From patchwork Wed Feb 23 05:21:36 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Junaid Shahid X-Patchwork-Id: 12756360 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0F75C433FE for ; Wed, 23 Feb 2022 05:23:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237538AbiBWFX1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Feb 2022 00:23:27 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55978 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230206AbiBWFX0 (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Feb 2022 00:23:26 -0500 Received: from mail-yw1-x1149.google.com (mail-yw1-x1149.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1149]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 233DF57B14 for ; Tue, 22 Feb 2022 21:22:58 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-yw1-x1149.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-2d6180e0ab4so162318177b3.2 for ; Tue, 22 Feb 2022 21:22:58 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from:to:cc; bh=zjp+Ug3qKnDQh2ZYpztLrr5vS+97j+kxGwKO31wAt4Y=; b=HCNybVBOuuMO0ov4T872vhKzoUX0CDxQol003kM3ZfWkC86rO0nKYHZEPBGCAOz8Qh Bih2YnChCWVMziuvzf6aa2y3OlGU0JADLPyhuU6dmM4qSlCrn3ndEjWTfle+lo1qUd56 MXRj08+JI/3pVpZJniCqNpX8yzXhug12OYqtKxUateLiEXRk87PCn8OO32qhdGNWQkqf 9J+zOc58mjCtmd5L0ezqa7I/Rj9rm6Qj41PxEifEAmN2Zf/row/vzotG+Ja3TW4ofsfG Yh5JLhlSugnOTnaOVGJK6Y/m9yDzwJIt0yxJaNAAtzaBFsv52uEEJNQF50HlHWthAhO4 iGaQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from:to:cc; bh=zjp+Ug3qKnDQh2ZYpztLrr5vS+97j+kxGwKO31wAt4Y=; b=7RPTXgRbmjZKcuZlUfwciokSCKwd8sbit2GPdQ4fx8ZnaftZM7TpQx59yMPFskjlLm QrHWSmf500WLDcCNbz/qEe7lcQc/k2lpZGgZwo7Ghax2Cg2dM8Y3R0LClG6g9uaNO5nQ hFr/sCvM7k18TCLdyrGYCFCcui317XY0c4XXhohsRC7rE0ZFcUxvqL+D1d7nfFrVBONd ByYCdSwKYix6OFwMUFKG5YowxPpb5pe5lf4rMgV/cPSC0krVkSTrAqgHbzNwFXSpgRW5 UYmuBy3iXhaN221v0rZviJVcbR7oJA20Y+jTzNLCalr+o9oKP9bqOdGH9t5o6tdWogM2 S07Q== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530Uk9UaR3YGYy7QaUFtAjlLSjKXD+eMJDBnsF4CXMXQt9cvF4zs bFUQqMzpP+AUeb2EbuOZ0fliR5L8zQCb X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxGwe8LCKWxDRCHkVlkAVbw2DqPXrMcJw7+qIj1NWzZCk3cjYWicBO/QVKBWBdvP6C3Q+AJ2/s6QaCm X-Received: from js-desktop.svl.corp.google.com ([2620:15c:2cd:202:ccbe:5d15:e2e6:322]) (user=junaids job=sendgmr) by 2002:a25:a4aa:0:b0:624:b512:7d27 with SMTP id g39-20020a25a4aa000000b00624b5127d27mr9210236ybi.590.1645593777356; Tue, 22 Feb 2022 21:22:57 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 21:21:36 -0800 Message-Id: <20220223052223.1202152-1-junaids@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1.473.g83b2b277ed-goog Subject: [RFC PATCH 00/47] Address Space Isolation for KVM From: Junaid Shahid To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com, pjt@google.com, oweisse@google.com, alexandre.chartre@oracle.com, rppt@linux.ibm.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, peterz@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org This patch series is a proof-of-concept RFC for an end-to-end implementation of Address Space Isolation for KVM. It has similar goals and a somewhat similar high-level design as the original ASI patches from Alexandre Chartre ([1],[2],[3],[4]), but with a different underlying implementation. This also includes several memory management changes to help with differentiating between sensitive and non-sensitive memory and mapping of non-sensitive memory into the ASI restricted address spaces. This RFC is intended as a demonstration of what a full ASI implementation for KVM could look like, not necessarily as a direct proposal for what might eventually be merged. In particular, these patches do not yet implement KPTI on top of ASI, although the framework is generic enough to be able to support it. Similarly, these patches do not include non-sensitive annotations for data structures that did not get frequently accessed during execution of our test workloads, but the framework is designed such that new non-sensitive memory annotations can be added trivially. The patches apply on top of Linux v5.16. These patches are also available via gerrit at https://linux-review.googlesource.com/q/topic:asi-rfc. Background ========== Address Space Isolation is a comprehensive security mitigation for several types of speculative execution attacks. Even though the kernel already has several speculative execution vulnerability mitigations, some of them can be quite expensive if enabled fully e.g. to fully mitigate L1TF using the existing mechanisms requires doing an L1 cache flush on every single VM entry as well as disabling hyperthreading altogether. (Although core scheduling can provide some protection when hyperthreading is enabled, it is not sufficient by itself to protect against all leaks unless sibling hyperthread stunning is also performed on every VM exit.) ASI provides a much less expensive mitigation for such vulnerabilities while still providing an almost similar level of protection. There are a couple of basic insights/assumptions behind ASI: 1. Most execution paths in the kernel (especially during virtual machine execution) access only memory that is not particularly sensitive even if it were to get leaked to the executing process/VM (setting aside for a moment what exactly should be considered sensitive or non-sensitive). 2. Even when executing speculatively, the CPU can generally only bring memory that is mapped in the current page tables into its various caches and internal buffers. Given these, the idea of using ASI to thwart speculative attacks is that we can execute the kernel using a restricted set of page tables most of the time and switch to the full unrestricted kernel address space only when the kernel needs to access something that is not mapped in the restricted address space. And we keep track of when a switch to the full kernel address space is done, so that before returning back to the process/VM, we can switch back to the restricted address space. In the paths where the kernel is able to execute entirely while remaining in the restricted address space, we can skip other mitigations for speculative execution attacks (such as L1 cache / micro-arch buffer flushes, sibling hyperthread stunning etc.). Only in the cases where we do end up switching the page tables, we perform these more expensive mitigations. Assuming that happens relatively infrequently, the performance can be significantly better compared to performing these mitigations all the time. Please note that although we do have a sibling hyperthread stunning implementation internally, which is fully integrated with KVM-ASI, it is not included in this RFC for the time being. The earlier upstream proposal for sibling stunning [6] could potentially be integrated into an upstream ASI implementation. Basic concepts ============== Different types of restricted address spaces are represented by different ASI classes. For instance, KVM-ASI is an ASI class used during VM execution. KPTI would be another ASI class. An ASI instance (struct asi) represents a single restricted address space. There is a separate ASI instance for each untrusted context (e.g. a userspace process, a VM, or even a single VCPU etc.) Note that there can be multiple untrusted security contexts (and thus multiple restricted address spaces) within a single process e.g. in the case of VMs, the userspace process is a different security context than the guest VM, and in principle, even each VCPU could be considered a separate security context (That would be primarily useful for securing nested virtualization). In this RFC, a process can have at most one ASI instance of each class, though this is not an inherent limitation and multiple instances of the same class should eventually be supported. (A process can still have ASI instances of different classes e.g. KVM-ASI and KPTI.) In fact, in principle, it is not even entirely necessary to tie an ASI instance to a process. That is just a simplification for the initial implementation. An asi_enter operation switches into the restricted address space represented by the given ASI instance. An asi_exit operation switches to the full unrestricted kernel address space. Each ASI class can provide hooks to be executed during these operations, which can be used to perform speculative attack mitigations relevant to that class. For instance, the KVM-ASI hooks would perform a sibling-hyperthread-stun operation in the asi_exit hook, and L1-flush/MDS-clear and sibling-hyperthread-unstun operations in the asi_enter hook. On the other hand, the hooks for the KPTI class would be NO-OP, since the switching of the page tables is enough mitigation in that case. If the kernel attempts to access memory that is not mapped in the currently active ASI instance, the page fault handler automatically performs an asi_exit operation. This means that except for a few critical pieces of memory, leaving something out of an unrestricted address space will result in only a performance hit, rather than a catastrophic failure. The kernel can also perform explicit asi_exit operations in some paths as needed. Apart from the page fault handler, other exceptions and interrupts (even NMIs) do not automatically cause an asi_exit and could potentially be executed completely within a restricted address space if they don't end up accessing any sensitive piece of memory. The mappings within a restricted address space are always a subset of the full kernel address space and each mapping is always the same as the corresponding mapping in the full kernel address space. This is necessary because we could potentially end up performing an asi_exit at any point. Although this RFC only includes an implementation of the KVM-ASI class, a KPTI class could also be implemented on top of the same infrastructure. Furthermore, in the future we could also implement a KPTI-Next class that actually uses the ASI model for userspace processes i.e. mapping non-sensitive kernel memory in the restricted address space and trying to execute most syscalls/interrupts without switching to the full kernel address space, as opposed to the current KPTI which requires an address space switch on every kernel/user mode transition. Memory classification ===================== We divide memory into three categories. 1. Sensitive memory This is memory that should never get leaked to any process or VM. Sensitive memory is only mapped in the unrestricted kernel page tables. By default, all memory is considered sensitive unless specifically categorized otherwise. 2. Globally non-sensitive memory This is memory that does not present a substantial security threat even if it were to get leaked to any process or VM in the system. Globally non-sensitive memory is mapped in the restricted address spaces for all processes. 3. Locally non-sensitive memory This is memory that does not present a substantial security threat if it were to get leaked to the currently running process or VM, but would present a security issue if it were to get leaked to any other process or VM in the system. Examples include userspace memory (or guest memory in the case of VMs) or kernel structures containing userspace/guest register context etc. Locally non-sensitive memory is mapped only in the restricted address space of a single process. Various mechanisms are provided to annotate different types of memory (static, buddy allocator, slab, vmalloc etc.) as globally or locally non-sensitive. In addition, the ASI infrastructure takes care to ensure that different classes of memory do not share the same physical page. This includes separation of sensitive, globally non-sensitive and locally non-sensitive memory into different pages and also separation of locally non-sensitive memory for different processes into different pages as well. What exactly should be considered non-sensitive (either globally or locally) is somewhat open-ended. Some things are clearly sensitive or non-sensitive, but many things also fall into a gray area, depending on how paranoid one wants to be. For this proof of concept, we have generally treated such things as non-sensitive, though that may not necessarily be the ideal classification in each case. Similarly, there is also a gray area between globally and locally non-sensitive classifications in some cases, and in those cases this RFC has mostly erred on the side of marking them as locally non-sensitive, even though many of those cases could likely be safely classified as globally non-sensitive. Although this implementation includes fairly extensive support for marking most types of dynamically allocated memory as locally non-sensitive, it is possibly feasible, at least for KVM-ASI, to get away with a simpler implementation (such as [5]), if we are very selective about what memory we treat as locally non-sensitive (as opposed to globally non-sensitive). Nevertheless, the more general mechanism is included in this proof of concept as an illustration for what could be done if we really needed to treat any arbitrary kernel memory as locally non-sensitive. It is also possible to have ASI classes that do not utilize the above described infrastructure and instead manage all the memory mappings inside the restricted address space on their own. References ========== [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1557758315-12667-1-git-send-email-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1562855138-19507-1-git-send-email-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1582734120-26757-1-git-send-email-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com [4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200504144939.11318-1-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com [5] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190612170834.14855-1-mhillenb@amazon.de [6] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200815031908.1015049-1-joel@joelfernandes.org Cc: Paul Turner Cc: Jim Mattson Cc: Alexandre Chartre Cc: Mike Rapoport Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Andy Lutomirski Junaid Shahid (32): mm: asi: Introduce ASI core API mm: asi: Add command-line parameter to enable/disable ASI mm: asi: Switch to unrestricted address space when entering scheduler mm: asi: ASI support in interrupts/exceptions mm: asi: Make __get_current_cr3_fast() ASI-aware mm: asi: ASI page table allocation and free functions mm: asi: Functions to map/unmap a memory range into ASI page tables mm: asi: Add basic infrastructure for global non-sensitive mappings mm: Add __PAGEFLAG_FALSE mm: asi: Support for global non-sensitive direct map allocations mm: asi: Global non-sensitive vmalloc/vmap support mm: asi: Support for global non-sensitive slab caches mm: asi: Disable ASI API when ASI is not enabled for a process kvm: asi: Restricted address space for VM execution mm: asi: Support for mapping non-sensitive pcpu chunks mm: asi: Aliased direct map for local non-sensitive allocations mm: asi: Support for pre-ASI-init local non-sensitive allocations mm: asi: Support for locally nonsensitive page allocations mm: asi: Support for locally non-sensitive vmalloc allocations mm: asi: Add support for locally non-sensitive VM_USERMAP pages mm: asi: Add support for mapping all userspace memory into ASI mm: asi: Support for local non-sensitive slab caches mm: asi: Avoid warning from NMI userspace accesses in ASI context mm: asi: Use separate PCIDs for restricted address spaces mm: asi: Avoid TLB flushes during ASI CR3 switches when possible mm: asi: Avoid TLB flush IPIs to CPUs not in ASI context mm: asi: Reduce TLB flushes when freeing pages asynchronously mm: asi: Add API for mapping userspace address ranges mm: asi: Support for non-sensitive SLUB caches x86: asi: Allocate FPU state separately when ASI is enabled. kvm: asi: Map guest memory into restricted ASI address space kvm: asi: Unmap guest memory from ASI address space when using nested virt Ofir Weisse (15): asi: Added ASI memory cgroup flag mm: asi: Added refcounting when initilizing an asi mm: asi: asi_exit() on PF, skip handling if address is accessible mm: asi: Adding support for dynamic percpu ASI allocations mm: asi: ASI annotation support for static variables. mm: asi: ASI annotation support for dynamic modules. mm: asi: Skip conventional L1TF/MDS mitigations mm: asi: support for static percpu DEFINE_PER_CPU*_ASI mm: asi: Annotation of static variables to be nonsensitive mm: asi: Annotation of PERCPU variables to be nonsensitive mm: asi: Annotation of dynamic variables to be nonsensitive kvm: asi: Splitting kvm_vcpu_arch into non/sensitive parts mm: asi: Mapping global nonsensitive areas in asi_global_init kvm: asi: Do asi_exit() in vcpu_run loop before returning to userspace mm: asi: Properly un/mapping task stack from ASI + tlb flush arch/alpha/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/arc/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/arm/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/csky/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/h8300/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/hexagon/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/ia64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/m68k/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/microblaze/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/mips/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/nds32/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/nios2/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/openrisc/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/parisc/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/s390/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/sh/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/sparc/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/um/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + arch/x86/events/core.c | 6 +- arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/msr.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/asi.h | 215 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/current.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/debugreg.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/hw_irq.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 25 +- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 124 +- arch/x86/include/asm/page.h | 19 +- arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h | 27 +- arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h | 20 + arch/x86/include/asm/percpu.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 10 + arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 17 +- arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 49 +- arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c | 8 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 12 +- arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 7 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 47 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c | 7 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 21 +- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 12 + arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/irq.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 13 +- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/setup_percpu.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/smp.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c | 10 +- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 18 +- arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h | 22 +- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 11 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 16 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 209 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 40 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 14 +- arch/x86/kvm/mtrr.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 34 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 70 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 52 +- arch/x86/kvm/trace.h | 10 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 14 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 90 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 152 ++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 315 +++-- arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 4 +- arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/mm/asi.c | 1397 ++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 67 +- arch/x86/mm/init.c | 7 +- arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 26 +- arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 34 +- arch/x86/mm/mm_internal.h | 5 + arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c | 8 + arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 419 ++++++- arch/xtensa/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 + fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +- fs/eventfd.c | 2 +- fs/eventpoll.c | 10 +- fs/exec.c | 7 + fs/file.c | 3 +- fs/timerfd.c | 2 +- include/asm-generic/asi.h | 149 +++ include/asm-generic/irq_regs.h | 2 +- include/asm-generic/percpu.h | 6 + include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 36 +- include/linux/arch_topology.h | 2 +- include/linux/debug_locks.h | 4 +- include/linux/gfp.h | 13 +- include/linux/hrtimer.h | 2 +- include/linux/interrupt.h | 2 +- include/linux/jiffies.h | 4 +- include/linux/kernel_stat.h | 4 +- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 +- include/linux/kvm_types.h | 3 + include/linux/memcontrol.h | 3 + include/linux/mm_types.h | 59 + include/linux/module.h | 15 + include/linux/notifier.h | 2 +- include/linux/page-flags.h | 19 + include/linux/percpu-defs.h | 39 + include/linux/percpu.h | 8 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/prandom.h | 2 +- include/linux/profile.h | 2 +- include/linux/rcupdate.h | 4 +- include/linux/rcutree.h | 2 +- include/linux/sched.h | 5 + include/linux/sched/mm.h | 12 + include/linux/sched/sysctl.h | 1 + include/linux/slab.h | 68 +- include/linux/slab_def.h | 4 + include/linux/slub_def.h | 6 + include/linux/vmalloc.h | 16 +- include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 14 +- init/main.c | 2 +- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 9 +- kernel/cpu.c | 14 +- kernel/entry/common.c | 6 + kernel/events/core.c | 25 +- kernel/exit.c | 2 + kernel/fork.c | 69 +- kernel/freezer.c | 2 +- kernel/irq_work.c | 6 +- kernel/locking/lockdep.c | 14 +- kernel/module-internal.h | 1 + kernel/module.c | 210 +++- kernel/panic.c | 2 +- kernel/printk/printk.c | 4 +- kernel/profile.c | 4 +- kernel/rcu/srcutree.c | 3 +- kernel/rcu/tree.c | 12 +- kernel/rcu/update.c | 4 +- kernel/sched/clock.c | 2 +- kernel/sched/core.c | 23 +- kernel/sched/cpuacct.c | 10 +- kernel/sched/cpufreq.c | 3 +- kernel/sched/cputime.c | 4 +- kernel/sched/fair.c | 7 +- kernel/sched/loadavg.c | 2 +- kernel/sched/rt.c | 2 +- kernel/sched/sched.h | 25 +- kernel/sched/topology.c | 28 +- kernel/smp.c | 26 +- kernel/softirq.c | 5 +- kernel/time/hrtimer.c | 4 +- kernel/time/jiffies.c | 8 +- kernel/time/ntp.c | 30 +- kernel/time/tick-common.c | 6 +- kernel/time/tick-internal.h | 6 +- kernel/time/tick-sched.c | 4 +- kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 10 +- kernel/time/timekeeping.h | 2 +- kernel/time/timer.c | 4 +- kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 5 +- kernel/trace/trace.c | 4 +- kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c | 2 +- kernel/trace/trace_sched_switch.c | 4 +- kernel/tracepoint.c | 2 +- kernel/watchdog.c | 12 +- lib/debug_locks.c | 5 +- lib/irq_regs.c | 2 +- lib/radix-tree.c | 6 +- lib/random32.c | 3 +- mm/init-mm.c | 2 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/memcontrol.c | 37 +- mm/memory.c | 4 +- mm/page_alloc.c | 204 +++- mm/percpu-internal.h | 23 +- mm/percpu-km.c | 5 +- mm/percpu-vm.c | 57 +- mm/percpu.c | 273 ++++- mm/slab.c | 42 +- mm/slab.h | 166 ++- mm/slab_common.c | 461 ++++++- mm/slub.c | 140 ++- mm/sparse.c | 4 +- mm/util.c | 3 +- mm/vmalloc.c | 193 ++- net/core/skbuff.c | 2 +- net/core/sock.c | 2 +- security/Kconfig | 12 + tools/perf/builtin-kmem.c | 2 + virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c | 2 +- virt/kvm/eventfd.c | 5 +- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 61 +- 211 files changed, 5727 insertions(+), 959 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/asi.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/asi.c create mode 100644 include/asm-generic/asi.h