsky X-Patchwork-Id: 12188255 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BED28C433E6 for ; Wed, 17 Feb 2021 04:12:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EABF64DF3 for ; Wed, 17 Feb 2021 04:12:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231338AbhBQEMN (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Feb 2021 23:12:13 -0500 Received: from mga07.intel.com ([134.134.136.100]:21743 "EHLO mga07.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231346AbhBQELr (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Feb 2021 23:11:47 -0500 IronPort-SDR: GspS+H6jCKCprRbqT4PcDuYa9z98YqP6+cBY6mEKF7Pmw2Yq1/p7wmnnzzWWasIvoeXtBe/7AT a0B8B+Lsli0w== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9897"; a="247165948" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,184,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="247165948" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by orsmga105.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 16 Feb 2021 20:10:18 -0800 IronPort-SDR: Mug5PkrodM8Rl1xWiYxq98sDIf0X3SSeMjlZa9yQ7TA5gumGj0U/nmFtBL6W2PpAlt1kXP8boS FlOqJ5QddABA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,184,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="384948885" Received: from yxie-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO bwidawsk-mobl5.local) ([10.252.134.141]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 16 Feb 2021 20:10:16 -0800 From: Ben Widawsky To: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ben Widawsky , linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, Bjorn Helgaas , Chris Browy , Christoph Hellwig , Dan Williams , David Hildenbrand , David Rientjes , Ira Weiny , Jon Masters , Jonathan Cameron , Rafael Wysocki , Randy Dunlap , Vishal Verma , "John Groves (jgroves)" , "Kelley, Sean V" Subject: [RFC PATCH v5 9/9] cxl/mem: Add payload dumping for debug Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2021 20:09:58 -0800 Message-Id: <20210217040958.1354670-10-ben.widawsky@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.1 In-Reply-To: <20210217040958.1354670-1-ben.widawsky@intel.com> References: <20210217040958.1354670-1-ben.widawsky@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org It's often useful in debug scenarios to see what the hardware has dumped out. As it stands today, any device error will result in the payload not being copied out, so there is no way to triage commands which weren't expected to fail (and sometimes the payload may have that information). The functionality is protected by normal kernel security mechanisms as well as a CONFIG option in the CXL driver. This was extracted from the original version of the CXL enabling patch series. Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky --- drivers/cxl/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++ drivers/cxl/mem.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/cxl/Kconfig b/drivers/cxl/Kconfig index 97dc4d751651..3eec9276e586 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/cxl/Kconfig @@ -50,4 +50,17 @@ config CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS potential impact to memory currently in use by the kernel. If developing CXL hardware or the driver say Y, otherwise say N. + +config CXL_MEM_INSECURE_DEBUG + bool "CXL.mem debugging" + depends on CXL_MEM + help + Enable debug of all CXL command payloads. + + Some CXL devices and controllers support encryption and other + security features. The payloads for the commands that enable + those features may contain sensitive clear-text security + material. Disable debug of those command payloads by default. + If you are a kernel developer actively working on CXL + security enabling say Y, otherwise say N. endif diff --git a/drivers/cxl/mem.c b/drivers/cxl/mem.c index 6d7d3870b5da..d63c8eaf23c7 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/mem.c +++ b/drivers/cxl/mem.c @@ -346,6 +346,14 @@ static int __cxl_mem_mbox_send_cmd(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, /* #5 */ rc = cxl_mem_wait_for_doorbell(cxlm); + + if (!cxl_is_security_command(mbox_cmd->opcode) || + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CXL_MEM_INSECURE_DEBUG)) { + print_hex_dump_debug("Payload ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 1, + mbox_cmd->payload_in, mbox_cmd->size_in, + true); + } + if (rc == -ETIMEDOUT) { cxl_mem_mbox_timeout(cxlm, mbox_cmd); return rc;