| Message ID | 20230306094921.tik5ewne4ft6mfpo@begin (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | VT: Protect KD_FONT_OP_GET_TALL from unbound access | expand |
diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c index 57a5c23b51d4..3c2ea9c098f7 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c @@ -4545,6 +4545,9 @@ static int con_font_get(struct vc_data *vc, struct console_font_op *op) int c; unsigned int vpitch = op->op == KD_FONT_OP_GET_TALL ? op->height : 32; + if (vpitch > max_font_height) + return -EINVAL; + if (op->data) { font.data = kvmalloc(max_font_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!font.data)
In ioctl(KD_FONT_OP_GET_TALL), userland tells through op->height which vpitch should be used to copy over the font. In con_font_get, we were not checking that it is within the maximum height value, and thus userland could make the vc->vc_sw->con_font_get(vc, &font, vpitch); call possibly overflow the allocated max_font_size bytes, and the copy_to_user(op->data, font.data, c) call possibly read out of that allocated buffer. By checking vpitch against max_font_height, the max_font_size buffer will always be large enough for the vc->vc_sw->con_font_get(vc, &font, vpitch) call (since we already prevent loading a font larger than that), and c = (font.width+7)/8 * vpitch * font.charcount will always remain below max_font_size. Fixes: 24d69384bcd3 ("VT: Add KD_FONT_OP_SET/GET_TALL operations") Reported-by: syzbot+3af17071816b61e807ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org> Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>