[v2] certs: Reference revocation list for all keyrings

Commit Message

Eric Snowberg Aug. 17, 2023, 2:04 p.m. UTC

Systems booted with shim have a Forbidden Signature Database called mokx.
During boot, hashes and certs contained within the mokx are loaded into the
blacklist keyring.  When calling verify_pkcs7_message_sig the contents of
the blacklist keyring (or revocation list) are referenced when validating
keys on the platform keyring. Currently, when validating against the
secondary or builtin keyrings, the revocation list is not referenced.  Move
up the check to allow the revocation list to be used with all keyrings,
including the secondary and builtin, allowing the system owner to take
corrective action should a vulnerability be found within keys contained
within either keyring.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <[e-mail]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[e-mail]>
---
v2 changes:
Since this one seems to have been forgotten, added the two Reviewed-by tags.
Unless there are any objections, could this be picked up?

link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[e-mail]/
---
 certs/system_keyring.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

Comments

Jarkko Sakkinen Aug. 17, 2023, 6:54 p.m. UTC | #1

On Thu Aug 17, 2023 at 2:04 PM UTC, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Systems booted with shim have a Forbidden Signature Database called mokx.
> During boot, hashes and certs contained within the mokx are loaded into the
> blacklist keyring.  When calling verify_pkcs7_message_sig the contents of
> the blacklist keyring (or revocation list) are referenced when validating
> keys on the platform keyring. Currently, when validating against the
> secondary or builtin keyrings, the revocation list is not referenced.  Move
> up the check to allow the revocation list to be used with all keyrings,
> including the secondary and builtin, allowing the system owner to take
> corrective action should a vulnerability be found within keys contained
> within either keyring.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <[e-mail]>
> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[e-mail]>
> ---
> v2 changes:
> Since this one seems to have been forgotten, added the two Reviewed-by tags.
> Unless there are any objections, could this be picked up?

Applied to -next.

BR, Jarkko

Patch

diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index a7a49b17ceb1..6bc138bc594f 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -251,6 +251,12 @@  int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
 
+	ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7);
+	if (ret != -ENOKEY) {
+		pr_devel("PKCS#7 key is on revocation list\n");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
 	if (!trusted_keys) {
 		trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
 	} else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING) {
@@ -270,12 +276,6 @@  int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
 			pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n");
 			goto error;
 		}
-
-		ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7);
-		if (ret != -ENOKEY) {
-			pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform key is on revocation list\n");
-			goto error;
-		}
 	}
 	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
 	if (ret < 0) {