| Message ID | 20210130004519.25106-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | support for duplicate measurement of integrity critical data | expand |
Hi Tushar, On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 16:45 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: > IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very > expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical > data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately > determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing > from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this > example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to > 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately > determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the > system. > > This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure > duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy. The same reason for re-measuring buffer data is equally applicable to files. In both cases, the file or the buffer isn't re-measured if it already exists in the htable. Please don't limit this patch set to just buffer data. thanks, Mimi -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
Hi Tushar, On Mon, 2021-02-08 at 15:22 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 16:45 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: > > IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very > > expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical > > data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately > > determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing > > from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this > > example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to > > 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately > > determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the > > system. > > > > This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure > > duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy. > > The same reason for re-measuring buffer data is equally applicable to > files. In both cases, the file or the buffer isn't re-measured if it > already exists in the htable. Please don't limit this patch set to > just buffer data. Instead of making the change on a per measurement rule basis, disabling "htable" would be the simplest way of forcing re-measurements. All that would be needed is a new Kconfig (e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE) and the associated test in ima_add_template_entry(). thanks, Mimi -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
Thank you Mimi for reviewing this series. On 2021-02-08 1:10 p.m., Mimi Zohar wrote: > Hi Tushar, > > > On Mon, 2021-02-08 at 15:22 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: >> On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 16:45 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >>> IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very >>> expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical >>> data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately >>> determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing >>> from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this >>> example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to >>> 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately >>> determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the >>> system. >>> >>> This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure >>> duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy. >> >> The same reason for re-measuring buffer data is equally applicable to >> files. In both cases, the file or the buffer isn't re-measured if it >> already exists in the htable. Please don't limit this patch set to >> just buffer data. > Agreed. I wasn't sure if you wanted the support for files, or other buffer measurement scenarios, except critical data. So I started the implementation with supporting just critical data. Happy to extend it to files and other buffer measurement scenarios as you suggested. > Instead of making the change on a per measurement rule basis, disabling > "htable" would be the simplest way of forcing re-measurements. All > that would be needed is a new Kconfig (e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE) > and the associated test in ima_add_template_entry(). > Agreed. Earlier I wasn't sure if you wanted allow_dup support for all the scenarios. Now that it is clear, I will implement it as you suggested. Thank you so much for the pointers. Appreciate it. Thanks, Tushar > thanks, > > Mimi > -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
On Tue, 2021-02-09 at 10:23 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: > > On Mon, 2021-02-08 at 15:22 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > >> On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 16:45 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: > >>> IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very > >>> expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical > >>> data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately > >>> determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing > >>> from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this > >>> example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to > >>> 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately > >>> determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the > >>> system. > >>> > >>> This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure > >>> duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy. > >> > >> The same reason for re-measuring buffer data is equally applicable to > >> files. In both cases, the file or the buffer isn't re-measured if it > >> already exists in the htable. Please don't limit this patch set to > >> just buffer data. > > > Agreed. I wasn't sure if you wanted the support for files, or other > buffer measurement scenarios, except critical data. So I started the > implementation with supporting just critical data. Happy to extend it > to files and other buffer measurement scenarios as you suggested. > > > Instead of making the change on a per measurement rule basis, disabling > > "htable" would be the simplest way of forcing re-measurements. All > > that would be needed is a new Kconfig (e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE) > > and the associated test in ima_add_template_entry(). > > > Agreed. Earlier I wasn't sure if you wanted allow_dup support for all > the scenarios. Now that it is clear, I will implement it as you > suggested. Thank you so much for the pointers. Appreciate it. There are two different solutions - per measurement rule, disabling htable - being discussed. Disabling htable requires miminumal changes. Which version are you thinking of implementing? thanks, Mimi -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
On 2021-02-09 10:53 a.m., Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Tue, 2021-02-09 at 10:23 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >>> On Mon, 2021-02-08 at 15:22 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: >>>> On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 16:45 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >>>>> IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very >>>>> expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical >>>>> data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately >>>>> determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing >>>>> from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this >>>>> example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to >>>>> 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately >>>>> determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the >>>>> system. >>>>> >>>>> This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure >>>>> duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy. >>>> >>>> The same reason for re-measuring buffer data is equally applicable to >>>> files. In both cases, the file or the buffer isn't re-measured if it >>>> already exists in the htable. Please don't limit this patch set to >>>> just buffer data. >>> >> Agreed. I wasn't sure if you wanted the support for files, or other >> buffer measurement scenarios, except critical data. So I started the >> implementation with supporting just critical data. Happy to extend it >> to files and other buffer measurement scenarios as you suggested. >> >>> Instead of making the change on a per measurement rule basis, disabling >>> "htable" would be the simplest way of forcing re-measurements. All >>> that would be needed is a new Kconfig (e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE) >>> and the associated test in ima_add_template_entry(). >>> >> Agreed. Earlier I wasn't sure if you wanted allow_dup support for all >> the scenarios. Now that it is clear, I will implement it as you >> suggested. Thank you so much for the pointers. Appreciate it. > > There are two different solutions - per measurement rule, disabling > htable - being discussed. Disabling htable requires miminumal > changes. Which version are you thinking of implementing? > I am thinking of implementing "disabling 'htable' using a new Kconfig (e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE)". That is, not using the var ima_htable or ima_lookup_digest_entry() if that CONFIG is set. So the duplicate measurements are allowed when the CONFIG is set. This would cover all the measurement scenarios through a single CONFIG setting. I am not planning to implement it as a "per measurement rule". Sorry it wasn't clear in my earlier response. Thanks, Tushar > thanks, > > Mimi > -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
IMA does not measure duplicate buffer data since TPM extend is a very expensive operation. However, in some cases for integrity critical data, the measurement of duplicate data is necessary to accurately determine the current state of the system. Eg, SELinux state changing from 'audit', to 'enforcing', and back to 'audit' again. In this example, currently, IMA will not measure the last state change to 'audit'. This limits the ability of attestation services to accurately determine the current state of the integrity critical data on the system. This series addresses this gap by providing the ability to measure duplicate entries for integrity critical data, driven by policy. This series is based on the following repo/branch/commit: repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git branch: next-integrity-testing commit b3f82afc1041 ("IMA: Measure kernel version in early boot") Tushar Sugandhi (3): IMA: add policy condition to measure duplicate critical data IMA: update functions to read allow_dup policy condition IMA: add support to measure duplicate buffer for critical data hook Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 4 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 +++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 15 +++++++------ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 9 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 5 +++-- 8 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)