Message ID | 20240403072131.54935-7-david@sigma-star.at (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers | show |
Series | DCP as trusted keys backend | expand |
On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 09:21:22AM +0200, David Gstir wrote: > diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > index e989b9802f92..f4d7e162d5e4 100644 > --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > @@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ safe. > randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. > Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. > > + (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) > + > + Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt > + in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only. > + DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key > + and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting > + the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key). > + > * Execution isolation > > (1) TPM > @@ -57,6 +65,12 @@ safe. > > Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. > > + (4) DCP > + > + Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution > + environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there. > + The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space. > + > * Optional binding to platform integrity state > > (1) TPM > @@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ safe. > Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs > for platform integrity. > > + (4) DCP > + > + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for > + platform integrity. > + > * Interfaces and APIs > > (1) TPM > @@ -94,6 +113,11 @@ safe. > > Interface is specific to silicon vendor. > > + (4) DCP > + > + Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in > + ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``. > + > * Threat model > > The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given > @@ -129,6 +153,13 @@ selected trust source: > CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device > is probed. > > + * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) > + > + The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface, > + so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have > + a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled > + to back the kernel RNG. > + > Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel > command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. > > @@ -231,6 +262,19 @@ Usage:: > CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. > Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). > > +Trusted Keys usage: DCP > +----------------------- > + > +Usage:: > + > + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring > + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring > + keyctl print keyid > + > +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format > +specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key length for new keys is > +always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). > + > Encrypted Keys usage > -------------------- > > @@ -426,3 +470,12 @@ string length. > privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the > initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed > string length. > + > +DCP Blob Format > +--------------- > + > +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > + :doc: dcp blob format > + > +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > + :identifiers: struct dcp_blob_fmt > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > index 16c44aafeab3..b5f81a05be36 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > @@ -19,6 +19,25 @@ > #define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1 > #define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16 > > +/** > + * DOC: dcp blob format > + * > + * The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its > + * AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing. > + * To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define > + * our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing > + * key stored in the key blob. > + * > + * Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit > + * blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to > + * encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM. > + * > + * The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCP's AES > + * encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce, > + * BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together > + * with a version number, payload length and authentication tag. > + */ > + > /** > * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. > * The doc LGTM, thanks! Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
On Wed Apr 3, 2024 at 10:21 AM EEST, David Gstir wrote: > Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as new > trust source: > > - Describe security properties of DCP trust source > - Describe key usage > - Document blob format > > Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> > Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> > Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> > Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> > Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> > --- > .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 19 +++++++ > 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > index e989b9802f92..f4d7e162d5e4 100644 > --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > @@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ safe. > randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. > Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. > > + (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) > + > + Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt > + in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only. > + DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key > + and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting > + the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key). > + > * Execution isolation > > (1) TPM > @@ -57,6 +65,12 @@ safe. > > Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. > > + (4) DCP > + > + Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution > + environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there. > + The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space. > + > * Optional binding to platform integrity state > > (1) TPM > @@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ safe. > Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs > for platform integrity. > > + (4) DCP > + > + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for > + platform integrity. > + > * Interfaces and APIs > > (1) TPM > @@ -94,6 +113,11 @@ safe. > > Interface is specific to silicon vendor. > > + (4) DCP > + > + Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in > + ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``. > + > * Threat model > > The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given > @@ -129,6 +153,13 @@ selected trust source: > CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device > is probed. > > + * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) > + > + The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface, > + so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have > + a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled > + to back the kernel RNG. > + > Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel > command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. > > @@ -231,6 +262,19 @@ Usage:: > CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. > Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). > > +Trusted Keys usage: DCP > +----------------------- > + > +Usage:: > + > + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring > + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring > + keyctl print keyid > + > +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format > +specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key length for new keys is > +always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). > + > Encrypted Keys usage > -------------------- > > @@ -426,3 +470,12 @@ string length. > privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the > initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed > string length. > + > +DCP Blob Format > +--------------- > + > +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > + :doc: dcp blob format > + > +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > + :identifiers: struct dcp_blob_fmt > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > index 16c44aafeab3..b5f81a05be36 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > @@ -19,6 +19,25 @@ > #define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1 > #define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16 > > +/** > + * DOC: dcp blob format > + * > + * The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its > + * AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing. > + * To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define > + * our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing > + * key stored in the key blob. > + * > + * Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit > + * blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to > + * encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM. > + * > + * The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCP's AES > + * encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce, > + * BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together > + * with a version number, payload length and authentication tag. > + */ > + > /** > * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. > * Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> I can only test that this does not break a machine without the hardware feature. Is there anyone who could possibly peer test these patches? BR, Jarkko
Hi Jarkko, > -----Original Message----- > From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> > Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2024 9:18 PM > To: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>; Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>; > James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>; Herbert Xu > <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>; David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> > Cc: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>; Jonathan Corbet > <corbet@lwn.net>; Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>; Pengutronix > Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>; Fabio Estevam > <festevam@gmail.com>; dl-linux-imx <linux-imx@nxp.com>; Ahmad Fatoum > <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>; sigma star Kernel Team > <upstream+dcp@sigma-star.at>; David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>; Li > Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com>; Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>; James > Morris <jmorris@namei.org>; Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>; Paul E. > McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>; Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>; > Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>; Rafael J. Wysocki > <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>; Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>; Steven Rostedt > (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>; linux-doc@vger.kernel.org; linux- > kernel@vger.kernel.org; linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org; > keyrings@vger.kernel.org; linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org; linux-arm- > kernel@lists.infradead.org; linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org; linux-security- > module@vger.kernel.org; Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>; David > Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> > Subject: [EXT] Re: [PATCH v8 6/6] docs: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new > trust source > > Caution: This is an external email. Please take care when clicking links or > opening attachments. When in doubt, report the message using the 'Report > this email' button > > > On Wed Apr 3, 2024 at 10:21 AM EEST, David Gstir wrote: > > Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as > > new trust source: > > > > - Describe security properties of DCP trust source > > - Describe key usage > > - Document blob format > > > > Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> > > Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer > > <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> > > Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> > > Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> > > --- > > .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 19 +++++++ > > 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > index e989b9802f92..f4d7e162d5e4 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > @@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ safe. > > randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. > > Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. > > > > + (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX > > + SoCs) > > + > > + Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally > burnt > > + in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine > only. > > + DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP > key > > + and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting > > + the OTP key can be done via a module parameter > (dcp_use_otp_key). > > + > > * Execution isolation > > > > (1) TPM > > @@ -57,6 +65,12 @@ safe. > > > > Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. > > > > + (4) DCP > > + > > + Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution > > + environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there. > > + The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel > space. > > + > > * Optional binding to platform integrity state > > > > (1) TPM > > @@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ safe. > > Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs > > for platform integrity. > > > > + (4) DCP > > + > > + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for > > + platform integrity. > > + > > * Interfaces and APIs > > > > (1) TPM > > @@ -94,6 +113,11 @@ safe. > > > > Interface is specific to silicon vendor. > > > > + (4) DCP > > + > > + Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto > driver in > > + ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``. > > + > > * Threat model > > > > The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source > > for a given @@ -129,6 +153,13 @@ selected trust source: > > CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure > the device > > is probed. > > > > + * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) > > + > > + The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG > interface, > > + so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do > have > > + a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be > enabled > > + to back the kernel RNG. > > + > > Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the > > kernel command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random > number pool. > > > > @@ -231,6 +262,19 @@ Usage:: > > CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. > > Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). > > > > +Trusted Keys usage: DCP > > +----------------------- > > + > > +Usage:: > > + > > + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring > > + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring > > + keyctl print keyid > > + > > +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is > > +in format specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key > > +length for new keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes > (256 - 1024 bits). > > + > > Encrypted Keys usage > > -------------------- > > > > @@ -426,3 +470,12 @@ string length. > > privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the > > initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed > > string length. > > + > > +DCP Blob Format > > +--------------- > > + > > +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > + :doc: dcp blob format > > + > > +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > + :identifiers: struct dcp_blob_fmt > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > index 16c44aafeab3..b5f81a05be36 100644 > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > @@ -19,6 +19,25 @@ > > #define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1 > > #define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16 > > > > +/** > > + * DOC: dcp blob format > > + * > > + * The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using > > +its > > + * AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key > sealing/unsealing. > > + * To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we > > +define > > + * our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the > > +sealing > > + * key stored in the key blob. > > + * > > + * Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a > > +random 128-bit > > + * blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are > > +used to > > + * encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM. > > + * > > + * The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the > > +DCP's AES > > + * encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated > > +nonce, > > + * BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob > > +format together > > + * with a version number, payload length and authentication tag. > > + */ > > + > > /** > > * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. > > * > > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> > > I can only test that this does not break a machine without the hardware > feature. > > Is there anyone who could possibly peer test these patches? I am already working on testing this patchset on i.MX6 platform. Regards, Kshitiz > BR, Jarkko
On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 06:47:51PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> > > I can only test that this does not break a machine without the > hardware feature. Please feel free to take this through your tree. Thanks,
On Tue Apr 9, 2024 at 12:48 PM EEST, Kshitiz Varshney wrote: > Hi Jarkko, > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> > > Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2024 9:18 PM > > To: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>; Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>; > > James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>; Herbert Xu > > <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>; David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> > > Cc: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>; Jonathan Corbet > > <corbet@lwn.net>; Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>; Pengutronix > > Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>; Fabio Estevam > > <festevam@gmail.com>; dl-linux-imx <linux-imx@nxp.com>; Ahmad Fatoum > > <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>; sigma star Kernel Team > > <upstream+dcp@sigma-star.at>; David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>; Li > > Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com>; Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>; James > > Morris <jmorris@namei.org>; Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>; Paul E. > > McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>; Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>; > > Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>; Rafael J. Wysocki > > <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>; Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>; Steven Rostedt > > (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>; linux-doc@vger.kernel.org; linux- > > kernel@vger.kernel.org; linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org; > > keyrings@vger.kernel.org; linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org; linux-arm- > > kernel@lists.infradead.org; linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org; linux-security- > > module@vger.kernel.org; Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>; David > > Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> > > Subject: [EXT] Re: [PATCH v8 6/6] docs: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new > > trust source > > > > Caution: This is an external email. Please take care when clicking links or > > opening attachments. When in doubt, report the message using the 'Report > > this email' button > > > > > > On Wed Apr 3, 2024 at 10:21 AM EEST, David Gstir wrote: > > > Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as > > > new trust source: > > > > > > - Describe security properties of DCP trust source > > > - Describe key usage > > > - Document blob format > > > > > > Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> > > > Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer > > > <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> > > > Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> > > > Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> > > > --- > > > .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ > > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 19 +++++++ > > > 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+) > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > > b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > > index e989b9802f92..f4d7e162d5e4 100644 > > > --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > > +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst > > > @@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ safe. > > > randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. > > > Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. > > > > > > + (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX > > > + SoCs) > > > + > > > + Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally > > burnt > > > + in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine > > only. > > > + DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP > > key > > > + and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting > > > + the OTP key can be done via a module parameter > > (dcp_use_otp_key). > > > + > > > * Execution isolation > > > > > > (1) TPM > > > @@ -57,6 +65,12 @@ safe. > > > > > > Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. > > > > > > + (4) DCP > > > + > > > + Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution > > > + environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there. > > > + The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel > > space. > > > + > > > * Optional binding to platform integrity state > > > > > > (1) TPM > > > @@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ safe. > > > Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs > > > for platform integrity. > > > > > > + (4) DCP > > > + > > > + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for > > > + platform integrity. > > > + > > > * Interfaces and APIs > > > > > > (1) TPM > > > @@ -94,6 +113,11 @@ safe. > > > > > > Interface is specific to silicon vendor. > > > > > > + (4) DCP > > > + > > > + Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto > > driver in > > > + ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``. > > > + > > > * Threat model > > > > > > The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source > > > for a given @@ -129,6 +153,13 @@ selected trust source: > > > CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure > > the device > > > is probed. > > > > > > + * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) > > > + > > > + The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG > > interface, > > > + so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do > > have > > > + a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be > > enabled > > > + to back the kernel RNG. > > > + > > > Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the > > > kernel command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random > > number pool. > > > > > > @@ -231,6 +262,19 @@ Usage:: > > > CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. > > > Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). > > > > > > +Trusted Keys usage: DCP > > > +----------------------- > > > + > > > +Usage:: > > > + > > > + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring > > > + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring > > > + keyctl print keyid > > > + > > > +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is > > > +in format specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key > > > +length for new keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes > > (256 - 1024 bits). > > > + > > > Encrypted Keys usage > > > -------------------- > > > > > > @@ -426,3 +470,12 @@ string length. > > > privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the > > > initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed > > > string length. > > > + > > > +DCP Blob Format > > > +--------------- > > > + > > > +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > > + :doc: dcp blob format > > > + > > > +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > > + :identifiers: struct dcp_blob_fmt > > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > > b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > > index 16c44aafeab3..b5f81a05be36 100644 > > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c > > > @@ -19,6 +19,25 @@ > > > #define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1 > > > #define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16 > > > > > > +/** > > > + * DOC: dcp blob format > > > + * > > > + * The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using > > > +its > > > + * AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key > > sealing/unsealing. > > > + * To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we > > > +define > > > + * our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the > > > +sealing > > > + * key stored in the key blob. > > > + * > > > + * Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a > > > +random 128-bit > > > + * blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are > > > +used to > > > + * encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM. > > > + * > > > + * The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the > > > +DCP's AES > > > + * encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated > > > +nonce, > > > + * BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob > > > +format together > > > + * with a version number, payload length and authentication tag. > > > + */ > > > + > > > /** > > > * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. > > > * > > > > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> > > > > I can only test that this does not break a machine without the hardware > > feature. > > > > Is there anyone who could possibly peer test these patches? > I am already working on testing this patchset on i.MX6 platform. > Regards, > Kshitiz OK great. BR, Jarkko
On Fri Apr 12, 2024 at 9:26 AM EEST, Herbert Xu wrote: > On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 06:47:51PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> > > > > I can only test that this does not break a machine without the > > hardware feature. > > Please feel free to take this through your tree. > > Thanks, OK, thanks! BR, Jarkko
Hi Kshitiz, > On 09.04.2024, at 11:48, Kshitiz Varshney <kshitiz.varshney@nxp.com> wrote: > > Hi Jarkko, > > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> >> Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2024 9:18 PM >> To: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>; Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>; >> James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>; Herbert Xu >> <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>; David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> >> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>; Jonathan Corbet >> <corbet@lwn.net>; Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>; Pengutronix >> Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>; Fabio Estevam >> <festevam@gmail.com>; dl-linux-imx <linux-imx@nxp.com>; Ahmad Fatoum >> <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>; sigma star Kernel Team >> <upstream+dcp@sigma-star.at>; David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>; Li >> Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com>; Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>; James >> Morris <jmorris@namei.org>; Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>; Paul E. >> McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>; Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>; >> Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>; Rafael J. Wysocki >> <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>; Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>; Steven Rostedt >> (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>; linux-doc@vger.kernel.org; linux- >> kernel@vger.kernel.org; linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org; >> keyrings@vger.kernel.org; linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org; linux-arm- >> kernel@lists.infradead.org; linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org; linux-security- >> module@vger.kernel.org; Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>; David >> Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> >> Subject: [EXT] Re: [PATCH v8 6/6] docs: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new >> trust source >> >> Caution: This is an external email. Please take care when clicking links or >> opening attachments. When in doubt, report the message using the 'Report >> this email' button >> >> >> On Wed Apr 3, 2024 at 10:21 AM EEST, David Gstir wrote: >>> Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as >>> new trust source: >>> >>> - Describe security properties of DCP trust source >>> - Describe key usage >>> - Document blob format >>> >>> Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> >>> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> >>> Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer >>> <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> >>> Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> >>> Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> >>> --- >>> .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ >>> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 19 +++++++ >>> 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+) >>> >>> diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst >>> b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst >>> index e989b9802f92..f4d7e162d5e4 100644 >>> --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst >>> +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst >>> @@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ safe. >>> randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. >>> Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. >>> >>> + (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX >>> + SoCs) >>> + >>> + Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally >> burnt >>> + in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine >> only. >>> + DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP >> key >>> + and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting >>> + the OTP key can be done via a module parameter >> (dcp_use_otp_key). >>> + >>> * Execution isolation >>> >>> (1) TPM >>> @@ -57,6 +65,12 @@ safe. >>> >>> Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. >>> >>> + (4) DCP >>> + >>> + Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution >>> + environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there. >>> + The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel >> space. >>> + >>> * Optional binding to platform integrity state >>> >>> (1) TPM >>> @@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ safe. >>> Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs >>> for platform integrity. >>> >>> + (4) DCP >>> + >>> + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for >>> + platform integrity. >>> + >>> * Interfaces and APIs >>> >>> (1) TPM >>> @@ -94,6 +113,11 @@ safe. >>> >>> Interface is specific to silicon vendor. >>> >>> + (4) DCP >>> + >>> + Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto >> driver in >>> + ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``. >>> + >>> * Threat model >>> >>> The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source >>> for a given @@ -129,6 +153,13 @@ selected trust source: >>> CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure >> the device >>> is probed. >>> >>> + * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) >>> + >>> + The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG >> interface, >>> + so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do >> have >>> + a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be >> enabled >>> + to back the kernel RNG. >>> + >>> Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the >>> kernel command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random >> number pool. >>> >>> @@ -231,6 +262,19 @@ Usage:: >>> CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. >>> Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). >>> >>> +Trusted Keys usage: DCP >>> +----------------------- >>> + >>> +Usage:: >>> + >>> + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring >>> + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring >>> + keyctl print keyid >>> + >>> +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is >>> +in format specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key >>> +length for new keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes >> (256 - 1024 bits). >>> + >>> Encrypted Keys usage >>> -------------------- >>> >>> @@ -426,3 +470,12 @@ string length. >>> privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the >>> initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed >>> string length. >>> + >>> +DCP Blob Format >>> +--------------- >>> + >>> +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c >>> + :doc: dcp blob format >>> + >>> +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c >>> + :identifiers: struct dcp_blob_fmt >>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c >>> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c >>> index 16c44aafeab3..b5f81a05be36 100644 >>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c >>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c >>> @@ -19,6 +19,25 @@ >>> #define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1 >>> #define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16 >>> >>> +/** >>> + * DOC: dcp blob format >>> + * >>> + * The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using >>> +its >>> + * AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key >> sealing/unsealing. >>> + * To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we >>> +define >>> + * our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the >>> +sealing >>> + * key stored in the key blob. >>> + * >>> + * Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a >>> +random 128-bit >>> + * blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are >>> +used to >>> + * encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM. >>> + * >>> + * The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the >>> +DCP's AES >>> + * encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated >>> +nonce, >>> + * BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob >>> +format together >>> + * with a version number, payload length and authentication tag. >>> + */ >>> + >>> /** >>> * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. >>> * >> >> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> >> >> I can only test that this does not break a machine without the hardware >> feature. >> >> Is there anyone who could possibly peer test these patches? > I am already working on testing this patchset on i.MX6 platform. Did you get around to testing this? I’d greatly appreciate a Tested-by for this. :-) Thanks! BR, David
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index e989b9802f92..f4d7e162d5e4 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ safe. randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. + (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) + + Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt + in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only. + DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key + and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting + the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key). + * Execution isolation (1) TPM @@ -57,6 +65,12 @@ safe. Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. + (4) DCP + + Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution + environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there. + The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space. + * Optional binding to platform integrity state (1) TPM @@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ safe. Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs for platform integrity. + (4) DCP + + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for + platform integrity. + * Interfaces and APIs (1) TPM @@ -94,6 +113,11 @@ safe. Interface is specific to silicon vendor. + (4) DCP + + Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in + ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``. + * Threat model The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given @@ -129,6 +153,13 @@ selected trust source: CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device is probed. + * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) + + The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface, + so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have + a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled + to back the kernel RNG. + Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. @@ -231,6 +262,19 @@ Usage:: CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). +Trusted Keys usage: DCP +----------------------- + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl print keyid + +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format +specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key length for new keys is +always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). + Encrypted Keys usage -------------------- @@ -426,3 +470,12 @@ string length. privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed string length. + +DCP Blob Format +--------------- + +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c + :doc: dcp blob format + +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c + :identifiers: struct dcp_blob_fmt diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c index 16c44aafeab3..b5f81a05be36 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c @@ -19,6 +19,25 @@ #define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1 #define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16 +/** + * DOC: dcp blob format + * + * The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its + * AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing. + * To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define + * our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing + * key stored in the key blob. + * + * Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit + * blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to + * encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM. + * + * The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCP's AES + * encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce, + * BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together + * with a version number, payload length and authentication tag. + */ + /** * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. *