[v3,39/57] KVM: x86: Rename "governed features" helpers to use "guest_cpu_cap"

Message ID	20241128013424.4096668-40-seanjc@google.com (mailing list archive)
State	New
Headers	show Received: from mail-pj1-f74.google.com (mail-pj1-f74.google.com [209.85.216.74]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 439D91C2DAE for <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>; Thu, 28 Nov 2024 01:35:40 +0000 (UTC) Reply-To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 17:34:06 -0800 In-Reply-To: <20241128013424.4096668-1-seanjc@google.com> Precedence: bulk Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20241128013424.4096668-1-seanjc@google.com> Message-ID: <20241128013424.4096668-40-seanjc@google.com> Subject: [PATCH v3 39/57] KVM: x86: Rename "governed features" helpers to use "guest_cpu_cap" From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>, Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>, Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>, Kechen Lu <kechenl@nvidia.com>, Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>, Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>, Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>, Robert Hoo <robert.hoo.linux@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Series	KVM: x86: CPUID overhaul, fixes, and caching \| expand [v3,00/57] KVM: x86: CPUID overhaul, fixes, and caching [v3,01/57] KVM: x86: Use feature_bit() to clear CONSTANT_TSC when emulating CPUID [v3,02/57] KVM: x86: Limit use of F() and SF() to kvm_cpu_cap_{mask,init_kvm_defined}() [v3,03/57] KVM: x86: Do all post-set CPUID processing during vCPU creation [v3,04/57] KVM: x86: Explicitly do runtime CPUID updates "after" initial setup [v3,05/57] KVM: x86: Account for KVM-reserved CR4 bits when passing through CR4 on VMX [v3,06/57] KVM: selftests: Update x86's set_sregs_test to match KVM's CPUID enforcement [v3,07/57] KVM: selftests: Assert that vcpu->cpuid is non-NULL when getting CPUID entries [v3,08/57] KVM: selftests: Refresh vCPU CPUID cache in __vcpu_get_cpuid_entry() [v3,09/57] KVM: selftests: Verify KVM stuffs runtime CPUID OS bits on CR4 writes [v3,10/57] KVM: x86: Move __kvm_is_valid_cr4() definition to x86.h [v3,11/57] KVM: x86/pmu: Drop now-redundant refresh() during init() [v3,12/57] KVM: x86: Drop now-redundant MAXPHYADDR and GPA rsvd bits from vCPU creation [v3,13/57] KVM: x86: Disallow KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS after vCPU creation [v3,14/57] KVM: x86: Reject disabling of MWAIT/HLT interception when not allowed [v3,15/57] KVM: x86: Drop the now unused KVM_X86_DISABLE_VALID_EXITS [v3,16/57] KVM: selftests: Fix a bad TEST_REQUIRE() in x86's KVM PV test [v3,17/57] KVM: selftests: Update x86's KVM PV test to match KVM's disabling exits behavior [v3,18/57] KVM: x86: Zero out PV features cache when the CPUID leaf is not present [v3,19/57] KVM: x86: Don't update PV features caches when enabling enforcement capability [v3,20/57] KVM: x86: Do reverse CPUID sanity checks in __feature_leaf() [v3,21/57] KVM: x86: Account for max supported CPUID leaf when getting raw host CPUID [v3,22/57] KVM: x86: Unpack F() CPUID feature flag macros to one flag per line of code [v3,23/57] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_cpu_cap_mask() to kvm_cpu_cap_init() [v3,24/57] KVM: x86: Add a macro to init CPUID features that are 64-bit only [v3,25/57] KVM: x86: Add a macro to precisely handle aliased 0x1.EDX CPUID features [v3,26/57] KVM: x86: Handle kernel- and KVM-defined CPUID words in a single helper [v3,27/57] KVM: x86: #undef SPEC_CTRL_SSBD in cpuid.c to avoid macro collisions [v3,28/57] KVM: x86: Harden CPU capabilities processing against out-of-scope features [v3,29/57] KVM: x86: Add a macro to init CPUID features that ignore host kernel support [v3,30/57] KVM: x86: Add a macro to init CPUID features that KVM emulates in software [v3,31/57] KVM: x86: Swap incoming guest CPUID into vCPU before massaging in KVM_SET_CPUID2 [v3,32/57] KVM: x86: Clear PV_UNHALT for !HLT-exiting only when userspace sets CPUID [v3,33/57] KVM: x86: Remove unnecessary caching of KVM's PV CPUID base [v3,34/57] KVM: x86: Always operate on kvm_vcpu data in cpuid_entry2_find() [v3,35/57] KVM: x86: Move kvm_find_cpuid_entry{,_index}() up near cpuid_entry2_find() [v3,36/57] KVM: x86: Remove all direct usage of cpuid_entry2_find() [v3,37/57] KVM: x86: Advertise TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID [v3,38/57] KVM: x86: Advertise HYPERVISOR in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID [v3,39/57] KVM: x86: Rename "governed features" helpers to use "guest_cpu_cap" [v3,40/57] KVM: x86: Replace guts of "governed" features with comprehensive cpu_caps [v3,41/57] KVM: x86: Initialize guest cpu_caps based on guest CPUID [v3,42/57] KVM: x86: Extract code for generating per-entry emulated CPUID information [v3,43/57] KVM: x86: Treat MONTIOR/MWAIT as a "partially emulated" feature [v3,44/57] KVM: x86: Initialize guest cpu_caps based on KVM support [v3,45/57] KVM: x86: Avoid double CPUID lookup when updating MWAIT at runtime [v3,46/57] KVM: x86: Drop unnecessary check that cpuid_entry2_find() returns right leaf [v3,47/57] KVM: x86: Update OS{XSAVE,PKE} bits in guest CPUID irrespective of host support [v3,48/57] KVM: x86: Update guest cpu_caps at runtime for dynamic CPUID-based features [v3,49/57] KVM: x86: Shuffle code to prepare for dropping guest_cpuid_has() [v3,50/57] KVM: x86: Replace (almost) all guest CPUID feature queries with cpu_caps [v3,51/57] KVM: x86: Drop superfluous host XSAVE check when adjusting guest XSAVES caps [v3,52/57] KVM: x86: Add a macro for features that are synthesized into boot_cpu_data [v3,53/57] KVM: x86: Pull CPUID capabilities from boot_cpu_data only as needed [v3,54/57] KVM: x86: Rename "SF" macro to "SCATTERED_F" [v3,55/57] KVM: x86: Explicitly track feature flags that require vendor enabling [v3,56/57] KVM: x86: Explicitly track feature flags that are enabled at runtime [v3,57/57] KVM: x86: Use only local variables (no bitmask) to init kvm_cpu_caps

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index a13bf0ab417d..7b2fbb148661 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) allow_gbpages = tdp_enabled ? boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) : guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES); if (allow_gbpages) - kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES); + guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES); best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1); if (best && apic) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index 5d0fe3793d75..e1b05da23cf2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -237,8 +237,8 @@ static __always_inline bool kvm_is_governed_feature(unsigned int x86_feature) return kvm_governed_feature_index(x86_feature) >= 0; } -static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, - unsigned int x86_feature) +static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + unsigned int x86_feature) { BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature)); @@ -246,15 +246,15 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, vcpu->arch.governed_features.enabled); } -static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, - unsigned int x86_feature) +static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + unsigned int x86_feature) { if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(x86_feature) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, x86_feature)) - kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, x86_feature); + guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, x86_feature); } -static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, - unsigned int x86_feature) +static __always_inline bool guest_cpu_cap_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + unsigned int x86_feature) { BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature)); @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, static inline bool kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3) { - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM)) + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM)) cr3 &= ~(X86_CR3_LAM_U48 | X86_CR3_LAM_U57); return kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, cr3); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h index e9322358678b..caec3d11638d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_get_active_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static inline unsigned long kvm_get_active_cr3_lam_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM)) + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM)) return 0; return kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & (X86_CR3_LAM_U48 | X86_CR3_LAM_U57); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index 22e7ad235123..d138560a9320 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -5034,7 +5034,7 @@ static void reset_guest_rsvds_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(&context->guest_rsvd_check, vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits, context->cpu_role.base.level, is_efer_nx(context), - guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES), + guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES), is_cr4_pse(context), guest_cpuid_is_amd_compatible(vcpu)); } @@ -5111,7 +5111,7 @@ static void reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(shadow_zero_check, reserved_hpa_bits(), context->root_role.level, context->root_role.efer_nx, - guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES), + guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES), is_pse, is_amd); if (!shadow_me_mask) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c index b708bdf7eaff..d77b094d9a4d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static void nested_svm_uninit_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static bool nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { - if (!guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD)) + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD)) return true; if (!nested_npt_enabled(svm)) @@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb12 vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb02, VMCB_DR); } - if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && + if (unlikely(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) { /* * Reserved bits of DEBUGCTL are ignored. Be consistent with @@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm, * exit_int_info, exit_int_info_err, next_rip, insn_len, insn_bytes. */ - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) && + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) && (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK)) int_ctl_vmcb12_bits |= (V_GIF_MASK | V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK); else @@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm, vmcb02->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset; - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) && + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) && svm->tsc_ratio_msr != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio) nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu); @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm, * what a nrips=0 CPU would do (L1 is responsible for advancing RIP * prior to injecting the event). */ - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS)) + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS)) vmcb02->control.next_rip = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS)) vmcb02->control.next_rip = vmcb12_rip; @@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm, svm->soft_int_injected = true; svm->soft_int_csbase = vmcb12_csbase; svm->soft_int_old_rip = vmcb12_rip; - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS)) + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS)) svm->soft_int_next_rip = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip; else svm->soft_int_next_rip = vmcb12_rip; @@ -728,18 +728,18 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm, vmcb02->control.virt_ext = vmcb01->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV)) + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV)) vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK); if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm)) vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK; - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER)) + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER)) pause_count12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_count; else pause_count12 = 0; - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD)) + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD)) pause_thresh12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_thresh; else pause_thresh12 = 0; @@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm) if (vmcb12->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_ERR) nested_save_pending_event_to_vmcb12(svm, vmcb12); - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS)) + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS)) vmcb12->control.next_rip = vmcb02->control.next_rip; vmcb12->control.int_ctl = svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl; @@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm) if (!nested_exit_on_intr(svm)) kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu); - if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && + if (unlikely(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) { svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb12, vmcb02); svm_update_lbrv(vcpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 72674b8825c4..4e5aba3f86cd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -4458,16 +4458,15 @@ static void sev_es_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm) * For SEV-ES, accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS should not be intercepted if * the host/guest supports its use. * - * guest_can_use() checks a number of requirements on the host/guest to - * ensure that MSR_IA32_XSS is available, but it might report true even - * if X86_FEATURE_XSAVES isn't configured in the guest to ensure host - * MSR_IA32_XSS is always properly restored. For SEV-ES, it is better - * to further check that the guest CPUID actually supports - * X86_FEATURE_XSAVES so that accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS by misbehaved - * guests will still get intercepted and caught in the normal - * kvm_emulate_rdmsr()/kvm_emulated_wrmsr() paths. + * KVM treats the guest as being capable of using XSAVES even if XSAVES + * isn't enabled in guest CPUID as there is no intercept for XSAVES, + * i.e. the guest can use XSAVES/XRSTOR to read/write XSS if XSAVE is + * exposed to the guest and XSAVES is supported in hardware. Condition + * full XSS passthrough on the guest being able to use XSAVES *and* + * XSAVES being exposed to the guest so that KVM can at least honor + * guest CPUID for RDMSR and WRMSR. */ - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) && + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_XSS, 1, 1); else diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index dd15cc635655..f96c62a9d2c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); bool current_enable_lbrv = svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; bool enable_lbrv = (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) || - (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && + (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)); if (enable_lbrv == current_enable_lbrv) @@ -2864,7 +2864,7 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) switch (msr_info->index) { case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && - !guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) + !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) return 1; msr_info->data = svm->tsc_ratio_msr; break; @@ -3024,7 +3024,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) switch (ecx) { case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO: - if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) { + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) { if (!msr->host_initiated) return 1; @@ -3046,7 +3046,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) svm->tsc_ratio_msr = data; - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) && + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) && is_guest_mode(vcpu)) nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu); @@ -4404,11 +4404,11 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) - kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); + guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS); - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR); - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV); + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS); + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR); + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV); /* * Intercept VMLOAD if the vCPU model is Intel in order to emulate that @@ -4416,12 +4416,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * SVM on Intel is bonkers and extremely unlikely to work). */ if (!guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible(vcpu)) - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD); + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD); - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER); - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD); - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF); - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI); + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER); + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD); + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF); + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI); svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 43fa6a16eb19..6eff8c60d5eb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ static inline bool svm_is_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit) static inline bool nested_vgif_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { - return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) && + return guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) && (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK); } @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ static inline bool nested_npt_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm) static inline bool nested_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { - return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI) && + return guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI) && (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index aa78b6f38dfe..9aaa703f5f98 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -6617,7 +6617,7 @@ static int vmx_get_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && (vmx->nested.vmxon || vmx->nested.smm.vmxon)) { kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa = vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr; kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa = vmx->nested.current_vmptr; @@ -6758,7 +6758,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (kvm_state->flags & ~KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS) return -EINVAL; } else { - if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) return -EINVAL; if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa)) @@ -6792,7 +6792,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return -EINVAL; if ((kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS) && - (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) || + (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) || !vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled)) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 893366e53732..ccba522246c3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -2084,7 +2084,7 @@ int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) [msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0]; break; case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR: - if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) return 1; if (vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data)) @@ -2394,7 +2394,7 @@ int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR: if (!msr_info->host_initiated) return 1; /* they are read-only */ - if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) return 1; return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data); case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL: @@ -4591,7 +4591,7 @@ vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 *exec_control, \ if (cpu_has_vmx_##name()) { \ if (kvm_is_governed_feature(X86_FEATURE_##feat_name)) \ - __enabled = guest_can_use(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \ + __enabled = guest_cpu_cap_has(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \ else \ __enabled = guest_cpuid_has(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \ vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, SECONDARY_EXEC_##ctrl_name,\ @@ -7830,10 +7830,10 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) */ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX); - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM); + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX); + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM); vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx); @@ -7841,7 +7841,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(vmx, vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx)); - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX | FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX; @@ -7850,7 +7850,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) ~(FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX | FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX); - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu); if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) && diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 9f0ffc3289d2..1ee955cdb109 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1177,7 +1177,7 @@ void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != kvm_host.xcr0) xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0); - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) && + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) && vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != kvm_host.xss) wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, vcpu->arch.ia32_xss); } @@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != kvm_host.xcr0) xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, kvm_host.xcr0); - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) && + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) && vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != kvm_host.xss) wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, kvm_host.xss); }

[v3,39/57] KVM: x86: Rename "governed features" helpers to use "guest_cpu_cap"

Commit Message

Patch