| Message ID | 0f8a2125c7acb7b38fc51a044a8088e8baa45e3d.1585548051.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add AMD SEV guest live migration support | expand |
On 2020-03-30 06:21:36 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@amd.com> > > The command finalize the guest receiving process and make the SEV guest > ready for the execution. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > --- > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 8 +++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index 554aa33a99cc..93cd95d9a6c0 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -375,6 +375,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > __u32 trans_len; > }; > > +15. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH > +------------------------ > + > +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command can be > +issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution. > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > index 5fc5355536d7..7c2721e18b06 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -7573,6 +7573,26 @@ static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_receive_finish *data; > + int ret; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -ENOTTY; Noticed this in earlier patches too. Is -ENOTTY the best return value? Aren't one of -ENXIO, or -ENODEV, or -EINVAL a better choice? What is the rationale for using -ENOTTY? > + > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!data) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + data->handle = sev->handle; > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, data, &argp->error); > + > + kfree(data); > + return ret; > +} > + > static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -7632,6 +7652,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH: > + r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; > -- > 2.17.1 >
On 3/29/20 11:21 PM, Ashish Kalra wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@amd.com> > > The command finalize the guest receiving process and make the SEV guest > ready for the execution. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > --- > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 8 +++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index 554aa33a99cc..93cd95d9a6c0 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -375,6 +375,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > __u32 trans_len; > }; > > +15. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH > +------------------------ > + > +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command can be > +issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution. > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > index 5fc5355536d7..7c2721e18b06 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -7573,6 +7573,26 @@ static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_receive_finish *data; > + int ret; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -ENOTTY; > + > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!data) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + data->handle = sev->handle; > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, data, &argp->error); > + > + kfree(data); > + return ret; > +} > + > static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -7632,6 +7652,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH: > + r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
On Thu, Apr 2, 2020 at 3:27 PM Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> wrote: > > > On 3/29/20 11:21 PM, Ashish Kalra wrote: > > From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@amd.com> > > > > The command finalize the guest receiving process and make the SEV guest > > ready for the execution. > > > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> > > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > > Cc: x86@kernel.org > > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > --- > > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 8 +++++++ > > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ > > 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > > index 554aa33a99cc..93cd95d9a6c0 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > > @@ -375,6 +375,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > > __u32 trans_len; > > }; > > > > +15. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH > > +------------------------ > > + > > +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command can be > > +issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution. > > + > > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > > + > > References > > ========== > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > index 5fc5355536d7..7c2721e18b06 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > @@ -7573,6 +7573,26 @@ static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > > return ret; > > } > > > > +static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > > +{ > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > > + struct sev_data_receive_finish *data; > > + int ret; > > + > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > + return -ENOTTY; > > + > > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > > + if (!data) > > + return -ENOMEM; > > + > > + data->handle = sev->handle; > > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, data, &argp->error); > > + > > + kfree(data); > > + return ret; > > +} > > + > > static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > > { > > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > > @@ -7632,6 +7652,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > > case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > > r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > > break; > > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH: > > + r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); > > + break; > > default: > > r = -EINVAL; > > goto out; > Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> As to ENOTTY, man page for ioctl translates it as "The specified request does not apply to the kind of object that the file descriptor fd references", which seems appropriate here. Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index 554aa33a99cc..93cd95d9a6c0 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -375,6 +375,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error __u32 trans_len; }; +15. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH +------------------------ + +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command can be +issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution. + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 5fc5355536d7..7c2721e18b06 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -7573,6 +7573,26 @@ static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_receive_finish *data; + int ret; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + data->handle = sev->handle; + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, data, &argp->error); + + kfree(data); + return ret; +} + static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -7632,6 +7652,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH: + r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out;