| Message ID | 20230718131844.5706-1-guang.zeng@intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | LASS KVM virtualization support | expand |
Please ignore this patch set as I posted wrong one by mistake. I will submit the correct patch series soon. Sorry for bothering. On 7/18/2023 9:18 PM, Zeng, Guang wrote: > Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)[1] is a new mechanism that > enforces the same mode-based protections as paging, i.e. SMAP/SMEP > but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections > enforced by LASS are applied before paging, "probes" by malicious > software will provide no paging-based timing information. > > Based on a linear-address organization, LASS partitions 64-bit linear > address space into two halves, user-mode address (LA[bit 63]=0) and > supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1). > > LASS aims to prevent any attempt to probe supervisor-mode addresses by > user mode, and likewise stop any attempt to access (if SMAP enabled) or > execute user-mode addresses from supervisor mode. > > When platform has LASS capability, KVM requires to expose this feature > to guest VM enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], and > allow guest to enable it via CR4.LASS[bit 27] on demand. For instruction > executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the check. But KVM > also needs to behave same as hardware to apply LASS to kinds of guest > memory accesses when emulating instructions by software. > > KVM will take following LASS violations check on emulation path. > User-mode access to supervisor space address: > LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3) > Supervisor-mode access to user space address: > Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3) > Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 && > CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access) > > This patch series provide a LASS KVM solution and depends on kernel > enabling that can be found at > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ > > We tested the basic function of LASS virtualization including LASS > enumeration and enabling in non-root and nested environment. As KVM > unittest framework is not compatible to LASS rule, we use kernel module > and application test to emulate LASS violation instead. With KVM forced > emulation mechanism, we also verified the LASS functionality on some > emulation path with instruction fetch and data access to have same > behavior as hardware. > > How to extend kselftest to support LASS is under investigation and > experiment. > > [1] Intel ISE https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368 > Chapter Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > v1->v2 > 1. refactor and optimize the interface of instruction emulation > by introducing new set of operation type definition prefixed with > "X86EMUL_F_" to distinguish access. > 2. reorganize the patch to make each area of KVM better isolated. > 3. refine LASS violation check design with consideration of wraparound > access across address space boundary. > > v0->v1 > 1. Adapt to new __linearize() API > 2. Function refactor of vmx_check_lass() > 3. Refine commit message to be more precise > 4. Drop LASS kvm cap detection depending > on hardware capability > > Binbin Wu (4): > KVM: x86: Consolidate flags for __linearize() > KVM: x86: Use a new flag for branch instructions > KVM: x86: Add an emulation flag for implicit system access > KVM: x86: Add X86EMUL_F_INVTLB and pass it in em_invlpg() > > Zeng Guang (4): > KVM: emulator: Add emulation of LASS violation checks on linear > address > KVM: VMX: Implement and apply vmx_is_lass_violation() for LASS > protection > KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS > KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space > > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 3 ++- > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++- > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 ++-- > arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- > arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 9 +++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 ++- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 4 ++++ > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 +++ > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ > 11 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) >
On July 18, 2023 6:18:36 AM PDT, Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com> wrote: >Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)[1] is a new mechanism that >enforces the same mode-based protections as paging, i.e. SMAP/SMEP >but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections >enforced by LASS are applied before paging, "probes" by malicious >software will provide no paging-based timing information. > >Based on a linear-address organization, LASS partitions 64-bit linear >address space into two halves, user-mode address (LA[bit 63]=0) and >supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1). > >LASS aims to prevent any attempt to probe supervisor-mode addresses by >user mode, and likewise stop any attempt to access (if SMAP enabled) or >execute user-mode addresses from supervisor mode. > >When platform has LASS capability, KVM requires to expose this feature >to guest VM enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], and >allow guest to enable it via CR4.LASS[bit 27] on demand. For instruction >executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the check. But KVM >also needs to behave same as hardware to apply LASS to kinds of guest >memory accesses when emulating instructions by software. > >KVM will take following LASS violations check on emulation path. >User-mode access to supervisor space address: > LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3) >Supervisor-mode access to user space address: > Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3) > Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 && > CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access) > >This patch series provide a LASS KVM solution and depends on kernel >enabling that can be found at >https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ > >We tested the basic function of LASS virtualization including LASS >enumeration and enabling in non-root and nested environment. As KVM >unittest framework is not compatible to LASS rule, we use kernel module >and application test to emulate LASS violation instead. With KVM forced >emulation mechanism, we also verified the LASS functionality on some >emulation path with instruction fetch and data access to have same >behavior as hardware. > >How to extend kselftest to support LASS is under investigation and >experiment. > >[1] Intel ISE https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368 >Chapter Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >v1->v2 >1. refactor and optimize the interface of instruction emulation > by introducing new set of operation type definition prefixed with > "X86EMUL_F_" to distinguish access. >2. reorganize the patch to make each area of KVM better isolated. >3. refine LASS violation check design with consideration of wraparound > access across address space boundary. > >v0->v1 >1. Adapt to new __linearize() API >2. Function refactor of vmx_check_lass() >3. Refine commit message to be more precise >4. Drop LASS kvm cap detection depending > on hardware capability > >Binbin Wu (4): > KVM: x86: Consolidate flags for __linearize() > KVM: x86: Use a new flag for branch instructions > KVM: x86: Add an emulation flag for implicit system access > KVM: x86: Add X86EMUL_F_INVTLB and pass it in em_invlpg() > >Zeng Guang (4): > KVM: emulator: Add emulation of LASS violation checks on linear > address > KVM: VMX: Implement and apply vmx_is_lass_violation() for LASS > protection > KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS > KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space > > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 3 ++- > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++- > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 ++-- > arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- > arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 9 +++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 ++- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 4 ++++ > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 +++ > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ > 11 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > Equating this with SMEP/SMAP is backwards. LASS is something completely different: it makes it so *user space accesses* cannot even walk the kernel page tables (specifically, the negative half of the linear address space.) Such an access with immediately #PF: it is similar to always having U=0 in the uppermost level of the page tables, except with LASS enabled the CPU will not even touch the page tables in memory.
On 7/20/2023 9:59 AM, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > On July 18, 2023 6:18:36 AM PDT, Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com> wrote: >> Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)[1] is a new mechanism that >> enforces the same mode-based protections as paging, i.e. SMAP/SMEP >> but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections >> enforced by LASS are applied before paging, "probes" by malicious >> software will provide no paging-based timing information. >> >> Based on a linear-address organization, LASS partitions 64-bit linear >> address space into two halves, user-mode address (LA[bit 63]=0) and >> supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1). >> >> LASS aims to prevent any attempt to probe supervisor-mode addresses by >> user mode, and likewise stop any attempt to access (if SMAP enabled) or >> execute user-mode addresses from supervisor mode. >> >> When platform has LASS capability, KVM requires to expose this feature >> to guest VM enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], and >> allow guest to enable it via CR4.LASS[bit 27] on demand. For instruction >> executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the check. But KVM >> also needs to behave same as hardware to apply LASS to kinds of guest >> memory accesses when emulating instructions by software. >> >> KVM will take following LASS violations check on emulation path. >> User-mode access to supervisor space address: >> LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3) >> Supervisor-mode access to user space address: >> Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3) >> Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 && >> CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access) >> >> This patch series provide a LASS KVM solution and depends on kernel >> enabling that can be found at >> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ >> >> We tested the basic function of LASS virtualization including LASS >> enumeration and enabling in non-root and nested environment. As KVM >> unittest framework is not compatible to LASS rule, we use kernel module >> and application test to emulate LASS violation instead. With KVM forced >> emulation mechanism, we also verified the LASS functionality on some >> emulation path with instruction fetch and data access to have same >> behavior as hardware. >> >> How to extend kselftest to support LASS is under investigation and >> experiment. >> >> [1] Intel ISE https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368 >> Chapter Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> v1->v2 >> 1. refactor and optimize the interface of instruction emulation >> by introducing new set of operation type definition prefixed with >> "X86EMUL_F_" to distinguish access. >> 2. reorganize the patch to make each area of KVM better isolated. >> 3. refine LASS violation check design with consideration of wraparound >> access across address space boundary. >> >> v0->v1 >> 1. Adapt to new __linearize() API >> 2. Function refactor of vmx_check_lass() >> 3. Refine commit message to be more precise >> 4. Drop LASS kvm cap detection depending >> on hardware capability >> >> Binbin Wu (4): >> KVM: x86: Consolidate flags for __linearize() >> KVM: x86: Use a new flag for branch instructions >> KVM: x86: Add an emulation flag for implicit system access >> KVM: x86: Add X86EMUL_F_INVTLB and pass it in em_invlpg() >> >> Zeng Guang (4): >> KVM: emulator: Add emulation of LASS violation checks on linear >> address >> KVM: VMX: Implement and apply vmx_is_lass_violation() for LASS >> protection >> KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS >> KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space >> >> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 3 ++- >> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++- >> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 ++-- >> arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- >> arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 9 +++++++ >> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 ++- >> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 4 ++++ >> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 +++ >> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++++++ >> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ >> 11 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) >> > Equating this with SMEP/SMAP is backwards. > > LASS is something completely different: it makes it so *user space accesses* cannot even walk the kernel page tables (specifically, the negative half of the linear address space.) > > Such an access with immediately #PF: it is similar to always having U=0 in the uppermost level of the page tables, except with LASS enabled the CPU will not even touch the page tables in memory. Right. LASS provide a more stricter protect mode without touching/walk page table than paging. The difference is that LASS will generate #GP or #SS exception whenever it detects any violation other than page fault.
On August 17, 2023 12:32:44 AM PDT, Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com> wrote: > >On 7/20/2023 9:59 AM, H. Peter Anvin wrote: >> On July 18, 2023 6:18:36 AM PDT, Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com> wrote: >>> Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)[1] is a new mechanism that >>> enforces the same mode-based protections as paging, i.e. SMAP/SMEP >>> but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections >>> enforced by LASS are applied before paging, "probes" by malicious >>> software will provide no paging-based timing information. >>> >>> Based on a linear-address organization, LASS partitions 64-bit linear >>> address space into two halves, user-mode address (LA[bit 63]=0) and >>> supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1). >>> >>> LASS aims to prevent any attempt to probe supervisor-mode addresses by >>> user mode, and likewise stop any attempt to access (if SMAP enabled) or >>> execute user-mode addresses from supervisor mode. >>> >>> When platform has LASS capability, KVM requires to expose this feature >>> to guest VM enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], and >>> allow guest to enable it via CR4.LASS[bit 27] on demand. For instruction >>> executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the check. But KVM >>> also needs to behave same as hardware to apply LASS to kinds of guest >>> memory accesses when emulating instructions by software. >>> >>> KVM will take following LASS violations check on emulation path. >>> User-mode access to supervisor space address: >>> LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3) >>> Supervisor-mode access to user space address: >>> Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3) >>> Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 && >>> CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access) >>> >>> This patch series provide a LASS KVM solution and depends on kernel >>> enabling that can be found at >>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ >>> >>> We tested the basic function of LASS virtualization including LASS >>> enumeration and enabling in non-root and nested environment. As KVM >>> unittest framework is not compatible to LASS rule, we use kernel module >>> and application test to emulate LASS violation instead. With KVM forced >>> emulation mechanism, we also verified the LASS functionality on some >>> emulation path with instruction fetch and data access to have same >>> behavior as hardware. >>> >>> How to extend kselftest to support LASS is under investigation and >>> experiment. >>> >>> [1] Intel ISE https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368 >>> Chapter Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> v1->v2 >>> 1. refactor and optimize the interface of instruction emulation >>> by introducing new set of operation type definition prefixed with >>> "X86EMUL_F_" to distinguish access. >>> 2. reorganize the patch to make each area of KVM better isolated. >>> 3. refine LASS violation check design with consideration of wraparound >>> access across address space boundary. >>> >>> v0->v1 >>> 1. Adapt to new __linearize() API >>> 2. Function refactor of vmx_check_lass() >>> 3. Refine commit message to be more precise >>> 4. Drop LASS kvm cap detection depending >>> on hardware capability >>> >>> Binbin Wu (4): >>> KVM: x86: Consolidate flags for __linearize() >>> KVM: x86: Use a new flag for branch instructions >>> KVM: x86: Add an emulation flag for implicit system access >>> KVM: x86: Add X86EMUL_F_INVTLB and pass it in em_invlpg() >>> >>> Zeng Guang (4): >>> KVM: emulator: Add emulation of LASS violation checks on linear >>> address >>> KVM: VMX: Implement and apply vmx_is_lass_violation() for LASS >>> protection >>> KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS >>> KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space >>> >>> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 3 ++- >>> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++- >>> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 ++-- >>> arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- >>> arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 9 +++++++ >>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 ++- >>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 4 ++++ >>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 +++ >>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++++++ >>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ >>> 11 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) >>> >> Equating this with SMEP/SMAP is backwards. >> >> LASS is something completely different: it makes it so *user space accesses* cannot even walk the kernel page tables (specifically, the negative half of the linear address space.) >> >> Such an access with immediately #PF: it is similar to always having U=0 in the uppermost level of the page tables, except with LASS enabled the CPU will not even touch the page tables in memory. >Right. LASS provide a more stricter protect mode without touching/walk page table than paging. >The difference is that LASS will generate #GP or #SS exception whenever it detects any violation >other than page fault. > Ok, that's a minor detail. Perhaps a better way to describe LASS is that "negative addresses are no longer canonical for user access."
Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)[1] is a new mechanism that enforces the same mode-based protections as paging, i.e. SMAP/SMEP but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections enforced by LASS are applied before paging, "probes" by malicious software will provide no paging-based timing information. Based on a linear-address organization, LASS partitions 64-bit linear address space into two halves, user-mode address (LA[bit 63]=0) and supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1). LASS aims to prevent any attempt to probe supervisor-mode addresses by user mode, and likewise stop any attempt to access (if SMAP enabled) or execute user-mode addresses from supervisor mode. When platform has LASS capability, KVM requires to expose this feature to guest VM enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], and allow guest to enable it via CR4.LASS[bit 27] on demand. For instruction executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the check. But KVM also needs to behave same as hardware to apply LASS to kinds of guest memory accesses when emulating instructions by software. KVM will take following LASS violations check on emulation path. User-mode access to supervisor space address: LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3) Supervisor-mode access to user space address: Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3) Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 && CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access) This patch series provide a LASS KVM solution and depends on kernel enabling that can be found at https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ We tested the basic function of LASS virtualization including LASS enumeration and enabling in non-root and nested environment. As KVM unittest framework is not compatible to LASS rule, we use kernel module and application test to emulate LASS violation instead. With KVM forced emulation mechanism, we also verified the LASS functionality on some emulation path with instruction fetch and data access to have same behavior as hardware. How to extend kselftest to support LASS is under investigation and experiment. [1] Intel ISE https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368 Chapter Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ v1->v2 1. refactor and optimize the interface of instruction emulation by introducing new set of operation type definition prefixed with "X86EMUL_F_" to distinguish access. 2. reorganize the patch to make each area of KVM better isolated. 3. refine LASS violation check design with consideration of wraparound access across address space boundary. v0->v1 1. Adapt to new __linearize() API 2. Function refactor of vmx_check_lass() 3. Refine commit message to be more precise 4. Drop LASS kvm cap detection depending on hardware capability Binbin Wu (4): KVM: x86: Consolidate flags for __linearize() KVM: x86: Use a new flag for branch instructions KVM: x86: Add an emulation flag for implicit system access KVM: x86: Add X86EMUL_F_INVTLB and pass it in em_invlpg() Zeng Guang (4): KVM: emulator: Add emulation of LASS violation checks on linear address KVM: VMX: Implement and apply vmx_is_lass_violation() for LASS protection KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 9 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ 11 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)