From patchwork Tue Nov 6 13:45:47 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 10670477 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34C5F15E9 for ; Tue, 6 Nov 2018 13:50:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2315F29B9F for ; Tue, 6 Nov 2018 13:50:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 1730429BB8; Tue, 6 Nov 2018 13:50:43 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9E82329B9F for ; Tue, 6 Nov 2018 13:50:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388442AbeKFXQB (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 18:16:01 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:62509 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2388191AbeKFXQA (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 18:16:00 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 06 Nov 2018 05:50:41 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.54,472,1534834800"; d="scan'208";a="106322641" Received: from fhoeg-mobl.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.249.254.66]) by orsmga002.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 06 Nov 2018 05:50:32 -0800 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: x86@kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, serge.ayoun@intel.com, shay.katz-zamir@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, kai.svahn@intel.com, Andy Lutomirski , Dave Hansen , Jarkko Sakkinen , Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list:X86 MM) Subject: [PATCH v16 08/22] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV for userspace #PFs w/ PF_SGX Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 15:45:47 +0200 Message-Id: <20181106134758.10572-9-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20181106134758.10572-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> References: <20181106134758.10572-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-sgx-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Sean Christopherson The PF_SGX bit is set if and only if the #PF is detected by the SGX Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM). The EPCM is a hardware-managed table that enforces accesses to an enclave's EPC pages in addition to the software-managed kernel page tables, i.e. the effective permissions for an EPC page are a logical AND of the kernel's page tables and the corresponding EPCM entry. The EPCM is consulted only after an access walks the kernel's page tables, i.e.: a. the access was allowed by the kernel b. the kernel's tables have become less restrictive than the EPCM c. the kernel cannot fixup the cause of the fault Noteably, (b) implies that either the kernel has botched the EPC mappings or the EPCM has been invalidated (see below). Regardless of why the fault occurred, userspace needs to be alerted so that it can take appropriate action, e.g. restart the enclave. This is reinforced by (c) as the kernel doesn't really have any other reasonable option, i.e. signalling SIGSEGV is actually the least severe action possible. Although the primary purpose of the EPCM is to prevent a malicious or compromised kernel from attacking an enclave, e.g. by modifying the enclave's page tables, do not WARN on a #PF w/ PF_SGX set. The SGX architecture effectively allows the CPU to invalidate all EPCM entries at will and requires that software be prepared to handle an EPCM fault at any time. The architecture defines this behavior because the EPCM is encrypted with an ephemeral key that isn't exposed to software. As such, the EPCM entries cannot be preserved across transitions that result in a new key being used, e.g. CPU power down as part of an S3 transition or when a VM is live migrated to a new physical system. Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 47bebfe6efa7..11d16bcf6e64 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -1153,6 +1153,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) if (error_code & X86_PF_PK) return 1; + /* + * Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the + * access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens + * when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a + * suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't + * fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified + * by software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal + * userspace, e.g. so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even + * though userspace may not have actually violated access permissions. + */ + if (unlikely(error_code & X86_PF_SGX)) + return 1; + /* * Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform * faults just to hit a X86_PF_PK as soon as we fill in a