@@ -5089,6 +5089,7 @@ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
u32 access = (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, gva, access, exception);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read);
gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_fetch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
struct x86_exception *exception)
@@ -5105,6 +5106,7 @@ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
access |= PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, gva, access, exception);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write);
/* uses this to access any guest's mapped memory without checking CPL */
gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
Support for SGX Launch Control requires KVM to trap and execute ENCLS[ECREATE] and ENCLS[EINIT] on behalf of the guest, which requires requires obtaining the GPA of a Secure Enclave Control Structure (SECS) in order to get its corresponding HVA. Because the SECS must reside in the Enclave Page Cache (EPC), copying the SECS's data to a host-controlled buffer via existing exported helpers is not a viable option as the EPC is not readable or writable by the kernel. Translating GVA->HVA for non-EPC pages is also desirable, as passing user pointers directly to ECREATE and EINIT avoids having to copy pages worth of data into the kernel. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)