| Message ID | 940cd6a0e88793060cdf5ddb7880c03564b38bdd.1641822505.git.msuchanek@suse.de (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | KEXEC_SIG with appended signature | expand |
On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 02:49:53PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote: > Module verification already implements appeded signature check. > > Reuse it for kexec_file. > > The kexec_file implementation uses EKEYREJECTED error in some cases when > there is no key and the common implementation uses ENOPKG or EBADMSG > instead. > > Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de> > Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> > --- > v3: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about > change of return value > --- > arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 22 +++++----------------- > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c > index 8f43575a4dd3..c944d71316c7 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c > +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c > @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) > const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; > struct module_signature *ms; > unsigned long sig_len; > + int ret; > > /* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ > if (!ipl_secure_flag) > @@ -45,25 +46,12 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) > kernel_len -= marker_len; > > ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms); > - kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms); > + ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec"); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > > sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len); > - if (sig_len >= kernel_len) > - return -EKEYREJECTED; There is a small minor fix here, where by using mod_check_sig() now decreased the kernel_len by the sizeof(*ms). It is minor though. > - kernel_len -= sig_len; > - > - if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) > - return -EKEYREJECTED; More importantly is the return value used here changes but given the Ack by Heiko I suspect this if fine and does not break old userspace, the only change here is the possible error value returned by the kexec_file_load() system call. Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Luis
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c index 8f43575a4dd3..c944d71316c7 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; struct module_signature *ms; unsigned long sig_len; + int ret; /* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ if (!ipl_secure_flag) @@ -45,25 +46,12 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) kernel_len -= marker_len; ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms); - kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms); + ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec"); + if (ret) + return ret; sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len); - if (sig_len >= kernel_len) - return -EKEYREJECTED; - kernel_len -= sig_len; - - if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) - return -EKEYREJECTED; - - if (ms->algo != 0 || - ms->hash != 0 || - ms->signer_len != 0 || - ms->key_id_len != 0 || - ms->__pad[0] != 0 || - ms->__pad[1] != 0 || - ms->__pad[2] != 0) { - return -EBADMSG; - } + kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len; return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len, kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,