From patchwork Thu Jan 28 00:14:10 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Stefan Berger X-Patchwork-Id: 12051301 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 17986C433E9 for ; Thu, 28 Jan 2021 00:16:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E6C6864D99 for ; Thu, 28 Jan 2021 00:16:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231815AbhA1APz (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:15:55 -0500 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:14172 "EHLO mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231132AbhA1APT (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:15:19 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0127361.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 10RNXjlE068715; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:14:19 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding; s=pp1; bh=f8l1OS8MIPpB1SXV7cJD0BErSfvofm+rcezPXa5kSms=; b=jwM+oPp5nZOcX5rQ9ZRD0bfSFAw2EBWAHqGmr4dZZKWgNu5dX3ORlft+ftA8zfIl5+to xTZgEYeYh+mmvAwhzgtABdcMl3w5XIYBw458iHkxjTrdLEWhwBfEw6Bti0GhAqj8xAjd 1KEWvRUSkE6hEDJUedfaIn0jzEHhxXSnGGLnEF64ErHI3G+odEkCb4jfrmoYd+TMxipd 5TAcN5yt4E5Y8UWLLGnJrGTFH0CwRCTIwZWG5nipRn4EBob8/KL6lzGgqbvqDWwM2OUx ZZ1DGwqk9g+dfFr6uN7L4lZRv2L8tTZ8eW9VsHZ2jql+dr8lNj4dsEAJIaWwKwCcUdch +g== Received: from ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com (aa.5b.37a9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.55.91.170]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 36b5t4kt5k-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:14:18 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 10S07kfq029389; Thu, 28 Jan 2021 00:14:18 GMT Received: from b01cxnp22033.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01cxnp22033.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.198.23]) by ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 36acj9dkwc-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 28 Jan 2021 00:14:17 +0000 Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.110]) by b01cxnp22033.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 10S0EHpP29622646 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 28 Jan 2021 00:14:17 GMT Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B761AE064; Thu, 28 Jan 2021 00:14:17 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 69F0EAE063; Thu, 28 Jan 2021 00:14:17 +0000 (GMT) Received: from sbct-3.pok.ibm.com (unknown [9.47.158.153]) by b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 28 Jan 2021 00:14:17 +0000 (GMT) From: Stefan Berger To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, patrick@puiterwijk.org, Stefan Berger , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Subject: [PATCH v4 1/3] crypto: Add support for ECDSA signature verification Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:14:10 -0500 Message-Id: <20210128001412.822048-2-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210128001412.822048-1-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20210128001412.822048-1-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.343,18.0.737 definitions=2021-01-27_10:2021-01-27,2021-01-27 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 bulkscore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 clxscore=1015 suspectscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 impostorscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2009150000 definitions=main-2101270116 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org From: Stefan Berger Add support for parsing the parameters of a NIST P256 or NIST P192 key. Enable signature verification using these keys. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org --- crypto/Makefile | 9 +- crypto/ecc.c | 279 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ crypto/ecc.h | 2 + crypto/ecdsasignature.asn1 | 4 + 4 files changed, 293 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 crypto/ecdsasignature.asn1 diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile index b279483fba50..767f6b71aa20 100644 --- a/crypto/Makefile +++ b/crypto/Makefile @@ -50,6 +50,14 @@ sm2_generic-y += sm2.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2) += sm2_generic.o +$(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.c $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h +$(obj)/ecc.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h + +ecc_generic-y += ecdsasignature.asn1.o +ecc_generic-y += ecc.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC) += ecc_generic.o + crypto_acompress-y := acompress.o crypto_acompress-y += scompress.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ACOMP2) += crypto_acompress.o @@ -172,7 +180,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG) += algif_rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD) += algif_aead.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD) += zstd.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_OFB) += ofb.o -obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC) += ecc.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV) += essiv.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CURVE25519) += curve25519-generic.o diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c index c80aa25994a0..3636f9d17eaf 100644 --- a/crypto/ecc.c +++ b/crypto/ecc.c @@ -29,13 +29,18 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include #include #include +#include +#include #include "ecc.h" #include "ecc_curve_defs.h" +#include "ecdsasignature.asn1.h" typedef struct { u64 m_low; @@ -1542,4 +1547,278 @@ int crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_ecdh_shared_secret); +struct ecc_ctx { + const struct ecc_curve *curve; + struct ecc_point *pub_key; +}; + +struct ecdsa_signature_ctx { + const struct ecc_curve *curve; + u64 r[ECC_MAX_DIGITS]; + u64 s[ECC_MAX_DIGITS]; +}; + +/* + * Get the r and s components of a signature from the X509 certificate. + */ +static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen, + unsigned int ndigits) +{ + size_t keylen = ndigits * sizeof(u64); + ssize_t diff = vlen - keylen; + const char *d = value; + u8 rs[ECC_MAX_BYTES]; + + if (!value || !vlen) + return -EINVAL; + + /* diff = 0: 'value' has exacly the right size + * diff > 0: 'value' has too many bytes; one leading zero is allowed that + * makes the value a positive integer; error on more + * diff < 0: 'value' is missing leading zeros, which we add + */ + if (diff > 0) { + /* skip over leading zeros that make 'value' a positive int */ + if (*d == 0) { + vlen -= 1; + diff--; + d++; + } + if (diff) + return -EINVAL; + } + if (-diff >= keylen) + return -EINVAL; + + if (diff) { + /* leading zeros not given in 'value' */ + memset(rs, 0, -diff); + } + + memcpy(&rs[-diff], d, vlen); + + ecc_swap_digits((u64 *)rs, dest, ndigits); + + return 0; +} + +int ecdsa_get_signature_r(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct ecdsa_signature_ctx *sig = context; + + return ecdsa_get_signature_rs(sig->r, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen, + sig->curve->g.ndigits); +} + +int ecdsa_get_signature_s(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct ecdsa_signature_ctx *sig = context; + + return ecdsa_get_signature_rs(sig->s, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen, + sig->curve->g.ndigits); +} + +static int _ecdsa_verify(struct ecc_ctx *ctx, const u64 *hash, + const u64 *r, const u64 *s) +{ + const struct ecc_curve *curve = ctx->curve; + unsigned int ndigits = curve->g.ndigits; + u64 s1[ECC_MAX_DIGITS]; + u64 u1[ECC_MAX_DIGITS]; + u64 u2[ECC_MAX_DIGITS]; + u64 x1[ECC_MAX_DIGITS]; + u64 y1[ECC_MAX_DIGITS]; + struct ecc_point res = ECC_POINT_INIT(x1, y1, ndigits); + + /* 0 < r < n and 0 < s < n */ + if (vli_is_zero(r, ndigits) || vli_cmp(r, curve->n, ndigits) >= 0 || + vli_is_zero(s, ndigits) || vli_cmp(s, curve->n, ndigits) >= 0) + return -EBADMSG; + + /* hash is given */ + pr_devel("hash : %016llx %016llx ... %016llx\n", + hash[ndigits - 1], hash[ndigits - 2], hash[0]); + + /* s1 = (s^-1) mod n */ + vli_mod_inv(s1, s, curve->n, ndigits); + /* u1 = (hash * s1) mod n */ + vli_mod_mult_slow(u1, hash, s1, curve->n, ndigits); + /* u2 = (r * s1) mod n */ + vli_mod_mult_slow(u2, r, s1, curve->n, ndigits); + /* res = u1*G + u2 * pub_key */ + ecc_point_mult_shamir(&res, u1, &curve->g, u2, ctx->pub_key, curve); + + /* res.x = res.x mod n (if res.x > order) */ + if (unlikely(vli_cmp(res.x, curve->n, ndigits) == 1)) + /* faster alternative for NIST p256 & p192 */ + vli_sub(res.x, res.x, curve->n, ndigits); + + if (!vli_cmp(res.x, r, ndigits)) + return 0; + + return -EKEYREJECTED; +} + +/* + * Verify an ECDSA signature. + */ +static int ecdsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct ecc_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm); + size_t keylen = ctx->curve->g.ndigits * sizeof(u64); + struct ecdsa_signature_ctx sig_ctx = { + .curve = ctx->curve, + }; + u8 rawhash[ECC_MAX_BYTES]; + u64 hash[ECC_MAX_DIGITS]; + unsigned char *buffer; + ssize_t diff; + int ret; + + if (unlikely(!ctx->pub_key)) + return -EINVAL; + + buffer = kmalloc(req->src_len + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buffer) + return -ENOMEM; + + sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src, + sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->src_len + req->dst_len), + buffer, req->src_len + req->dst_len, 0); + + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&ecdsasignature_decoder, &sig_ctx, + buffer, req->src_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + /* if the hash is shorter then we will add leading zeros to fit to ndigits */ + diff = keylen - req->dst_len; + if (diff >= 0) { + if (diff) + memset(rawhash, 0, diff); + memcpy(&rawhash[diff], buffer + req->src_len, req->dst_len); + } else if (diff < 0) { + /* given hash is longer, we take the left-most bytes */ + memcpy(&rawhash, buffer + req->src_len, keylen); + } + + ecc_swap_digits((u64 *)rawhash, hash, ctx->curve->g.ndigits); + + ret = _ecdsa_verify(ctx, hash, sig_ctx.r, sig_ctx.s); + +error: + kfree(buffer); + + return ret; +} + +static void ecdsa_ec_ctx_deinit(struct ecc_ctx *ctx) +{ + ecc_free_point(ctx->pub_key); + ctx->pub_key = NULL; +} + +static int ecdsa_ec_ctx_reset(struct ecc_ctx *ctx) +{ + ecdsa_ec_ctx_deinit(ctx); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set the public key given the raw uncompressed key data from an X509 + * certificate. The key data contain the concatenated X and Y coordinates of + * the public key. + */ +static int ecdsa_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, + const void *key, unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct ecc_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm); + const unsigned char *d = key; + const u64 *digits = (const u64 *)&d[1]; + unsigned int ndigits; + int ret; + + ret = ecdsa_ec_ctx_reset(ctx); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (keylen < 1 || (((keylen - 1) >> 1) % sizeof(u64)) != 0) + return -EINVAL; + /* we only accept uncompressed format */ + if (d[0] != 4) + return -EINVAL; + + keylen--; + ndigits = (keylen >> 1) / sizeof(u64); + switch (ndigits) { + case 3: + ctx->curve = ecc_get_curve(ECC_CURVE_NIST_P192); + break; + case 4: + ctx->curve = ecc_get_curve(ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256); + break; + } + if (!ctx->curve) + return -EINVAL; + + ctx->pub_key = ecc_alloc_point(ndigits); + if (!ctx->pub_key) + return -ENOMEM; + + ecc_swap_digits(digits, ctx->pub_key->x, ndigits); + ecc_swap_digits(&digits[ndigits], ctx->pub_key->y, ndigits); + return ecc_is_pubkey_valid_full(ctx->curve, ctx->pub_key); +} + +static void ecdsa_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm) +{ + struct ecc_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + ecdsa_ec_ctx_deinit(ctx); +} + +static unsigned int ecdsa_max_size(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm) +{ + struct ecc_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + return ctx->pub_key->ndigits << ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT; +} + +static int ecdsa_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm) +{ + return 0; +} + +static struct akcipher_alg ecdsa = { + .verify = ecdsa_verify, + .set_pub_key = ecdsa_set_pub_key, + .max_size = ecdsa_max_size, + .init = ecdsa_init_tfm, + .exit = ecdsa_exit_tfm, + .base = { + .cra_name = "ecdsa", + .cra_driver_name = "ecdsa-generic", + .cra_priority = 100, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct ecc_ctx), + }, +}; + +static int ecdsa_init(void) +{ + return crypto_register_akcipher(&ecdsa); +} + +static void ecdsa_exit(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_akcipher(&ecdsa); +} + +subsys_initcall(ecdsa_init); +module_exit(ecdsa_exit); + MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL"); diff --git a/crypto/ecc.h b/crypto/ecc.h index d4e546b9ad79..26d7c83908bc 100644 --- a/crypto/ecc.h +++ b/crypto/ecc.h @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ #define ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT 3 +#define ECC_MAX_BYTES (ECC_MAX_DIGITS << ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT) + /** * struct ecc_point - elliptic curve point in affine coordinates * diff --git a/crypto/ecdsasignature.asn1 b/crypto/ecdsasignature.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..621ab754fb9f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/ecdsasignature.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +ECDSASignature ::= SEQUENCE { + r INTEGER ({ ecdsa_get_signature_r }), + s INTEGER ({ ecdsa_get_signature_s }) +}