mbox series

[RFC,v2,00/12] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support

Message ID 20210826222627.3556-1-michael.roth@amd.com (mailing list archive)
Headers show
Series Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support | expand

Message

Michael Roth Aug. 26, 2021, 10:26 p.m. UTC
These patches implement SEV-SNP along with CPUID enforcement support for QEMU,
and are also available at:

  https://github.com/mdroth/qemu/commits/snp-rfc-v2-upstream

They are based on the initial RFC submitted by Brijesh:

  https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210722000259.ykepl7t6ptua7im5@amd.com/T/

Changes since RFC v1:

 - rebased onto latest master
 - drop SNP config file in favor of a new 'sev-snp-guest' object where all
   SNP-related params are passed as strings/integers via command-line
 - report specific error if BIOS reports invalid address/len for
   reserved/pre-validated regions (Connor)
 - use Range helpers for handling validated region overlaps (Dave)
 - simplify error handling in sev_snp_launch_start, and report the correct
   return code when handling LAUNCH_START failures (Dov)
 - add SEV-SNP bit to CPUID 0x8000001f when SNP enabled
 - updated query-sev to handle differences between SEV and SEV-SNP
 - updated to work against v5 of SEV-SNP host kernel / hypervisor patches

Overview
--------

SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integrity
protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data
replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory
encryption environment.

This series depends on the following patches to support SEV-SNP in Linux
kernel and OVMF:

  guest kernel (v5, part 1):
  https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210820151933.22401-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com/T/
  
  host kernel (v5, part 2):
  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210820155918.7518-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com/
  
  OVMF (v5):
  https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/77335?p=,,,20,0,0,0::Created,,posterid%3A5969970,20,2,20,83891508

The Qemu patches uses the command id added by the SEV-SNP hypervisor
patches to bootstrap the SEV-SNP VMs.

Additional resources
--------------------
SEV-SNP whitepaper
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf

APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36)

GHCB spec:
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf

SEV-SNP firmware specification:
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf

----------------------------------------------------------------
Brijesh Singh (6):
      linux-header: add the SNP specific command
      i386/sev: introduce 'sev-snp-guest' object
      i386/sev: initialize SNP context
      i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context
      i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled
      i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch

Michael Roth (6):
      i386/sev: introduce "sev-common" type to encapsulate common SEV state
      target/i386: set SEV-SNP CPUID bit when SNP enabled
      target/i386: allow versioned CPUs to specify new cache_info
      target/i386: add new EPYC CPU versions with updated cache_info
      i386/sev: sev-snp: add support for CPUID validation
      i386/sev: update query-sev QAPI format to handle SEV-SNP

 docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt |  77 +++-
 hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c             |   7 +-
 include/sysemu/sev.h           |   2 +-
 linux-headers/linux/kvm.h      |  50 +++
 qapi/misc-target.json          |  71 ++-
 qapi/qom.json                  |  94 +++-
 target/i386/cpu.c              | 221 ++++++++-
 target/i386/monitor.c          |  29 +-
 target/i386/sev-stub.c         |   8 +-
 target/i386/sev.c              | 989 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 target/i386/sev_i386.h         |   4 +
 target/i386/trace-events       |   4 +
 12 files changed, 1374 insertions(+), 182 deletions(-)

Comments

Daniel P. Berrangé Nov. 16, 2021, 9:23 a.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Aug 26, 2021 at 05:26:15PM -0500, Michael Roth wrote:
> These patches implement SEV-SNP along with CPUID enforcement support for QEMU,
> and are also available at:
> 
>   https://github.com/mdroth/qemu/commits/snp-rfc-v2-upstream
> 
> They are based on the initial RFC submitted by Brijesh:
> 
>   https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210722000259.ykepl7t6ptua7im5@amd.com/T/

What's the status of these patches ?  Is there going to be any non-RFC
version posted in the near future ?

Regards,
Daniel
Brijesh Singh Nov. 16, 2021, 11:54 a.m. UTC | #2
On 11/16/21 3:23 AM, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 26, 2021 at 05:26:15PM -0500, Michael Roth wrote:
>> These patches implement SEV-SNP along with CPUID enforcement support for QEMU,
>> and are also available at:
>>
>>   https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fmdroth%2Fqemu%2Fcommits%2Fsnp-rfc-v2-upstream&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C3506c40b7121401945b108d9a8e2c8d0%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637726514264887241%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=HXdG4TmNY157Gz6qLXhAL8FufCTxe9VzSiTaQICGawo%3D&reserved=0
>>
>> They are based on the initial RFC submitted by Brijesh:
>>
>>   https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.kernel.org%2Fqemu-devel%2F20210722000259.ykepl7t6ptua7im5%40amd.com%2FT%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C3506c40b7121401945b108d9a8e2c8d0%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637726514264887241%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=AhOI%2FoQFq4k%2B6uOqYQqos6FlxE4AD1FFYfIPPiSHioI%3D&reserved=0
> What's the status of these patches ?  Is there going to be any non-RFC
> version posted in the near future ?


I am waiting for the KVM interface to be finalized before spinning the
qemu patch. With the recent discussion on KVM patch we may see some
change in the interfaces. I am hoping to post updated series after
posting the newer KVM series.

thanls


>
> Regards,
> Daniel