Show patches with: Series = security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM       |    State = Action Required       |   9 patches
Patch Series A/R/T S/W/F Date Submitter Delegate State
[RFC,9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect() security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl() security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release() security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New