From patchwork Fri Apr 12 08:42:26 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Steven Price X-Patchwork-Id: 13627185 Received: from foss.arm.com (foss.arm.com [217.140.110.172]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2EA1E22625; Fri, 12 Apr 2024 08:43:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=217.140.110.172 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1712911399; cv=none; b=WbiOcCvIp1lifATcRp4rCPdy6gY17z30AZUFgui/DUaNx3ZuWoAcX/JRPzqWeR0p8KkFRsXpU0Lt1Rv6Xps8ntF3St3j08h4c3KNxt5tIaAEhqTjFkCon6R2EbthdzBwjN57JCxABWWbU6srXTojbtOzrneIVozG2jFTloMtDd0= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1712911399; c=relaxed/simple; bh=PrnauYr3z3W77LWu86/5V+U1l1W7Y+gdHbsn01XUGrs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=QmeIIT1Dcn8AZZ2+yC1oQAR2VJdc70F1DUagC/crOfNQlB7PfqbLI6aL5lLWARdzF9TrI5/9Pwlqt96+x1Hc8XBO9nSifp9qSKbS2PQWJ5AcB2ncWES/6vs5Oh252cIhWUn1HDqHqz9TCN64DFhy/EYRfIiEVwClXOZYTbaYrZI= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=arm.com; arc=none smtp.client-ip=217.140.110.172 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=arm.com Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1FF76339; Fri, 12 Apr 2024 01:43:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from e112269-lin.cambridge.arm.com (e112269-lin.cambridge.arm.com [10.1.194.51]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B790B3F6C4; Fri, 12 Apr 2024 01:43:15 -0700 (PDT) From: Steven Price To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev Cc: Steven Price , Catalin Marinas , Marc Zyngier , Will Deacon , James Morse , Oliver Upton , Suzuki K Poulose , Zenghui Yu , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Joey Gouly , Alexandru Elisei , Christoffer Dall , Fuad Tabba , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Ganapatrao Kulkarni Subject: [PATCH v2 00/43] arm64: Support for Arm CCA in KVM Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 09:42:26 +0100 Message-Id: <20240412084309.1733783-1-steven.price@arm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240412084056.1733704-1-steven.price@arm.com> References: <20240412084056.1733704-1-steven.price@arm.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 This series adds support for running protected VMs using KVM under the Arm Confidential Compute Architecture (CCA). The purpose of this series is to gather feedback on the proposed changes to the architecture code for CCA. The main change from the previous RFC is that it updates the code to use a guest_memfd descriptor to back the private memory of the guest. This avoids any issues where a malicious VMM could potentially cause a fatal Granule Protection Fault elsewhere in the kernel. The ABI to the RMM (the RMI) is based on the final RMM v1.0 (EAC 5) specification[1]. This series is based on v6.9-rc1. It is also available as a git repository: https://gitlab.arm.com/linux-arm/linux-cca cca-host/v2 Work in progress changes for kvmtool are available from the git repository below, these changes are based on Fuad Tabba's repository for pKVM to provide some alignment with the ongoing pKVM work: https://gitlab.arm.com/linux-arm/kvmtool-cca cca/v2 Introduction ============ A more general introduction to Arm CCA is available on the Arm website[2], and links to the other components involved are available in the overall cover letter. Arm Confidential Compute Architecture adds two new 'worlds' to the architecture: Root and Realm. A new software component known as the RMM (Realm Management Monitor) runs in Realm EL2 and is trusted by both the Normal World and VMs running within Realms. This enables mutual distrust between the Realm VMs and the Normal World. Virtual machines running within a Realm can decide on a (4k) page-by-page granularity whether to share a page with the (Normal World) host or to keep it private (protected). This protection is provided by the hardware and attempts to access a page which isn't shared by the Normal World will trigger a Granule Protection Fault. The series starts by adding handling for these; faults within user space can be handled by killing the process, faults within kernel space are considered fatal. The Normal World host can communicate with the RMM via an SMC interface known as RMI (Realm Management Interface), and Realm VMs can communicate with the RMM via another SMC interface known as RSI (Realm Services Interface). This series adds wrappers for the full set of RMI commands and uses them to manage the realm guests. The Normal World can use RMI commands to delegate pages to the Realm world and to create, manage and run Realm VMs. Once delegated the pages are inaccessible to the Normal World (unless explicitly shared by the guest). However the Normal World may destroy the Realm VM at any time to be able to reclaim (undelegate) the pages. Realm VMs are identified by the KVM_CREATE_VM command, where the 'type' argument has a new field to describe whether the guest is 'normal' or a 'realm'. Entry/exit of a Realm VM attempts to reuse the KVM infrastructure, but ultimately the final mechanism is different. So this series has a bunch of commits handling the differences. As much as possible is placed in a two new files: rme.c and rme-exit.c. KVM also handles some of the PSCI requests for a realm and helps the RMM complete the PSCI service requests. Interrupts are managed by KVM, and are injected into the Realm with the help of the RMM. The RMM specification provides a new mechanism for a guest to communicate with host which goes by the name "Host Call". This is simply hooked up to the existing support for HVC calls from a normal guest. [1] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0137/1-0eac5/ [2] https://www.arm.com/architecture/security-features/arm-confidential-compute-architecture Jean-Philippe Brucker (7): arm64: RME: Propagate number of breakpoints and watchpoints to userspace arm64: RME: Set breakpoint parameters through SET_ONE_REG arm64: RME: Initialize PMCR.N with number counter supported by RMM arm64: RME: Propagate max SVE vector length from RMM arm64: RME: Configure max SVE vector length for a Realm arm64: RME: Provide register list for unfinalized RME RECs arm64: RME: Provide accurate register list Joey Gouly (2): arm64: rme: allow userspace to inject aborts arm64: rme: support RSI_HOST_CALL Sean Christopherson (1): KVM: Prepare for handling only shared mappings in mmu_notifier events Steven Price (29): arm64: RME: Handle Granule Protection Faults (GPFs) arm64: RME: Add SMC definitions for calling the RMM arm64: RME: Add wrappers for RMI calls arm64: RME: Check for RME support at KVM init arm64: RME: Define the user ABI arm64: RME: ioctls to create and configure realms arm64: kvm: Allow passing machine type in KVM creation arm64: RME: Keep a spare page delegated to the RMM arm64: RME: RTT handling arm64: RME: Allocate/free RECs to match vCPUs arm64: RME: Support for the VGIC in realms KVM: arm64: Support timers in realm RECs arm64: RME: Allow VMM to set RIPAS arm64: RME: Handle realm enter/exit KVM: arm64: Handle realm MMIO emulation arm64: RME: Allow populating initial contents arm64: RME: Runtime faulting of memory KVM: arm64: Handle realm VCPU load KVM: arm64: Validate register access for a Realm VM KVM: arm64: Handle Realm PSCI requests KVM: arm64: WARN on injected undef exceptions arm64: Don't expose stolen time for realm guests arm64: RME: Always use 4k pages for realms arm64: rme: Prevent Device mappings for Realms arm_pmu: Provide a mechanism for disabling the physical IRQ arm64: rme: Enable PMU support with a realm guest kvm: rme: Hide KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM for realm guests arm64: kvm: Expose support for private memory KVM: arm64: Allow activating realms Suzuki K Poulose (4): kvm: arm64: pgtable: Track the number of pages in the entry level kvm: arm64: Include kvm_emulate.h in kvm/arm_psci.h kvm: arm64: Expose debug HW register numbers for Realm arm64: rme: Allow checking SVE on VM instance Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 35 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 13 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pgtable.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h | 154 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rmi_cmds.h | 509 +++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rmi_smc.h | 250 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/virt.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 49 + arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile | 3 +- arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c | 45 +- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 178 ++- arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c | 99 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c | 5 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c | 2 + arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c | 10 +- arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 172 ++- arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c | 7 +- arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c | 29 + arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 23 +- arch/arm64/kvm/rme-exit.c | 211 ++++ arch/arm64/kvm/rme.c | 1590 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 83 +- arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-v3.c | 9 +- arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c | 37 +- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 29 +- drivers/perf/arm_pmu.c | 15 + include/kvm/arm_arch_timer.h | 2 + include/kvm/arm_psci.h | 2 + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 + include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 30 +- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 7 + 35 files changed, 3514 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/rmi_cmds.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/rmi_smc.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/rme-exit.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/rme.c