From patchwork Thu Mar 28 20:17:12 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13609524 Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E98C13A27E; Thu, 28 Mar 2024 20:17:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1711657053; cv=none; b=AS7cCS5zsOtMvS2tU5/CV0AvOcSEB5yqmJsnlSqEUWyDi2VOvmgkIDV3lMMB4IffZIFE3P72Vaqz0j7l+KUIexqY+eKotFUyyZIfBdc544rOWR99tJw3qqHyZi8ALFI6N9jhzocjHcgB00Ltz1Y3WUWoxraOqYGg4CAMfM0YUJI= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1711657053; c=relaxed/simple; bh=SdetzVMvhRxs2WUTB+Ae9frL1BFCiK7sqJkKj6Jsa1g=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=Go1dT8R7kIp1H+aIDbbcPl/20YGtEuFRmM1kg6B3TIhJYBGnrNwzUiVlqdwGO5gcgtumJldjU+d6lr7tBfF3JJMAM1ZmzlKmjcAGqX6Gy37IuEcg8Y1E7EPY+ZpJvAd2kmJfyrMZIAzynmpvTL8d3vqg5/zEpIV9A9HnnBgM9Uo= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=HPBsuWKq; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="HPBsuWKq" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id A26AA20E6F16; Thu, 28 Mar 2024 13:17:28 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com A26AA20E6F16 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1711657048; bh=I5IovGY4Trx3cdUoHZFFX39nSrI+4UswhCur+YYRSYc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=HPBsuWKqRQ0PSrqRUPvzKVCbzZE6CrkS+eQrrJm+zYStnO7fn5DDWrBO3FC3z9ehT gYTTnZT+hSz0NcpYx8FE9oUJ8ojHY7zpUR38kgfzMZ9d/q4giefaRzuVpCC7n1MaV4 ZOCa2zJCbQS6/Fw1Kx7GqaBtn5i0V+D0u1NCR4qY= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Fan Wu Subject: [PATCH v16 05/20] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 13:17:12 -0700 Message-Id: <1711657047-10526-6-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1711657047-10526-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1711657047-10526-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: fsverity@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs. Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting. This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational in the critical boot phase. Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v1-v11: + Not present v12: + Introduced v13: + Rename the hook name to initramfs_populated() v14: + No changes v15: + No changes v16: + No changes --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ include/linux/security.h | 8 ++++++++ init/initramfs.c | 3 +++ security/security.c | 10 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 334e00efbde4..7db99ae75651 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -450,3 +450,5 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ + +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, initramfs_populated, void) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 41a8f667bdfa..14fff542f2e3 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -2255,4 +2255,12 @@ static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +extern void security_initramfs_populated(void); +#else +static inline void security_initramfs_populated(void) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ + #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */ diff --git a/init/initramfs.c b/init/initramfs.c index 3127e0bf7bbd..e2e40792dd00 100644 --- a/init/initramfs.c +++ b/init/initramfs.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "do_mounts.h" @@ -719,6 +720,8 @@ static void __init do_populate_rootfs(void *unused, async_cookie_t cookie) #endif } + security_initramfs_populated(); + done: /* * If the initrd region is overlapped with crashkernel reserved region, diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 287bfac6b471..b10230c51c0b 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -5675,3 +5675,13 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd); } #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ + +/** + * security_initramfs_populated() - Notify LSMs that initramfs has been loaded + * + * Tells the LSMs the initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs. + */ +void security_initramfs_populated(void) +{ + call_void_hook(initramfs_populated); +}