From patchwork Thu Mar 10 14:08:58 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Chao Peng X-Patchwork-Id: 12776416 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 430F8C433FE for ; Thu, 10 Mar 2022 14:09:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S242697AbiCJOKj (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Mar 2022 09:10:39 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:46972 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234624AbiCJOKh (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Mar 2022 09:10:37 -0500 Received: from mga02.intel.com (mga02.intel.com [134.134.136.20]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7BD6457499; Thu, 10 Mar 2022 06:09:36 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1646921376; x=1678457376; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=qOgHsb0TerXs6BotdtqnRubNe5gkoi8JAE7y4owcZNM=; b=VZlo9WvZcFU4DH2iqp1IjB67PABnlJsF9QhgcCF6EcBm3VDewb1X0B0+ W8WI3OVfW/mhp7Wg5eD2/hbKcuzjTtQPJtC789aDwv8GdPElk+sMGUsZS vURPkq1sobN1O6AWYxOvpC+9gS2zL4h0I/K1GskaALPljzgLjEciH8QNO 44yp4iUSaYRzC3lARrk6qo26GOqKoiBe+LrIH/4oQl1otVB5PMCMHDa2m 2+dOC/INdY3M4GD8XyqY8a8vM3oXKg1UHPlMoeF2qO9UmGeYf54TjCGg9 6t6jUGArYu78iuBvyF9OPbpe592icTlZp4R+JvY5L/Sa2+qLertW6jvsI Q==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10281"; a="242702393" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,170,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="242702393" Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by orsmga101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 10 Mar 2022 06:09:36 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.90,170,1643702400"; d="scan'208";a="554654744" Received: from chaop.bj.intel.com ([10.240.192.101]) by orsmga008.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 10 Mar 2022 06:09:27 -0800 From: Chao Peng To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Sean Christopherson , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Joerg Roedel , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" , Hugh Dickins , Jeff Layton , "J . Bruce Fields" , Andrew Morton , Mike Rapoport , Steven Price , "Maciej S . Szmigiero" , Vlastimil Babka , Vishal Annapurve , Yu Zhang , Chao Peng , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , luto@kernel.org, jun.nakajima@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com, david@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v5 00/13] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 22:08:58 +0800 Message-Id: <20220310140911.50924-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org This is the v5 of this series which tries to implement the fd-based KVM guest private memory. The patches are based on latest kvm/queue branch commit: d5089416b7fb KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2 Introduction ------------ In general this patch series introduce fd-based memslot which provides guest memory through memory file descriptor fd[offset,size] instead of hva/size. The fd can be created from a supported memory filesystem like tmpfs/hugetlbfs etc. which we refer as memory backing store. KVM and the the memory backing store exchange callbacks when such memslot gets created. At runtime KVM will call into callbacks provided by the backing store to get the pfn with the fd+offset. Memory backing store will also call into KVM callbacks when userspace fallocate/punch hole on the fd to notify KVM to map/unmap secondary MMU page tables. Comparing to existing hva-based memslot, this new type of memslot allows guest memory unmapped from host userspace like QEMU and even the kernel itself, therefore reduce attack surface and prevent bugs. Based on this fd-based memslot, we can build guest private memory that is going to be used in confidential computing environments such as Intel TDX and AMD SEV. When supported, the memory backing store can provide more enforcement on the fd and KVM can use a single memslot to hold both the private and shared part of the guest memory. mm extension --------------------- Introduces new MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag for memfd_create(), the file created with these flags cannot read(), write() or mmap() etc via normal MMU operations. The file content can only be used with the newly introduced memfile_notifier extension. The memfile_notifier extension provides two sets of callbacks for KVM to interact with the memory backing store: - memfile_notifier_ops: callbacks for memory backing store to notify KVM when memory gets allocated/invalidated. - memfile_pfn_ops: callbacks for KVM to call into memory backing store to request memory pages for guest private memory. The memfile_notifier extension also provides APIs for memory backing store to register/unregister itself and to trigger the notifier when the bookmarked memory gets fallocated/invalidated. memslot extension ----------------- Add the private fd and the fd offset to existing 'shared' memslot so that both private/shared guest memory can live in one single memslot. A page in the memslot is either private or shared. A page is private only when it's already allocated in the backing store fd, all the other cases it's treated as shared, this includes those already mapped as shared as well as those having not been mapped. This means the memory backing store is the place which tells the truth of which page is private. Private memory map/unmap and conversion --------------------------------------- Userspace's map/unmap operations are done by fallocate() ioctl on the backing store fd. - map: default fallocate() with mode=0. - unmap: fallocate() with FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE. The map/unmap will trigger above memfile_notifier_ops to let KVM map/unmap secondary MMU page tables. Test ---- To test the new functionalities of this patch TDX patchset is needed. Since TDX patchset has not been merged so I did two kinds of test: - Regresion test on kvm/queue (this patch) Most new code are not covered. I only tested building and booting. - New Funational test on latest TDX code The patch is rebased to latest TDX code and tested the new funcationalities. For TDX test please see below repos: Linux: https://github.com/chao-p/linux/tree/privmem-v5.1 QEMU: https://github.com/chao-p/qemu/tree/privmem-v4 And an example QEMU command line: -object tdx-guest,id=tdx \ -object memory-backend-memfd-private,id=ram1,size=2G \ -machine q35,kvm-type=tdx,pic=no,kernel_irqchip=split,memory-encryption=tdx,memory-backend=ram1 Changelog ---------- v5: - Removed userspace visible F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE, instead using an in-kernel flag (SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE for shmem). Private fd can only be created by MFD_INACCESSIBLE. - Introduced new APIs for backing store to register itself to memfile_notifier instead of direct function call. - Added the accounting and restriction for MFD_INACCESSIBLE memory. - Added KVM API doc for new memslot extensions and man page for the new MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag. - Removed the overlap check for mapping the same file+offset into multiple gfns due to perf consideration, warned in document. - Addressed other comments in v4. v4: - Decoupled the callbacks between KVM/mm from memfd and use new name 'memfile_notifier'. - Supported register multiple memslots to the same backing store. - Added per-memslot pfn_ops instead of per-system. - Reworked the invalidation part. - Improved new KVM uAPIs (private memslot extension and memory error) per Sean's suggestions. - Addressed many other minor fixes for comments from v3. v3: - Added locking protection when calling invalidate_page_range/fallocate callbacks. - Changed memslot structure to keep use useraddr for shared memory. - Re-organized F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE and MEMFD_OPS. - Added MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag to force F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE. - Commit message improvement. - Many small fixes for comments from the last version. Links to previous discussions ----------------------------- [1] Original design proposal: https://lkml.kernel.org/kvm/20210824005248.200037-1-seanjc@google.com/ [2] Updated proposal and RFC patch v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20211111141352.26311-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com/ [3] Patch v4: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/1/18/395 Chao Peng (10): mm: Introduce memfile_notifier mm/shmem: Restrict MFD_INACCESSIBLE memory against RLIMIT_MEMLOCK KVM: Extend the memslot to support fd-based private memory KVM: Use kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext KVM: Add KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_ERROR exit KVM: Use memfile_pfn_ops to obtain pfn for private pages KVM: Handle page fault for private memory KVM: Register private memslot to memory backing store KVM: Zap existing KVM mappings when pages changed in the private fd KVM: Expose KVM_MEM_PRIVATE Kirill A. Shutemov (2): mm/memfd: Introduce MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag mm/shmem: Support memfile_notifier Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 59 +++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 73 +++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 11 ++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 12 +-- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 49 ++++++++- include/linux/memfile_notifier.h | 64 ++++++++++++ include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 11 +++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 17 ++++ include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 + mm/Kconfig | 4 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/memfd.c | 26 ++++- mm/memfile_notifier.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++ mm/shmem.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 16 files changed, 717 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/memfile_notifier.h create mode 100644 mm/memfile_notifier.c