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[RFC,V4,1/3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation

Message ID 20180720233130.14129-2-ahmedsoliman0x666@gmail.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Ahmed Soliman July 20, 2018, 11:31 p.m. UTC
Following up with my previous threads on KVM assisted Anti rootkit
The current version doesn't address the attacks involving pages
remapping. It is still design in progress, nevertheless, it will be in
my later patch sets.

Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@gmail.com>
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt
index a890529c63ed..affd997eabfe 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt
@@ -121,3 +121,17 @@  compute the CLOCK_REALTIME for its clock, at the same instant.
 Returns KVM_EOPNOTSUPP if the host does not use TSC clocksource,
 or if clock type is different than KVM_CLOCK_PAIRING_WALLCLOCK.
+Architecture: x86
+Status: active
+Purpose: Hypercall used to apply Read-Only Enforcement to guest pages
+     a0: Start address aligned to page boundary.
+     a1: Number of pages to be protected.
+This hypercall lets a guest kernel have part of its read/write memory
+converted into read-only.  This action is irreversible. KVM_HC_HMROE can
+not be triggered from guest Ring 3 (user mode). The reason is that user
+mode malicious software can make use of it to enforce read only protection
+on an arbitrary memory page thus crashing the kernel.