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Hallyn" , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 05/11] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in creation data Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 15:16:30 -0800 Message-Id: <20221111151451.v5.5.I32591db064b6cdc91850d777f363c9d05c985b39@changeid> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.38.1.431.g37b22c650d-goog In-Reply-To: <20221111231636.3748636-1-evgreen@chromium.org> References: <20221111231636.3748636-1-evgreen@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org From: Matthew Garrett When TPMs generate keys, they can also generate some information describing the state of the PCRs at creation time. This data can then later be certified by the TPM, allowing verification of the PCR values. This allows us to determine the state of the system at the time a key was generated. Add an additional argument to the trusted key creation options, allowing the user to provide the set of PCRs that should have their values incorporated into the creation data. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210220013255.1083202-6-matthewgarrett@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Signed-off-by: Evan Green Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel Reviewed-by: Kees Cook --- Changes in v5: - Make Matthew's tag match author Changes in v3: - Clarified creationpcrs documentation (Ben) .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 6 +++++ include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 9 +++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 9bc9db8ec6517c..a1872964fe862f 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ Usage:: policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to seal the key. + creationpcrs= hex integer representing the set of PCRs to be + included in the creation data. For each bit set, the + corresponding PCR will be included in the key creation + data. Bit 0 corresponds to PCR0. Currently only the first + PC standard 24 PCRs are supported on the currently active + bank. Leading zeroes are optional. TPM2 only. "keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes. diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 209086fed240a5..8523d41507b2a4 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint32_t policydigest_len; unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; uint32_t policyhandle; + uint32_t creation_pcrs; }; struct trusted_key_ops { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index aa108bea6739b3..2975827c01bec0 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -713,6 +713,7 @@ enum { Opt_hash, Opt_policydigest, Opt_policyhandle, + Opt_creationpcrs, }; static const match_table_t key_tokens = { @@ -725,6 +726,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { {Opt_hash, "hash=%s"}, {Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"}, {Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"}, + {Opt_creationpcrs, "creationpcrs=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -858,6 +860,13 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; opt->policyhandle = handle; break; + case Opt_creationpcrs: + if (!tpm2) + return -EINVAL; + res = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 16, &opt->creation_pcrs); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; default: return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index ff2aede8986236..3d84c3d41bdee1 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf buf; u32 hash; u32 flags; - int i; + int i, j; int rc; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { @@ -497,7 +497,28 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); /* creation PCR */ - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + if (options->creation_pcrs) { + /* One bank */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 1); + /* Which bank to use */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); + /* Length of the PCR bitmask */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 3); + /* PCR bitmask */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + char tmp = 0; + + for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) { + char bit = (i * 8) + j; + + if (options->creation_pcrs & (1 << bit)) + tmp |= (1 << j); + } + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, tmp); + } + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + } if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { rc = -E2BIG;