@@ -217,7 +217,10 @@ Usage::
(40 ascii zeros)
blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
(40 ascii zeros)
- pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default)
+ pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no
+ default) on TPM 1.2 and a TPMS_PCR_SELECTION
+ coupled with a hash of all the selected PCRs on
+ TPM 2.0 using the selected hash.
pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
default 1 (resealing allowed)
@@ -343,6 +346,37 @@ Load a trusted key from the saved blob::
f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b
e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba
+Create a trusted key on TPM 2.0 using an all zero value of PCR16 and
+using the NV storage root 81000001 as the parent::
+
+ $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001 pcrinfo=000b0300000166687aadf862bd776c8fc18b8e9f8e20089714856ee233b3902a591d0d5f2925" @u
+
+Note the TPMS_PCR_SELECT value for sha256 bank PCR 16 is 000b03000001
+because all current TPMs have 24 PCRs, so the initial 000b says sha256
+bank (other possible banks are sha1=0004; sha384=000c; sha512=000d),
+03 says there are three following bytes of selection and then because
+the bytes are big endian, 16 is bit zero of byte 2. the hash is the
+sha256 sum of all zeros (the value of PCR 16)::
+
+ $ dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=32 2>/dev/null|sha256sum
+ 66687aadf862bd776c8fc18b8e9f8e20089714856ee233b3902a591d0d5f2925
+
+If you want to compute a current PCR hash value, simply take the
+hashes of multiple PCRs (in ascending order) and compute the sha256sum
+over the total:
+
+ $ { cat /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/pcr-sha256/7; cat /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/pcr-sha256/16; }|xxd -r -p|sha256sum
+
+Then use this value to append to a TPMS_PCR_SELECT (for 7 and 16 that
+would be 000b03800001) to the calculated hash as before. Note also
+that the hash of the PCR registers has to use the name algorithm hash
+(the keyctl option hash=) not the bank algorithm hash. So to select
+the sha1 pcr16 bank you'd say::
+
+ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001 pcrinfo=000403000001de47c9b27eb8d300dbb5f2c353e632c393262cf06340c4fa7f1b40c4cbd36f90" @u
+
+because the trailing hash is the sha256sum of 20 zero bytes.
+
Reseal (TPM specific) a trusted key under new PCR values::
$ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`"
@@ -425,11 +459,17 @@ policy::
TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER
emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL
+ policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL
parent INTEGER
pubkey OCTET STRING
privkey OCTET STRING
}
+ TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
+ CommandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER
+ CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
+ }
+
type is what distinguishes the key even in binary form since the OID
is provided by the TCG to be unique and thus forms a recognizable
binary pattern at offset 3 in the key. The OIDs currently made
@@ -455,6 +495,17 @@ is false or not present, the key requires an explicit authorization
phrase. This is used by most user space consumers to decide whether
to prompt for a password.
+policy represents a sequence of one or more policy statements that
+must be executed successfully into a session policy register. If
+policy isn't present then no policy is required to unlock the key, but
+if it is, commandCode is the TPM 2.0 command code of the policy
+instruction that must be executed and CommandPolicy represents the
+binary parameter area of the policy command.
+
+Note that the current sequential execution requirement means that only
+AND based policy can be constructed at the moment, so TPM2_PolicyOR is
+not currently supported.
+
parent represents the parent key handle, either in the 0x81 MSO space,
like 0x81000001 for the RSA primary storage key. Userspace programmes
also support specifying the primary handle in the 0x40 MSO space. If
@@ -20,9 +20,11 @@
#define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32
#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 512
-#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64
+#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 128
#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64
+#define TPM2_MAX_POLICIES 16
+
struct trusted_key_payload {
struct rcu_head rcu;
unsigned int key_len;
@@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
unsigned char old_format;
unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1];
unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE];
+ struct tpm2_policies *policies;
};
struct trusted_key_options {
@@ -248,7 +248,9 @@ enum tpm2_return_codes {
TPM2_RC_SUCCESS = 0x0000,
TPM2_RC_HASH = 0x0083, /* RC_FMT1 */
TPM2_RC_HANDLE = 0x008B,
+ TPM2_RC_AUTH_FAIL = 0x008E,
TPM2_RC_INTEGRITY = 0x009F,
+ TPM2_RC_BAD_AUTH = 0x00A2,
TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE = 0x0100, /* RC_VER1 */
TPM2_RC_FAILURE = 0x0101,
TPM2_RC_DISABLED = 0x0120,
@@ -259,6 +261,18 @@ enum tpm2_return_codes {
TPM2_RC_RETRY = 0x0922,
};
+static inline int tpm2_error_code(u32 rc)
+{
+ if ((rc & 0x0180) == 0)
+ /* TPM 1.2 error */
+ return -1;
+ if ((rc & 0x0080) == 0)
+ /* Error or Warning */
+ return rc;
+ /* strip off encoded parameter, handle or session */
+ return rc & 0x00ff;
+}
+
enum tpm2_command_codes {
TPM2_CC_FIRST = 0x011F,
TPM2_CC_HIERARCHY_CONTROL = 0x0121,
@@ -276,12 +290,14 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161,
TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162,
TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165,
+ TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE = 0x016B,
TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC = 0x0173,
TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS = 0x0176,
TPM2_CC_VERIFY_SIGNATURE = 0x0177,
TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A,
TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B,
TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E,
+ TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR = 0x017F,
TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182,
TPM2_CC_EVENT_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x0185,
TPM2_CC_HASH_SEQUENCE_START = 0x0186,
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
+ select CRYPTO_SHA512
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
select ASN1_ENCODER
select OID_REGISTRY
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm1.o
$(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h
trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm2.o
trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC),y)
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2-policy.o
+endif
trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com
+ */
+
+#include <linux/asn1_encoder.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
+
+#include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
+#include "tpm2-policy.h"
+
+int tpm2_key_code(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+ u32 code = 0;
+ const u8 *v = value;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) {
+ code <<= 8;
+ code |= v[i];
+ }
+
+ ctx->policy_code[ctx->policy_count] = code;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_policy(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->policies[ctx->policy_count] = value;
+ ctx->policy_len[ctx->policy_count++] = vlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* we only support a limited number of policy statement so
+ * make sure we don't have anything we can't support
+ */
+static int tpm2_validate_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (pols->count == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) {
+ switch (pols->code[i]) {
+ case TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR:
+ case TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE:
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_info("tpm2 policy 0x%x is unsupported\n",
+ pols->code[i]);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_key_process_policy - collect the policty from the context
+ * @ctx: the context to collect from
+ * @payload: the payload structure to place it in
+ *
+ * THis function sizes the policy statements and allocates space
+ * within the payload to receive them before copying them over. It
+ * should be used after the ber decoder has completed successfully
+ */
+int tpm2_key_policy_process(struct tpm2_key_context *ctx,
+ struct trusted_key_payload *payload)
+{
+ int tot_len = 0;
+ u8 *buf;
+ int i, ret, len = 0;
+ struct tpm2_policies *pols;
+ u16 name_alg;
+
+ if (ctx->policy_count == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->policy_count; i++)
+ tot_len += ctx->policy_len[i];
+ tot_len += sizeof(*pols);
+
+ pols = kmalloc(tot_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pols)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ payload->policies = pols;
+ buf = (u8 *)(pols + 1);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->policy_count; i++) {
+ pols->policies[i] = &buf[len];
+ pols->len[i] = ctx->policy_len[i];
+ pols->code[i] = ctx->policy_code[i];
+ if (pols->len[i])
+ memcpy(pols->policies[i], ctx->policies[i],
+ ctx->policy_len[i]);
+ len += ctx->policy_len[i];
+ }
+ pols->count = ctx->policy_count;
+
+ ret = tpm2_validate_policy(pols);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* capture the hash and size */
+
+ /* the hash is the second algorithm (the nameAlg) */
+ name_alg = get_unaligned_be16(&ctx->pub[4]);
+ pols->hash = tpm2_alg_to_crypto(name_alg);
+
+ if (pols->hash < 0)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* and the digest appears after the attributes */
+ pols->hash_size = get_unaligned_be16(&ctx->pub[10]);
+
+ out:
+ if (ret) {
+ kfree(pols);
+ payload->policies = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols,
+ u32 hash, u8 *policydigest, u32 *plen)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (pols->count == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ rc = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+ if (WARN(rc > MAX_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ "BUG: trusted key code has alg %s with digest too large (%d)",
+ hash_algo_name[hash], rc)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pols->hash = hash;
+ pols->hash_size = rc;
+ *plen = rc;
+
+ /* policy digests always start out all zeros */
+ memset(policydigest, 0, rc);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) {
+ u8 *policy = pols->policies[i];
+ int len = pols->len[i];
+ u32 cmd = pols->code[i];
+ u8 code[4];
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(sdesc, tfm);
+
+ sdesc->tfm = tfm;
+ rc = crypto_shash_init(sdesc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* first hash the previous digest */
+ crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policydigest, *plen);
+
+ /* then hash the command code */
+ put_unaligned_be32(cmd, code);
+ crypto_shash_update(sdesc, code, 4);
+
+ if (len)
+ crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policy, len);
+
+ /* now output the intermediate to the policydigest */
+ crypto_shash_final(sdesc, policydigest);
+
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+
+ err:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int tpm2_encode_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u8 **data, u32 *len)
+{
+ const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
+ u8 *buf = kmalloc(2 * SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ u8 *work = buf + SCRATCH_SIZE;
+ u8 *ptr;
+ u8 *end_work = work + SCRATCH_SIZE;
+ int i, ret;
+
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) {
+ u8 *seq, *tag;
+ u32 cmd = pols->code[i];
+
+ if (WARN(work - buf + 14 + pols->len[i] > 2 * SCRATCH_SIZE,
+ "BUG: scratch buffer is too small"))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ work = asn1_encode_sequence(work, end_work, NULL, -1);
+ seq = work;
+
+ work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, NULL, -1);
+ tag = work;
+
+ work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, cmd);
+ asn1_encode_tag(tag, end_work, 0, NULL, work - tag);
+
+ work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 1, NULL, -1);
+ tag = work;
+
+ work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work,
+ pols->policies[i],
+ pols->len[i]);
+
+ asn1_encode_tag(tag, end_work, 1, NULL, work - tag);
+
+ seq = asn1_encode_sequence(seq, end_work, NULL, work - seq);
+ if (IS_ERR(seq)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(seq);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ptr = asn1_encode_sequence(buf, buf + SCRATCH_SIZE, buf + PAGE_SIZE,
+ work - buf - PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (IS_ERR(ptr)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(ptr);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *data = buf;
+ *len = ptr - buf;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ err:
+ kfree(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols)
+{
+ int i, rc;
+ u32 handle;
+ const char *failure;
+
+ rc = tpm2_start_policy_session(chip, &handle, pols->hash);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) {
+ u32 cmd = pols->code[i];
+ struct tpm_buf buf;
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, cmd);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR:
+ failure = "PCR";
+ /*
+ * for reasons best known to the TCG we have
+ * to reverse the two arguments to send to the
+ * policy command
+ */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, pols->hash_size);
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i] + pols->len[i] -
+ pols->hash_size, pols->hash_size);
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i],
+ pols->len[i] - pols->hash_size);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ failure = "unknown policy";
+ if (pols->len[i])
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i],
+ pols->len[i]);
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "updating policy");
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_notice("TPM policy %s failed, rc=%d\n",
+ failure, rc);
+ tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+
+struct tpm2_key_context {
+ u32 parent;
+ const u8 *pub;
+ u32 pub_len;
+ const u8 *priv;
+ u32 priv_len;
+ const u8 *policies[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES];
+ u32 policy_code[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES];
+ u16 policy_len[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES];
+ u8 policy_count;
+};
+
+struct tpm2_policies {
+ u32 code[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES];
+ u8 *policies[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES];
+ u16 len[TPM2_MAX_POLICIES];
+ u8 count;
+ int hash; /* crypto not TPM hash algorithm */
+ u16 hash_size;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+int tpm2_key_policy_process(struct tpm2_key_context *ctx,
+ struct trusted_key_payload *payload);
+int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 hash,
+ u8 *policydigest, u32 *plen);
+int tpm2_encode_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u8 **data, u32 *len);
+int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols);
+#else
+static inline int tpm2_key_policy_process(struct tpm2_key_context *ctx,
+ struct trusted_key_payload *payload)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols,
+ u32 hash,
+ u8 *policydigest, u32 *plen)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+static inline int tpm2_encode_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols,
+ u8 **data, u32 *len)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+static inline int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ struct tpm2_policies *pols)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
@@ -1,11 +1,24 @@
---
--- ASN.1 for TPM 2.0 keys
---
+--- Note: This isn't quite the definition in the standard
+--- However, the Linux asn.1 parser doesn't understand
+--- [2] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF OPTIONAL
+--- So there's an extra intermediate TPMPolicySequence
+--- definition to work around this
TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({tpm2_key_type}),
emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
+ policy [1] EXPLICIT TPMPolicySequence OPTIONAL,
parent INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}),
pubkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}),
privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv})
}
+
+TPMPolicySequence ::= SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy
+
+TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
+ commandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER ({tpm2_key_code}),
+ commandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_policy})
+ }
@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
struct trusted_key_payload *p;
p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
+ kfree_sensitive(p->policies);
kfree_sensitive(p);
}
@@ -311,7 +312,11 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
*/
static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+
+ p = key->payload.data[0];
+ kfree_sensitive(p->policies);
+ kfree_sensitive(p);
}
struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
+#include "tpm2-policy.h"
static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 };
@@ -54,6 +55,21 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool);
}
+ if (payload->policies) {
+ u8 *encoded_pols;
+ u32 encoded_pol_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = tpm2_encode_policy(payload->policies, &encoded_pols,
+ &encoded_pol_len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 1, encoded_pols,
+ encoded_pol_len);
+ kfree(encoded_pols);
+ }
+
/*
* Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length
*
@@ -77,14 +93,6 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
return work1 - payload->blob;
}
-struct tpm2_key_context {
- u32 parent;
- const u8 *pub;
- u32 pub_len;
- const u8 *priv;
- u32 priv_len;
-};
-
static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u8 **buf)
@@ -107,6 +115,12 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
if (!blob)
return -ENOMEM;
+ ret = tpm2_key_policy_process(&ctx, payload);
+ if (ret) {
+ kfree(blob);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
*buf = blob;
options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
@@ -223,16 +237,85 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
int blob_len = 0;
- int hash = tpm2_crypto_to_alg(options->hash);
+ int name_alg = tpm2_crypto_to_alg(options->hash);
u32 flags;
int rc;
+ static const int POLICY_SIZE = 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+ u8 *scratch = NULL;
+ const bool generate_policy = options->pcrinfo_len;
- if (hash < 0)
+ if (name_alg < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (!options->keyhandle)
return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (generate_policy && payload->policies)
+ /*
+ * can't specify both policy construction options
+ * and passed in policy set
+ */
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (generate_policy) {
+ struct tpm2_policies *pols;
+
+ pols = kmalloc(POLICY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pols)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ pols->count = 0;
+ payload->policies = pols;
+ scratch = (u8 *)(pols + 1);
+ }
+
+ if (options->pcrinfo_len) {
+ struct tpm2_policies *pols = payload->policies;
+ int i;
+ /* 4 array len */
+ const int len = 4 + options->pcrinfo_len;
+
+ i = pols->count++;
+ pols->len[i] = len;
+ pols->policies[i] = scratch;
+ pols->code[i] = TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR;
+
+ /* only a single TPMS_PCR_SELECTION */
+ put_unaligned_be32(1, &scratch[0]);
+ memcpy(&scratch[4], options->pcrinfo, options->pcrinfo_len);
+ scratch += len;
+ }
+
+ if (options->policydigest_len != 0 && payload->policies)
+ /* can't specify both a digest and a policy */
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * if we already have a policy, we have to add authorization
+ * to it. If we don't, we can simply follow the usual
+ * non-policy route.
+ */
+ if (generate_policy && options->blobauth_len) {
+ struct tpm2_policies *pols;
+ int i;
+
+ pols = payload->policies;
+ i = pols->count++;
+
+ /* the TPM2_PolicyPassword command has no payload */
+ pols->len[i] = 0;
+ pols->code[i] = TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE;
+ }
+
+ if (payload->policies) {
+ rc = tpm2_generate_policy_digest(payload->policies,
+ options->hash,
+ options->policydigest,
+ &options->policydigest_len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -271,7 +354,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
/* public */
tpm_buf_reset_sized(&sized);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, hash);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, name_alg);
/* key properties */
flags = 0;
@@ -467,9 +550,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u8 *data;
int rc;
- rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ if (payload->policies && options->policyhandle)
+ /* can't have both a passed in policy and a key resident one */
+ return -EINVAL;
rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL);
if (rc) {
@@ -477,6 +560,13 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
return rc;
}
+ if (payload->policies)
+ rc = tpm2_get_policy_session(chip, payload->policies);
+ else
+ rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL);
if (!options->policyhandle) {
@@ -505,8 +595,14 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
- if (rc > 0)
+ if (rc > 0) {
+ rc = tpm2_error_code(rc);
+ if (rc == TPM2_RC_BAD_AUTH)
+ pr_info("Bad blobauth\n");
+ else if (rc == TPM2_RC_AUTH_FAIL)
+ pr_info("Bad blobauth (DA Counter incremented)\n");
rc = -EPERM;
+ }
if (!rc) {
data_len = be16_to_cpup(
@@ -574,3 +670,24 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
return rc;
}
+
+/*
+ * weak symbols for policy statements in tpm2key.asn1 in case
+ * tpm2-policy.c can't be built
+ */
+
+int __weak tpm2_key_code(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ pr_err("TPM key policy is unsupported without CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC=Y\n");
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int __weak tpm2_key_policy(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
This commit adds the ability to specify a PCR lock policy to TPM2 keys. There is a complexity in that keys that contain both a password (blobauth) and a PCR lock have to have two policy statements (POLICY_PCR and POLICY_AUTHVALUE). The way to construct a pcrinfo statement for a key is simply to use the TPMS_PCR_SELECT structure to specify the PCRs and follow this by a hash of all their values in order of ascending PCR number. To construct a policy around the value of the resettable PCR 16 using the sha256 bank, first reset the pcr to zero giving a hash of all zeros as: 66687aadf862bd776c8fc18b8e9f8e20089714856ee233b3902a591d0d5f2925 Then the TPMS_PCR_SELECT value for sha256 bank PCR 16 is 000b03000001 So create a new 32 byte key with a policy locking the key to this value of PCR 16 with a parent key of 81000001 would be: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001 pcrinfo=000b0300000166687aadf862bd776c8fc18b8e9f8e20089714856ee233b3902a591d0d5f2925" @u Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> --- .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 53 ++- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 5 +- include/linux/tpm.h | 16 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 3 + security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c | 325 ++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h | 53 +++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 13 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 7 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 147 +++++++- 10 files changed, 606 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h