Message ID | 20230421092321.12741-7-dave@stgolabs.net |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | cxl: Background cmds and device sanitation | expand |
On Fri, 21 Apr 2023 02:23:20 -0700 Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> wrote: > Implement support for the non-pmem exclusive secure erase, per > CXL specs. Create a write-only 'security/erase' sysfs file to > perform the requested operation. > > As with the sanitation this requires the device being offline > and thus no active HPA-DPA decoding. > > The expectation is that userspace can use it such as: > > cxl disable-memdev memX > echo 1 > /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase > cxl enable-memdev memX > > Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> > --- > Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 10 ++++++++ > drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 6 ++++- > drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 1 + > 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl > index 2e98ec9220ca..af7b603faf77 100644 > --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl > @@ -77,6 +77,16 @@ Description: > completion. > > > +What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase > +Date: May, 2023 > +KernelVersion: v6.5 > +Contact: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org > +Description: > + (WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to > + secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for > + all user data areas of the device. > + > + > What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/*/devtype > Date: June, 2021 > KernelVersion: v5.14 > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c > index 28daf7dcdec4..a2180f3e09eb 100644 > --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c > +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c > @@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd) > }; > struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = { .opcode = cmd }; > > - if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE) > + if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE && cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE) > return -EINVAL; > > rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &sec_cmd); > @@ -1067,6 +1067,10 @@ int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd) > if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) > return -EINVAL; > > + if (cmd == CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE && > + sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED) > + return -EINVAL; > + > rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &mbox_cmd); > if (rc < 0) { > dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to sanitize device : %d", rc); > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c > index 70e7158826c9..6406e8e47da2 100644 > --- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c > +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c > @@ -138,6 +138,39 @@ static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_sanitize = > __ATTR(sanitize, 0644, > security_sanitize_show, security_sanitize_store); > > +static ssize_t security_erase_store(struct device *dev, > + struct device_attribute *attr, > + const char *buf, size_t len) > +{ > + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev); > + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds; > + ssize_t rc; > + bool erase; > + > + rc = kstrtobool(buf, &erase); > + if (rc) > + return rc; > + > + if (erase) { As with earlier patch, I'd flip the logic. > + struct cxl_port *port = dev_get_drvdata(&cxlmd->dev); > + > + if (!port || !is_cxl_endpoint(port)) > + return -EINVAL; > + /* ensure no regions are mapped to this memdev */ > + if (port->commit_end != -1) > + return -EBUSY; > + > + rc = cxl_mem_sanitize(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE); and use a simple error check here. > + } > + > + if (rc == 0) > + rc = len; > + return rc; > +} > + > +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_erase = > + __ATTR(erase, 0200, NULL, security_erase_store); > + > static ssize_t serial_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, > char *buf) > { > @@ -199,6 +232,7 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = { > > static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_security_attributes[] = { > &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr, > + &dev_attr_security_erase.attr, > NULL, > }; > > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h > index 9bd33cfdc0ec..f8b513e70c21 100644 > --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h > +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h > @@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ enum cxl_opcode { > CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4304, > CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4305, > CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE = 0x4400, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE = 0x4401, > CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE = 0x4500, > CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE = 0x4501, > CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE = 0x4502,
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl index 2e98ec9220ca..af7b603faf77 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl @@ -77,6 +77,16 @@ Description: completion. +What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase +Date: May, 2023 +KernelVersion: v6.5 +Contact: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org +Description: + (WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to + secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for + all user data areas of the device. + + What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/*/devtype Date: June, 2021 KernelVersion: v5.14 diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c index 28daf7dcdec4..a2180f3e09eb 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c @@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd) }; struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = { .opcode = cmd }; - if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE) + if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE && cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE) return -EINVAL; rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &sec_cmd); @@ -1067,6 +1067,10 @@ int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd) if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) return -EINVAL; + if (cmd == CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE && + sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED) + return -EINVAL; + rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &mbox_cmd); if (rc < 0) { dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to sanitize device : %d", rc); diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c index 70e7158826c9..6406e8e47da2 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c @@ -138,6 +138,39 @@ static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_sanitize = __ATTR(sanitize, 0644, security_sanitize_show, security_sanitize_store); +static ssize_t security_erase_store(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t len) +{ + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev); + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds; + ssize_t rc; + bool erase; + + rc = kstrtobool(buf, &erase); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (erase) { + struct cxl_port *port = dev_get_drvdata(&cxlmd->dev); + + if (!port || !is_cxl_endpoint(port)) + return -EINVAL; + /* ensure no regions are mapped to this memdev */ + if (port->commit_end != -1) + return -EBUSY; + + rc = cxl_mem_sanitize(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE); + } + + if (rc == 0) + rc = len; + return rc; +} + +static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_erase = + __ATTR(erase, 0200, NULL, security_erase_store); + static ssize_t serial_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { @@ -199,6 +232,7 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = { static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_security_attributes[] = { &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr, + &dev_attr_security_erase.attr, NULL, }; diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h index 9bd33cfdc0ec..f8b513e70c21 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h @@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ enum cxl_opcode { CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4304, CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4305, CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE = 0x4400, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE = 0x4401, CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE = 0x4500, CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE = 0x4501, CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE = 0x4502,
Implement support for the non-pmem exclusive secure erase, per CXL specs. Create a write-only 'security/erase' sysfs file to perform the requested operation. As with the sanitation this requires the device being offline and thus no active HPA-DPA decoding. The expectation is that userspace can use it such as: cxl disable-memdev memX echo 1 > /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase cxl enable-memdev memX Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> --- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 10 ++++++++ drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 6 ++++- drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)