From patchwork Tue Apr 21 21:53:12 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 11502367 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F87C1575 for ; Tue, 21 Apr 2020 21:54:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 212F520724 for ; Tue, 21 Apr 2020 21:54:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726681AbgDUVy5 (ORCPT ); Tue, 21 Apr 2020 17:54:57 -0400 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:11684 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726328AbgDUVy5 (ORCPT ); Tue, 21 Apr 2020 17:54:57 -0400 IronPort-SDR: 8iAQZYegnjZZRRTHn56CI5XL3i9j5U4wHmH0z9nXPOKULjD3nIboYRcXaqfkZc41pQMDa8jKDx nULcA2K4Z8Dg== X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 21 Apr 2020 14:54:56 -0700 IronPort-SDR: +Ytifug0Cko3ABfHqixzgKVqE8Z6cjILTlxeuCnWXu6HF7xZQxu1morvMW6g1R2y0zrK5fgH2f CYjLdzB7hfXA== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.72,411,1580803200"; d="scan'208";a="456260810" Received: from mnchalux-mobl2.gar.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.252.44.234]) by fmsmga005.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 21 Apr 2020 14:54:51 -0700 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, kai.svahn@intel.com, bp@alien8.de, josh@joshtriplett.org, luto@kernel.org, kai.huang@intel.com, rientjes@google.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, Jarkko Sakkinen Subject: [PATCH v29 16/20] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 00:53:12 +0300 Message-Id: <20200421215316.56503-17-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200421215316.56503-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> References: <20200421215316.56503-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-sgx-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add helper function to sanitize error code to prepare for vDSO exception fixup, which will expose the error code to userspace and runs before set_signal_archinfo(), i.e. suppresses the signal when fixup is successful. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index dee9504cde79..6b662d272af6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -682,6 +682,18 @@ pgtable_bad(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, oops_end(flags, regs, sig); } +static void sanitize_error_code(unsigned long address, + unsigned long *error_code) +{ + /* + * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page + * table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to + * kernel addresses are always protection faults. + */ + if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) + *error_code |= X86_PF_PROT; +} + static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address, unsigned long error_code) { @@ -738,6 +750,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, * faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic. */ if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) { + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); + set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code); /* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */ @@ -886,13 +900,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, if (is_errata100(regs, address)) return; - /* - * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page table - * layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to kernel addresses - * are always protection faults. - */ - if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) - error_code |= X86_PF_PROT; + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); if (likely(show_unhandled_signals)) show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk); @@ -1009,6 +1017,8 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, if (is_prefetch(regs, error_code, address)) return; + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); + set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code); #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE