[RFC,5/5] transport: check remote.<name>pushurl with transfer.credentialsInUrl

Commit Message

Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason June 15, 2022, 10:53 a.m. UTC

Expand the checks added in 6dcbdc0d661 (remote: create
fetch.credentialsInUrl config, 2022-06-06) to also check the
remote.<name>.pushurl setting. Before this it would only check the
remote.<name>.url setting, and would thus miss potential passwords in
the config.

Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <[e-mail]>
---
 remote.c              | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 t/t5516-fetch-push.sh |  3 ++-
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

Patch

diff --git a/remote.c b/remote.c
index 61add35be2f..d4dcc02a827 100644
--- a/remote.c
+++ b/remote.c
@@ -642,6 +642,37 @@  enum credentials_in_url get_credentials_in_url(void)
 	return cred_in_url;
 }
 
+static void validate_one_remote_url(enum credentials_in_url cfg,
+				    const char *url, struct strbuf *redacted)
+{
+	struct url_info url_info = { 0 };
+
+	if (!url_normalize(url, &url_info) || !url_info.passwd_off)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	strbuf_reset(redacted);
+	strbuf_add(redacted, url_info.url, url_info.passwd_off);
+	strbuf_addstr(redacted, "<redacted>");
+	strbuf_addstr(redacted, url_info.url + url_info.passwd_off +
+		      url_info.passwd_len);
+
+	switch (cfg) {
+	case CRED_IN_URL_WARN:
+		warning(_("URL '%s' uses plaintext credentials"), redacted->buf);
+		break;
+	case CRED_IN_URL_DIE:
+		die(_("URL '%s' uses plaintext credentials"), redacted->buf);
+		break;
+	case CRED_IN_URL_ALLOW:
+	case CRED_IN_URL_UNKNOWN:
+		BUG("unreachable");
+		break;
+	}
+cleanup:
+	free(url_info.url);
+}
+
+
 static void validate_remote_url(struct remote *remote)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -653,34 +684,10 @@  static void validate_remote_url(struct remote *remote)
 	if (cfg == CRED_IN_URL_ALLOW)
 		goto done;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < remote->url_nr; i++) {
-		struct url_info url_info = { 0 };
-
-		if (!url_normalize(remote->url[i], &url_info) ||
-		    !url_info.passwd_off)
-			goto loop_cleanup;
-
-		strbuf_reset(&redacted);
-		strbuf_add(&redacted, url_info.url, url_info.passwd_off);
-		strbuf_addstr(&redacted, "<redacted>");
-		strbuf_addstr(&redacted,
-			      url_info.url + url_info.passwd_off + url_info.passwd_len);
-
-		switch (cfg) {
-		case CRED_IN_URL_WARN:
-			warning(_("URL '%s' uses plaintext credentials"), redacted.buf);
-			break;
-		case CRED_IN_URL_DIE:
-			die(_("URL '%s' uses plaintext credentials"), redacted.buf);
-			break;
-		case CRED_IN_URL_ALLOW:
-		case CRED_IN_URL_UNKNOWN:
-			BUG("unreachable");
-			break;
-		}
-	loop_cleanup:
-		free(url_info.url);
-	}
+	for (i = 0; i < remote->url_nr; i++)
+		validate_one_remote_url(cfg, remote->url[i], &redacted);
+	for (i = 0; i < remote->pushurl_nr; i++)
+		validate_one_remote_url(cfg, remote->pushurl[i], &redacted);
 
 	strbuf_release(&redacted);
 done:
diff --git a/t/t5516-fetch-push.sh b/t/t5516-fetch-push.sh
index c7a21d7cfb5..cdecc1c049c 100755
--- a/t/t5516-fetch-push.sh
+++ b/t/t5516-fetch-push.sh
@@ -1905,7 +1905,8 @@  test_expect_success CURL 'push warns or fails when using username:password in co
 	git -C repo remote set-url pwd-url https://localhost &&
 
 	test_must_fail git -C repo -c transfer.credentialsInUrl=warn push pwd-url HEAD:refs/heads/branch 2>err &&
-	! grep "warning: $message" err
+	grep "warning: $message" err >warnings &&
+	test_line_count = 1 warnings
 '
 
 test_done