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Hallyn" , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 03/10] security: keys: trusted: Parse out individual components of the key blob Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 16:20:55 -0700 Message-Id: <20220504161439.3.Id409e0cf397bd98b76df6eb60ff16454679dd23d@changeid> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.0 In-Reply-To: <20220504232102.469959-1-evgreen@chromium.org> References: <20220504232102.469959-1-evgreen@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org From: Matthew Garrett Performing any sort of state validation of a sealed TPM blob requires being able to access the individual members in the response. Parse the blob sufficiently to be able to stash pointers to each member, along with the length. From: Matthew Garrett Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Signed-off-by: Evan Green --- Matthew's original version of this patch is at: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/12096489/ include/keys/trusted-type.h | 8 +++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index d89fa2579ac056..8a793ae1ad9f70 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -22,15 +22,23 @@ #define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 512 #define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 #define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 +#define MAX_CREATION_DATA 412 +#define MAX_TK 76 struct trusted_key_payload { struct rcu_head rcu; unsigned int key_len; unsigned int blob_len; + unsigned int creation_len; + unsigned int creation_hash_len; + unsigned int tk_len; unsigned char migratable; unsigned char old_format; unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; + unsigned char *creation; + unsigned char *creation_hash; + unsigned char *tk; }; struct trusted_key_options { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 0165da386289c3..296a00f872ba40 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -215,6 +215,63 @@ static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle, tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len); } +static int tpm2_unpack_blob(struct trusted_key_payload *payload) +{ + int tmp, offset; + + /* Find the length of the private data */ + tmp = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]); + offset = tmp + 2; + if (offset > payload->blob_len) + return -EFAULT; + + /* Find the length of the public data */ + tmp = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[offset]); + offset += tmp + 2; + if (offset > payload->blob_len) + return -EFAULT; + + /* Find the length of the creation data and store it */ + tmp = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[offset]); + if (tmp > MAX_CREATION_DATA) + return -E2BIG; + + if ((offset + tmp + 2) > payload->blob_len) + return -EFAULT; + + payload->creation = &payload->blob[offset + 2]; + payload->creation_len = tmp; + offset += tmp + 2; + + /* Find the length of the creation hash and store it */ + tmp = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[offset]); + if (tmp > MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) + return -E2BIG; + + if ((offset + tmp + 2) > payload->blob_len) + return -EFAULT; + + payload->creation_hash = &payload->blob[offset + 2]; + payload->creation_hash_len = tmp; + offset += tmp + 2; + + /* + * Store the creation ticket. TPMT_TK_CREATION is two bytes of tag, + * four bytes of handle, and then the digest length and digest data + */ + tmp = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[offset + 6]); + if (tmp > MAX_TK) + return -E2BIG; + + if ((offset + tmp + 8) > payload->blob_len) + return -EFAULT; + + payload->tk = &payload->blob[offset]; + payload->tk_len = tmp + 8; + + return 0; +} + /** * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key * @@ -229,6 +286,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_options *options) { int blob_len = 0; + unsigned int offset; struct tpm_buf buf; u32 hash; u32 flags; @@ -317,15 +375,17 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, rc = -E2BIG; goto out; } - if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + blob_len) { + offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4; + if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < offset + blob_len) { rc = -EFAULT; goto out; } blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, - &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], + &buf.data[offset], blob_len); + rc = tpm2_unpack_blob(payload); out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); @@ -431,7 +491,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (!rc) *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); + else + goto out; + rc = tpm2_unpack_blob(payload); out: if (blob != payload->blob) kfree(blob);