Show patches with: Series = security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3       |    State = Action Required       |   12 patches
Patch Series A/R/T S/W/F Date Submitter Delegate State
[RFC,v3,12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v3,11/12] security/apparmor: Add enclave_load() implementation security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v3,10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v3,09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v3,08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_EXECMEM to map enclave page WX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v3,07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v3,06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v3,05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v3,04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v3,03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v3,02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v3,01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap() security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 - - - --- 2019-06-17 Sean Christopherson New