Message ID | 145620795852bf24ba2124a3f8234fd4aaac19d4.1649219184.git.kai.huang@intel.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | TDX host kernel support | expand |
On 4/5/22 9:49 PM, Kai Huang wrote: > TDX provides increased levels of memory confidentiality and integrity. > This requires special hardware support for features like memory > encryption and storage of memory integrity checksums. Not all memory > satisfies these requirements. > > As a result, TDX introduced the concept of a "Convertible Memory Region" > (CMR). During boot, the firmware builds a list of all of the memory > ranges which can provide the TDX security guarantees. The list of these > ranges, along with TDX module information, is available to the kernel by > querying the TDX module via TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL. > > Host kernel can choose whether or not to use all convertible memory > regions as TDX memory. Before TDX module is ready to create any TD > guests, all TDX memory regions that host kernel intends to use must be > configured to the TDX module, using specific data structures defined by > TDX architecture. Constructing those structures requires information of > both TDX module and the Convertible Memory Regions. Call TDH.SYS.INFO > to get this information as preparation to construct those structures. > > Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> > --- Looks good. Some minor comments. > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > index ef2718423f0f..482e6d858181 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > @@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_module_lock); > > static struct p_seamldr_info p_seamldr_info; > > +/* Base address of CMR array needs to be 512 bytes aligned. */ > +static struct cmr_info tdx_cmr_array[MAX_CMRS] __aligned(CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT); > +static int tdx_cmr_num; > +static struct tdsysinfo_struct tdx_sysinfo; > + > static bool __seamrr_enabled(void) > { > return (seamrr_mask & SEAMRR_ENABLED_BITS) == SEAMRR_ENABLED_BITS; > @@ -468,6 +473,127 @@ static int tdx_module_init_cpus(void) > return seamcall_on_each_cpu(&sc); > } > > +static inline bool cmr_valid(struct cmr_info *cmr) > +{ > + return !!cmr->size; > +} > + > +static void print_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int cmr_num, > + const char *name) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < cmr_num; i++) { > + struct cmr_info *cmr = &cmr_array[i]; > + > + pr_info("%s : [0x%llx, 0x%llx)\n", name, > + cmr->base, cmr->base + cmr->size); > + } I am not sure if it is ok to print this info by default or pr_debug would be better. I will let maintainers decide about it. > +} > + > +static int sanitize_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int cmr_num) Since this function only deals with tdx_cmr_array, why pass it as argument? > +{ > + int i, j; > + > + /* > + * Intel TDX module spec, 20.7.3 CMR_INFO: > + * > + * TDH.SYS.INFO leaf function returns a MAX_CMRS (32) entry > + * array of CMR_INFO entries. The CMRs are sorted from the > + * lowest base address to the highest base address, and they > + * are non-overlapping. > + * > + * This implies that BIOS may generate invalid empty entries > + * if total CMRs are less than 32. Skip them manually. > + */ > + for (i = 0; i < cmr_num; i++) { > + struct cmr_info *cmr = &cmr_array[i]; > + struct cmr_info *prev_cmr = NULL; Why not keep declarations together at the top of the function? > + > + /* Skip further invalid CMRs */ > + if (!cmr_valid(cmr)) > + break; > + > + if (i > 0) > + prev_cmr = &cmr_array[i - 1]; > + > + /* > + * It is a TDX firmware bug if CMRs are not > + * in address ascending order. > + */ > + if (prev_cmr && ((prev_cmr->base + prev_cmr->size) > > + cmr->base)) { > + pr_err("Firmware bug: CMRs not in address ascending order.\n"); > + return -EFAULT; > + } Since above condition is only true for i > 0 case, why not combine them together if (i > 0) {...} > + } > + > + /* > + * Also a sane BIOS should never generate invalid CMR(s) between > + * two valid CMRs. Sanity check this and simply return error in > + * this case. > + * > + * By reaching here @i is the index of the first invalid CMR (or > + * cmr_num). Starting with next entry of @i since it has already > + * been checked. > + */ > + for (j = i + 1; j < cmr_num; j++) > + if (cmr_valid(&cmr_array[j])) { > + pr_err("Firmware bug: invalid CMR(s) among valid CMRs.\n"); > + return -EFAULT; > + } > + > + /* > + * Trim all tail invalid empty CMRs. BIOS should generate at > + * least one valid CMR, otherwise it's a TDX firmware bug. > + */ > + tdx_cmr_num = i; > + if (!tdx_cmr_num) { > + pr_err("Firmware bug: No valid CMR.\n"); > + return -EFAULT; > + } > + > + /* Print kernel sanitized CMRs */ > + print_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, tdx_cmr_num, "Kernel-sanitized-CMR"); > + > + return 0; > +} > +
> > > +} > > + > > +static int sanitize_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int cmr_num) > > Since this function only deals with tdx_cmr_array, why pass it > as argument? I received comments to use cmr_num as argument and pass tdx_cmr_num to sanitize_cmrs() and finalize it at the end of this function. In this case I think it's better to pass tdx_cmr_array as argument. It also saves some typing (tdx_cmr_array vs cmr_array) in sanitize_cmrs(). > > > +{ > > + int i, j; > > + > > + /* > > + * Intel TDX module spec, 20.7.3 CMR_INFO: > > + * > > + * TDH.SYS.INFO leaf function returns a MAX_CMRS (32) entry > > + * array of CMR_INFO entries. The CMRs are sorted from the > > + * lowest base address to the highest base address, and they > > + * are non-overlapping. > > + * > > + * This implies that BIOS may generate invalid empty entries > > + * if total CMRs are less than 32. Skip them manually. > > + */ > > + for (i = 0; i < cmr_num; i++) { > > + struct cmr_info *cmr = &cmr_array[i]; > > + struct cmr_info *prev_cmr = NULL; > > Why not keep declarations together at the top of the function? Why? They are only used in this for-loop. > > > + > > + /* Skip further invalid CMRs */ > > + if (!cmr_valid(cmr)) > > + break; > > + > > + if (i > 0) > > + prev_cmr = &cmr_array[i - 1]; > > + > > + /* > > + * It is a TDX firmware bug if CMRs are not > > + * in address ascending order. > > + */ > > + if (prev_cmr && ((prev_cmr->base + prev_cmr->size) > > > + cmr->base)) { > > + pr_err("Firmware bug: CMRs not in address ascending order.\n"); > > + return -EFAULT; > > + } > > Since above condition is only true for i > 0 case, why not combine them > together if (i > 0) {...} It will make an additional ident for the above if() {} to check prev_cmr and cmr. I don't see it is better?
On 4/5/22 21:49, Kai Huang wrote: > TDX provides increased levels of memory confidentiality and integrity. > This requires special hardware support for features like memory > encryption and storage of memory integrity checksums. Not all memory > satisfies these requirements. > > As a result, TDX introduced the concept of a "Convertible Memory Region" > (CMR). During boot, the firmware builds a list of all of the memory > ranges which can provide the TDX security guarantees. The list of these > ranges, along with TDX module information, is available to the kernel by > querying the TDX module via TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL. > > Host kernel can choose whether or not to use all convertible memory > regions as TDX memory. Before TDX module is ready to create any TD > guests, all TDX memory regions that host kernel intends to use must be > configured to the TDX module, using specific data structures defined by > TDX architecture. Constructing those structures requires information of > both TDX module and the Convertible Memory Regions. Call TDH.SYS.INFO > to get this information as preparation to construct those structures. > > Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> > --- > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > index ef2718423f0f..482e6d858181 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > @@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_module_lock); > > static struct p_seamldr_info p_seamldr_info; > > +/* Base address of CMR array needs to be 512 bytes aligned. */ > +static struct cmr_info tdx_cmr_array[MAX_CMRS] __aligned(CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT); > +static int tdx_cmr_num; > +static struct tdsysinfo_struct tdx_sysinfo; I really dislike mixing hardware and software structures. Please make it clear which of these are fully software-defined and which are part of the hardware ABI. > static bool __seamrr_enabled(void) > { > return (seamrr_mask & SEAMRR_ENABLED_BITS) == SEAMRR_ENABLED_BITS; > @@ -468,6 +473,127 @@ static int tdx_module_init_cpus(void) > return seamcall_on_each_cpu(&sc); > } > > +static inline bool cmr_valid(struct cmr_info *cmr) > +{ > + return !!cmr->size; > +} > + > +static void print_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int cmr_num, > + const char *name) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < cmr_num; i++) { > + struct cmr_info *cmr = &cmr_array[i]; > + > + pr_info("%s : [0x%llx, 0x%llx)\n", name, > + cmr->base, cmr->base + cmr->size); > + } > +} > + > +static int sanitize_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int cmr_num) > +{ > + int i, j; > + > + /* > + * Intel TDX module spec, 20.7.3 CMR_INFO: > + * > + * TDH.SYS.INFO leaf function returns a MAX_CMRS (32) entry > + * array of CMR_INFO entries. The CMRs are sorted from the > + * lowest base address to the highest base address, and they > + * are non-overlapping. > + * > + * This implies that BIOS may generate invalid empty entries > + * if total CMRs are less than 32. Skip them manually. > + */ > + for (i = 0; i < cmr_num; i++) { > + struct cmr_info *cmr = &cmr_array[i]; > + struct cmr_info *prev_cmr = NULL; > + > + /* Skip further invalid CMRs */ > + if (!cmr_valid(cmr)) > + break; > + > + if (i > 0) > + prev_cmr = &cmr_array[i - 1]; > + > + /* > + * It is a TDX firmware bug if CMRs are not > + * in address ascending order. > + */ > + if (prev_cmr && ((prev_cmr->base + prev_cmr->size) > > + cmr->base)) { > + pr_err("Firmware bug: CMRs not in address ascending order.\n"); > + return -EFAULT; -EFAULT is a really weird return code to use for this. I'd use -EINVAL. > + } > + } > + > + /* > + * Also a sane BIOS should never generate invalid CMR(s) between > + * two valid CMRs. Sanity check this and simply return error in > + * this case. > + * > + * By reaching here @i is the index of the first invalid CMR (or > + * cmr_num). Starting with next entry of @i since it has already > + * been checked. > + */ > + for (j = i + 1; j < cmr_num; j++) > + if (cmr_valid(&cmr_array[j])) { > + pr_err("Firmware bug: invalid CMR(s) among valid CMRs.\n"); > + return -EFAULT; > + } Please add brackets for the for(). > + /* > + * Trim all tail invalid empty CMRs. BIOS should generate at > + * least one valid CMR, otherwise it's a TDX firmware bug. > + */ > + tdx_cmr_num = i; > + if (!tdx_cmr_num) { > + pr_err("Firmware bug: No valid CMR.\n"); > + return -EFAULT; > + } > + > + /* Print kernel sanitized CMRs */ > + print_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, tdx_cmr_num, "Kernel-sanitized-CMR"); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int tdx_get_sysinfo(void) > +{ > + struct tdx_module_output out; > + u64 tdsysinfo_sz, cmr_num; > + int ret; > + > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct) != TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE); > + > + ret = seamcall(TDH_SYS_INFO, __pa(&tdx_sysinfo), TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE, > + __pa(tdx_cmr_array), MAX_CMRS, NULL, &out); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + > + /* > + * If TDH.SYS.CONFIG succeeds, RDX contains the actual bytes > + * written to @tdx_sysinfo and R9 contains the actual entries > + * written to @tdx_cmr_array. Sanity check them. > + */ > + tdsysinfo_sz = out.rdx; > + cmr_num = out.r9; Please vertically align things like this: tdsysinfo_sz = out.rdx; cmr_num = out.r9; > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE((tdsysinfo_sz > sizeof(tdx_sysinfo)) || !tdsysinfo_sz || > + (cmr_num > MAX_CMRS) || !cmr_num)) > + return -EFAULT; Sanity checking is good, but this makes me wonder how much is too much. I don't see a lot of code for instance checking if sys_write() writes more than how much it was supposed to. Why are these sanity checks necessary here? Is the TDX module expected to be *THAT* buggy? The thing that's providing, oh, basically all of the security guarantees of this architecture. It's overflowing the buffers you hand it? > + pr_info("TDX module: vendor_id 0x%x, major_version %u, minor_version %u, build_date %u, build_num %u", > + tdx_sysinfo.vendor_id, tdx_sysinfo.major_version, > + tdx_sysinfo.minor_version, tdx_sysinfo.build_date, > + tdx_sysinfo.build_num); > + > + /* Print BIOS provided CMRs */ > + print_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, cmr_num, "BIOS-CMR"); > + > + return sanitize_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, cmr_num); > +} Does sanitize_cmrs() sanitize anything? It looks to me like it *checks* the CMRs. But, sanitizing is an active operation that writes to the data being sanitized. This looks read-only to me. check_cmrs() would be a better name for a passive check. > static int init_tdx_module(void) > { > int ret; > @@ -482,6 +608,11 @@ static int init_tdx_module(void) > if (ret) > goto out; > > + /* Get TDX module information and CMRs */ > + ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(); > + if (ret) > + goto out; Couldn't we get rid of that comment if you did something like: ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(&tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_sysinfo); and preferably make the variables function-local. > /* > * Return -EFAULT until all steps of TDX module > * initialization are done. > diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h > index b8cfdd6e12f3..2f21c45df6ac 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h > +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h > @@ -29,6 +29,66 @@ struct p_seamldr_info { > u8 reserved2[88]; > } __packed __aligned(P_SEAMLDR_INFO_ALIGNMENT); > > +struct cmr_info { > + u64 base; > + u64 size; > +} __packed; > + > +#define MAX_CMRS 32 > +#define CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT 512 > + > +struct cpuid_config { > + u32 leaf; > + u32 sub_leaf; > + u32 eax; > + u32 ebx; > + u32 ecx; > + u32 edx; > +} __packed; > + > +#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE 1024 > +#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT 1024 > + > +struct tdsysinfo_struct { > + /* TDX-SEAM Module Info */ > + u32 attributes; > + u32 vendor_id; > + u32 build_date; > + u16 build_num; > + u16 minor_version; > + u16 major_version; > + u8 reserved0[14]; > + /* Memory Info */ > + u16 max_tdmrs; > + u16 max_reserved_per_tdmr; > + u16 pamt_entry_size; > + u8 reserved1[10]; > + /* Control Struct Info */ > + u16 tdcs_base_size; > + u8 reserved2[2]; > + u16 tdvps_base_size; > + u8 tdvps_xfam_dependent_size; > + u8 reserved3[9]; > + /* TD Capabilities */ > + u64 attributes_fixed0; > + u64 attributes_fixed1; > + u64 xfam_fixed0; > + u64 xfam_fixed1; > + u8 reserved4[32]; > + u32 num_cpuid_config; > + /* > + * The actual number of CPUID_CONFIG depends on above > + * 'num_cpuid_config'. The size of 'struct tdsysinfo_struct' > + * is 1024B defined by TDX architecture. Use a union with > + * specific padding to make 'sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct)' > + * equal to 1024. > + */ > + union { > + struct cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0]; > + u8 reserved5[892]; > + }; > +} __packed __aligned(TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT); > + > /* > * P-SEAMLDR SEAMCALL leaf function > */ > @@ -38,6 +98,7 @@ struct p_seamldr_info { > /* > * TDX module SEAMCALL leaf functions > */ > +#define TDH_SYS_INFO 32 > #define TDH_SYS_INIT 33 > #define TDH_SYS_LP_INIT 35 > #define TDH_SYS_LP_SHUTDOWN 44
On Wed, 2022-04-27 at 15:15 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 4/5/22 21:49, Kai Huang wrote: > > TDX provides increased levels of memory confidentiality and integrity. > > This requires special hardware support for features like memory > > encryption and storage of memory integrity checksums. Not all memory > > satisfies these requirements. > > > > As a result, TDX introduced the concept of a "Convertible Memory Region" > > (CMR). During boot, the firmware builds a list of all of the memory > > ranges which can provide the TDX security guarantees. The list of these > > ranges, along with TDX module information, is available to the kernel by > > querying the TDX module via TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL. > > > > Host kernel can choose whether or not to use all convertible memory > > regions as TDX memory. Before TDX module is ready to create any TD > > guests, all TDX memory regions that host kernel intends to use must be > > configured to the TDX module, using specific data structures defined by > > TDX architecture. Constructing those structures requires information of > > both TDX module and the Convertible Memory Regions. Call TDH.SYS.INFO > > to get this information as preparation to construct those structures. > > > > Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> > > --- > > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++ > > 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > > index ef2718423f0f..482e6d858181 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > > @@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_module_lock); > > > > static struct p_seamldr_info p_seamldr_info; > > > > +/* Base address of CMR array needs to be 512 bytes aligned. */ > > +static struct cmr_info tdx_cmr_array[MAX_CMRS] __aligned(CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT); > > +static int tdx_cmr_num; > > +static struct tdsysinfo_struct tdx_sysinfo; > > I really dislike mixing hardware and software structures. Please make > it clear which of these are fully software-defined and which are part of > the hardware ABI. Both 'struct tdsysinfo_struct' and 'struct cmr_info' are hardware structures. They are defined in tdx.h which has a comment saying the data structures below this comment is hardware structures: +/* + * TDX architectural data structures + */ It is introduced in the P-SEAMLDR patch. Should I explicitly add comments around the variables saying they are used by hardware, something like: /* * Data structures used by TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL to return CMRs and * TDX module system information. */ ? > > > static bool __seamrr_enabled(void) > > { > > return (seamrr_mask & SEAMRR_ENABLED_BITS) == SEAMRR_ENABLED_BITS; > > @@ -468,6 +473,127 @@ static int tdx_module_init_cpus(void) > > return seamcall_on_each_cpu(&sc); > > } > > > > +static inline bool cmr_valid(struct cmr_info *cmr) > > +{ > > + return !!cmr->size; > > +} > > + > > +static void print_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int cmr_num, > > + const char *name) > > +{ > > + int i; > > + > > + for (i = 0; i < cmr_num; i++) { > > + struct cmr_info *cmr = &cmr_array[i]; > > + > > + pr_info("%s : [0x%llx, 0x%llx)\n", name, > > + cmr->base, cmr->base + cmr->size); > > + } > > +} > > + > > +static int sanitize_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int cmr_num) > > +{ > > + int i, j; > > + > > + /* > > + * Intel TDX module spec, 20.7.3 CMR_INFO: > > + * > > + * TDH.SYS.INFO leaf function returns a MAX_CMRS (32) entry > > + * array of CMR_INFO entries. The CMRs are sorted from the > > + * lowest base address to the highest base address, and they > > + * are non-overlapping. > > + * > > + * This implies that BIOS may generate invalid empty entries > > + * if total CMRs are less than 32. Skip them manually. > > + */ > > + for (i = 0; i < cmr_num; i++) { > > + struct cmr_info *cmr = &cmr_array[i]; > > + struct cmr_info *prev_cmr = NULL; > > + > > + /* Skip further invalid CMRs */ > > + if (!cmr_valid(cmr)) > > + break; > > + > > + if (i > 0) > > + prev_cmr = &cmr_array[i - 1]; > > + > > + /* > > + * It is a TDX firmware bug if CMRs are not > > + * in address ascending order. > > + */ > > + if (prev_cmr && ((prev_cmr->base + prev_cmr->size) > > > + cmr->base)) { > > + pr_err("Firmware bug: CMRs not in address ascending order.\n"); > > + return -EFAULT; > > -EFAULT is a really weird return code to use for this. I'd use -EINVAL. OK thanks. > > > + } > > + } > > + > > + /* > > + * Also a sane BIOS should never generate invalid CMR(s) between > > + * two valid CMRs. Sanity check this and simply return error in > > + * this case. > > + * > > + * By reaching here @i is the index of the first invalid CMR (or > > + * cmr_num). Starting with next entry of @i since it has already > > + * been checked. > > + */ > > + for (j = i + 1; j < cmr_num; j++) > > + if (cmr_valid(&cmr_array[j])) { > > + pr_err("Firmware bug: invalid CMR(s) among valid CMRs.\n"); > > + return -EFAULT; > > + } > > Please add brackets for the for(). OK. > > > + /* > > + * Trim all tail invalid empty CMRs. BIOS should generate at > > + * least one valid CMR, otherwise it's a TDX firmware bug. > > + */ > > + tdx_cmr_num = i; > > + if (!tdx_cmr_num) { > > + pr_err("Firmware bug: No valid CMR.\n"); > > + return -EFAULT; > > + } > > + > > + /* Print kernel sanitized CMRs */ > > + print_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, tdx_cmr_num, "Kernel-sanitized-CMR"); > > + > > + return 0; > > +} > > + > > +static int tdx_get_sysinfo(void) > > +{ > > + struct tdx_module_output out; > > + u64 tdsysinfo_sz, cmr_num; > > + int ret; > > + > > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct) != TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE); > > + > > + ret = seamcall(TDH_SYS_INFO, __pa(&tdx_sysinfo), TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE, > > + __pa(tdx_cmr_array), MAX_CMRS, NULL, &out); > > + if (ret) > > + return ret; > > + > > + /* > > + * If TDH.SYS.CONFIG succeeds, RDX contains the actual bytes > > + * written to @tdx_sysinfo and R9 contains the actual entries > > + * written to @tdx_cmr_array. Sanity check them. > > + */ > > + tdsysinfo_sz = out.rdx; > > + cmr_num = out.r9; > > Please vertically align things like this: > > tdsysinfo_sz = out.rdx; > cmr_num = out.r9; OK. > > > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE((tdsysinfo_sz > sizeof(tdx_sysinfo)) || !tdsysinfo_sz || > > + (cmr_num > MAX_CMRS) || !cmr_num)) > > + return -EFAULT; > > Sanity checking is good, but this makes me wonder how much is too much. > I don't see a lot of code for instance checking if sys_write() writes > more than how much it was supposed to. > > Why are these sanity checks necessary here? Is the TDX module expected > to be *THAT* buggy? The thing that's providing, oh, basically all of > the security guarantees of this architecture. It's overflowing the > buffers you hand it? I think this check can be removed. Will remove. > > > + pr_info("TDX module: vendor_id 0x%x, major_version %u, minor_version %u, build_date %u, build_num %u", > > + tdx_sysinfo.vendor_id, tdx_sysinfo.major_version, > > + tdx_sysinfo.minor_version, tdx_sysinfo.build_date, > > + tdx_sysinfo.build_num); > > + > > + /* Print BIOS provided CMRs */ > > + print_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, cmr_num, "BIOS-CMR"); > > + > > + return sanitize_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, cmr_num); > > +} > > Does sanitize_cmrs() sanitize anything? It looks to me like it *checks* > the CMRs. But, sanitizing is an active operation that writes to the > data being sanitized. This looks read-only to me. check_cmrs() would > be a better name for a passive check. Sure will change to check_cmrs(). > > > static int init_tdx_module(void) > > { > > int ret; > > @@ -482,6 +608,11 @@ static int init_tdx_module(void) > > if (ret) > > goto out; > > > > + /* Get TDX module information and CMRs */ > > + ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(); > > + if (ret) > > + goto out; > > Couldn't we get rid of that comment if you did something like: > > ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(&tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_sysinfo); Yes will do. > > and preferably make the variables function-local. 'tdx_sysinfo' will be used by KVM too.
On 4/27/22 17:15, Kai Huang wrote: > On Wed, 2022-04-27 at 15:15 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: >> On 4/5/22 21:49, Kai Huang wrote: >>> TDX provides increased levels of memory confidentiality and integrity. >>> This requires special hardware support for features like memory >>> encryption and storage of memory integrity checksums. Not all memory >>> satisfies these requirements. >>> >>> As a result, TDX introduced the concept of a "Convertible Memory Region" >>> (CMR). During boot, the firmware builds a list of all of the memory >>> ranges which can provide the TDX security guarantees. The list of these >>> ranges, along with TDX module information, is available to the kernel by >>> querying the TDX module via TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL. >>> >>> Host kernel can choose whether or not to use all convertible memory >>> regions as TDX memory. Before TDX module is ready to create any TD >>> guests, all TDX memory regions that host kernel intends to use must be >>> configured to the TDX module, using specific data structures defined by >>> TDX architecture. Constructing those structures requires information of >>> both TDX module and the Convertible Memory Regions. Call TDH.SYS.INFO >>> to get this information as preparation to construct those structures. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> >>> --- >>> arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>> arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++ >>> 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+) >>> >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c >>> index ef2718423f0f..482e6d858181 100644 >>> --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c >>> +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c >>> @@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_module_lock); >>> >>> static struct p_seamldr_info p_seamldr_info; >>> >>> +/* Base address of CMR array needs to be 512 bytes aligned. */ >>> +static struct cmr_info tdx_cmr_array[MAX_CMRS] __aligned(CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT); >>> +static int tdx_cmr_num; >>> +static struct tdsysinfo_struct tdx_sysinfo; >> >> I really dislike mixing hardware and software structures. Please make >> it clear which of these are fully software-defined and which are part of >> the hardware ABI. > > Both 'struct tdsysinfo_struct' and 'struct cmr_info' are hardware structures. > They are defined in tdx.h which has a comment saying the data structures below > this comment is hardware structures: > > +/* > + * TDX architectural data structures > + */ > > It is introduced in the P-SEAMLDR patch. > > Should I explicitly add comments around the variables saying they are used by > hardware, something like: > > /* > * Data structures used by TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL to return CMRs and > * TDX module system information. > */ I think we know they are data structures. :) But, saying: /* Used in TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL ABI: */ *is* actually helpful. It (probably) tells us where in the spec we can find the definition and tells how it gets used. Plus, it tells us this isn't a software data structure. >>> + /* Get TDX module information and CMRs */ >>> + ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(); >>> + if (ret) >>> + goto out; >> >> Couldn't we get rid of that comment if you did something like: >> >> ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(&tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_sysinfo); > > Yes will do. > >> and preferably make the variables function-local. > > 'tdx_sysinfo' will be used by KVM too. In other words, it's not a part of this series so I can't review whether this statement is correct or whether there's a better way to hand this information over to KVM. This (minor) nugget influencing the design also isn't even commented or addressed in the changelog.
On Thu, 2022-04-28 at 07:06 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 4/27/22 17:15, Kai Huang wrote: > > On Wed, 2022-04-27 at 15:15 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > > > On 4/5/22 21:49, Kai Huang wrote: > > > > TDX provides increased levels of memory confidentiality and integrity. > > > > This requires special hardware support for features like memory > > > > encryption and storage of memory integrity checksums. Not all memory > > > > satisfies these requirements. > > > > > > > > As a result, TDX introduced the concept of a "Convertible Memory Region" > > > > (CMR). During boot, the firmware builds a list of all of the memory > > > > ranges which can provide the TDX security guarantees. The list of these > > > > ranges, along with TDX module information, is available to the kernel by > > > > querying the TDX module via TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL. > > > > > > > > Host kernel can choose whether or not to use all convertible memory > > > > regions as TDX memory. Before TDX module is ready to create any TD > > > > guests, all TDX memory regions that host kernel intends to use must be > > > > configured to the TDX module, using specific data structures defined by > > > > TDX architecture. Constructing those structures requires information of > > > > both TDX module and the Convertible Memory Regions. Call TDH.SYS.INFO > > > > to get this information as preparation to construct those structures. > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> > > > > --- > > > > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++ > > > > 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > > > > index ef2718423f0f..482e6d858181 100644 > > > > --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > > > > @@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_module_lock); > > > > > > > > static struct p_seamldr_info p_seamldr_info; > > > > > > > > +/* Base address of CMR array needs to be 512 bytes aligned. */ > > > > +static struct cmr_info tdx_cmr_array[MAX_CMRS] __aligned(CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT); > > > > +static int tdx_cmr_num; > > > > +static struct tdsysinfo_struct tdx_sysinfo; > > > > > > I really dislike mixing hardware and software structures. Please make > > > it clear which of these are fully software-defined and which are part of > > > the hardware ABI. > > > > Both 'struct tdsysinfo_struct' and 'struct cmr_info' are hardware structures. > > They are defined in tdx.h which has a comment saying the data structures below > > this comment is hardware structures: > > > > +/* > > + * TDX architectural data structures > > + */ > > > > It is introduced in the P-SEAMLDR patch. > > > > Should I explicitly add comments around the variables saying they are used by > > hardware, something like: > > > > /* > > * Data structures used by TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL to return CMRs and > > * TDX module system information. > > */ > > I think we know they are data structures. :) > > But, saying: > > /* Used in TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL ABI: */ > > *is* actually helpful. It (probably) tells us where in the spec we can > find the definition and tells how it gets used. Plus, it tells us this > isn't a software data structure. Right. I'll use your above comment. > > > > > + /* Get TDX module information and CMRs */ > > > > + ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(); > > > > + if (ret) > > > > + goto out; > > > > > > Couldn't we get rid of that comment if you did something like: > > > > > > ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(&tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_sysinfo); > > > > Yes will do. > > > > > and preferably make the variables function-local. > > > > 'tdx_sysinfo' will be used by KVM too. > > In other words, it's not a part of this series so I can't review whether > this statement is correct or whether there's a better way to hand this > information over to KVM. > > This (minor) nugget influencing the design also isn't even commented or > addressed in the changelog. TDSYSINFO_STRUCT is 1024B and CMR array is 512B, so I don't think it should be in the stack. I can change to use dynamic allocation at the beginning and free it at the end of the function. KVM support patches can change it to static variable in the file. Or I can add a sentence saying KVM will need to use 'tdx_tdsysinfo' so use static variable. However currently KVM doesn't use CMR so no justification for CMR array. But I am thinking about memory hotplug interaction with TDX module initialization. That may use CMR info. Let me send out proposal and close that first to see whether this series needs to use CMR info out of this function.
On 4/28/22 16:14, Kai Huang wrote: > On Thu, 2022-04-28 at 07:06 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: >> On 4/27/22 17:15, Kai Huang wrote: >>>> Couldn't we get rid of that comment if you did something like: >>>> >>>> ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(&tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_sysinfo); >>> >>> Yes will do. >>> >>>> and preferably make the variables function-local. >>> >>> 'tdx_sysinfo' will be used by KVM too. >> >> In other words, it's not a part of this series so I can't review whether >> this statement is correct or whether there's a better way to hand this >> information over to KVM. >> >> This (minor) nugget influencing the design also isn't even commented or >> addressed in the changelog. > > TDSYSINFO_STRUCT is 1024B and CMR array is 512B, so I don't think it should be > in the stack. I can change to use dynamic allocation at the beginning and free > it at the end of the function. KVM support patches can change it to static > variable in the file. 2k of stack is big, but it isn't a deal breaker for something that's not nested anywhere and that's only called once in a pretty controlled setting and not in interrupt context. I wouldn't cry about it.
On Fri, 2022-04-29 at 10:47 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 4/28/22 16:14, Kai Huang wrote: > > On Thu, 2022-04-28 at 07:06 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > > > On 4/27/22 17:15, Kai Huang wrote: > > > > > Couldn't we get rid of that comment if you did something like: > > > > > > > > > > ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(&tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_sysinfo); > > > > > > > > Yes will do. > > > > > > > > > and preferably make the variables function-local. > > > > > > > > 'tdx_sysinfo' will be used by KVM too. > > > > > > In other words, it's not a part of this series so I can't review whether > > > this statement is correct or whether there's a better way to hand this > > > information over to KVM. > > > > > > This (minor) nugget influencing the design also isn't even commented or > > > addressed in the changelog. > > > > TDSYSINFO_STRUCT is 1024B and CMR array is 512B, so I don't think it should be > > in the stack. I can change to use dynamic allocation at the beginning and free > > it at the end of the function. KVM support patches can change it to static > > variable in the file. > > 2k of stack is big, but it isn't a deal breaker for something that's not > nested anywhere and that's only called once in a pretty controlled > setting and not in interrupt context. I wouldn't cry about it. OK. I'll change to use function local variables for both of them.
On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 5:15 PM Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> wrote: > > On Wed, 2022-04-27 at 15:15 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > > On 4/5/22 21:49, Kai Huang wrote: > > > TDX provides increased levels of memory confidentiality and integrity. > > > This requires special hardware support for features like memory > > > encryption and storage of memory integrity checksums. Not all memory > > > satisfies these requirements. > > > > > > As a result, TDX introduced the concept of a "Convertible Memory Region" > > > (CMR). During boot, the firmware builds a list of all of the memory > > > ranges which can provide the TDX security guarantees. The list of these > > > ranges, along with TDX module information, is available to the kernel by > > > querying the TDX module via TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL. > > > > > > Host kernel can choose whether or not to use all convertible memory > > > regions as TDX memory. Before TDX module is ready to create any TD > > > guests, all TDX memory regions that host kernel intends to use must be > > > configured to the TDX module, using specific data structures defined by > > > TDX architecture. Constructing those structures requires information of > > > both TDX module and the Convertible Memory Regions. Call TDH.SYS.INFO > > > to get this information as preparation to construct those structures. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> > > > --- > > > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++ > > > 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+) > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > > > index ef2718423f0f..482e6d858181 100644 > > > --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > > > +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c > > > @@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_module_lock); > > > > > > static struct p_seamldr_info p_seamldr_info; > > > > > > +/* Base address of CMR array needs to be 512 bytes aligned. */ > > > +static struct cmr_info tdx_cmr_array[MAX_CMRS] __aligned(CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT); > > > +static int tdx_cmr_num; > > > +static struct tdsysinfo_struct tdx_sysinfo; > > > > I really dislike mixing hardware and software structures. Please make > > it clear which of these are fully software-defined and which are part of > > the hardware ABI. > > Both 'struct tdsysinfo_struct' and 'struct cmr_info' are hardware structures. > They are defined in tdx.h which has a comment saying the data structures below > this comment is hardware structures: > > +/* > + * TDX architectural data structures > + */ > > It is introduced in the P-SEAMLDR patch. > > Should I explicitly add comments around the variables saying they are used by > hardware, something like: > > /* > * Data structures used by TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL to return CMRs and > * TDX module system information. > */ > > ? > > > > > > static bool __seamrr_enabled(void) > > > { > > > return (seamrr_mask & SEAMRR_ENABLED_BITS) == SEAMRR_ENABLED_BITS; > > > @@ -468,6 +473,127 @@ static int tdx_module_init_cpus(void) > > > return seamcall_on_each_cpu(&sc); > > > } > > > > > > +static inline bool cmr_valid(struct cmr_info *cmr) > > > +{ > > > + return !!cmr->size; > > > +} > > > + > > > +static void print_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int cmr_num, > > > + const char *name) > > > +{ > > > + int i; > > > + > > > + for (i = 0; i < cmr_num; i++) { > > > + struct cmr_info *cmr = &cmr_array[i]; > > > + > > > + pr_info("%s : [0x%llx, 0x%llx)\n", name, > > > + cmr->base, cmr->base + cmr->size); > > > + } > > > +} > > > + > > > +static int sanitize_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int cmr_num) > > > +{ > > > + int i, j; > > > + > > > + /* > > > + * Intel TDX module spec, 20.7.3 CMR_INFO: > > > + * > > > + * TDH.SYS.INFO leaf function returns a MAX_CMRS (32) entry > > > + * array of CMR_INFO entries. The CMRs are sorted from the > > > + * lowest base address to the highest base address, and they > > > + * are non-overlapping. > > > + * > > > + * This implies that BIOS may generate invalid empty entries > > > + * if total CMRs are less than 32. Skip them manually. > > > + */ > > > + for (i = 0; i < cmr_num; i++) { > > > + struct cmr_info *cmr = &cmr_array[i]; > > > + struct cmr_info *prev_cmr = NULL; > > > + > > > + /* Skip further invalid CMRs */ > > > + if (!cmr_valid(cmr)) > > > + break; > > > + > > > + if (i > 0) > > > + prev_cmr = &cmr_array[i - 1]; > > > + > > > + /* > > > + * It is a TDX firmware bug if CMRs are not > > > + * in address ascending order. > > > + */ > > > + if (prev_cmr && ((prev_cmr->base + prev_cmr->size) > > > > + cmr->base)) { > > > + pr_err("Firmware bug: CMRs not in address ascending order.\n"); > > > + return -EFAULT; > > > > -EFAULT is a really weird return code to use for this. I'd use -EINVAL. > > OK thanks. > > > > > > + } > > > + } > > > + > > > + /* > > > + * Also a sane BIOS should never generate invalid CMR(s) between > > > + * two valid CMRs. Sanity check this and simply return error in > > > + * this case. > > > + * > > > + * By reaching here @i is the index of the first invalid CMR (or > > > + * cmr_num). Starting with next entry of @i since it has already > > > + * been checked. > > > + */ > > > + for (j = i + 1; j < cmr_num; j++) > > > + if (cmr_valid(&cmr_array[j])) { > > > + pr_err("Firmware bug: invalid CMR(s) among valid CMRs.\n"); > > > + return -EFAULT; > > > + } > > > > Please add brackets for the for(). > > OK. > > > > > > + /* > > > + * Trim all tail invalid empty CMRs. BIOS should generate at > > > + * least one valid CMR, otherwise it's a TDX firmware bug. > > > + */ > > > + tdx_cmr_num = i; > > > + if (!tdx_cmr_num) { > > > + pr_err("Firmware bug: No valid CMR.\n"); > > > + return -EFAULT; > > > + } > > > + > > > + /* Print kernel sanitized CMRs */ > > > + print_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, tdx_cmr_num, "Kernel-sanitized-CMR"); > > > + > > > + return 0; > > > +} > > > + > > > +static int tdx_get_sysinfo(void) > > > +{ > > > + struct tdx_module_output out; > > > + u64 tdsysinfo_sz, cmr_num; > > > + int ret; > > > + > > > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct) != TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE); > > > + > > > + ret = seamcall(TDH_SYS_INFO, __pa(&tdx_sysinfo), TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE, > > > + __pa(tdx_cmr_array), MAX_CMRS, NULL, &out); > > > + if (ret) > > > + return ret; > > > + > > > + /* > > > + * If TDH.SYS.CONFIG succeeds, RDX contains the actual bytes > > > + * written to @tdx_sysinfo and R9 contains the actual entries > > > + * written to @tdx_cmr_array. Sanity check them. > > > + */ > > > + tdsysinfo_sz = out.rdx; > > > + cmr_num = out.r9; > > > > Please vertically align things like this: > > > > tdsysinfo_sz = out.rdx; > > cmr_num = out.r9; > > OK. > > > > > > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE((tdsysinfo_sz > sizeof(tdx_sysinfo)) || !tdsysinfo_sz || > > > + (cmr_num > MAX_CMRS) || !cmr_num)) > > > + return -EFAULT; > > > > Sanity checking is good, but this makes me wonder how much is too much. > > I don't see a lot of code for instance checking if sys_write() writes > > more than how much it was supposed to. > > > > Why are these sanity checks necessary here? Is the TDX module expected > > to be *THAT* buggy? The thing that's providing, oh, basically all of > > the security guarantees of this architecture. It's overflowing the > > buffers you hand it? > > I think this check can be removed. Will remove. > > > > > > + pr_info("TDX module: vendor_id 0x%x, major_version %u, minor_version %u, build_date %u, build_num %u", > > > + tdx_sysinfo.vendor_id, tdx_sysinfo.major_version, > > > + tdx_sysinfo.minor_version, tdx_sysinfo.build_date, > > > + tdx_sysinfo.build_num); > > > + > > > + /* Print BIOS provided CMRs */ > > > + print_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, cmr_num, "BIOS-CMR"); > > > + sanitize_cmrs already prints the cmrs in case of success. So for valid cmrs we are going to print them twice. Would it be better to only print cmrs here in case sanitize_cmrs fails? > > > + return sanitize_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, cmr_num); > > > +} > > > > Does sanitize_cmrs() sanitize anything? It looks to me like it *checks* > > the CMRs. But, sanitizing is an active operation that writes to the > > data being sanitized. This looks read-only to me. check_cmrs() would > > be a better name for a passive check. > > Sure will change to check_cmrs(). > > > > > > static int init_tdx_module(void) > > > { > > > int ret; > > > @@ -482,6 +608,11 @@ static int init_tdx_module(void) > > > if (ret) > > > goto out; > > > > > > + /* Get TDX module information and CMRs */ > > > + ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(); > > > + if (ret) > > > + goto out; > > > > Couldn't we get rid of that comment if you did something like: > > > > ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(&tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_sysinfo); > > Yes will do. > > > > > and preferably make the variables function-local. > > 'tdx_sysinfo' will be used by KVM too. > > > > -- > Thanks, > -Kai > > Sagi
On Wed, 2022-05-18 at 15:30 -0700, Sagi Shahar wrote: > > > > > > > + pr_info("TDX module: vendor_id 0x%x, major_version %u, minor_version > > > > %u, build_date %u, build_num %u", > > > > + tdx_sysinfo.vendor_id, tdx_sysinfo.major_version, > > > > + tdx_sysinfo.minor_version, tdx_sysinfo.build_date, > > > > + tdx_sysinfo.build_num); > > > > + > > > > + /* Print BIOS provided CMRs */ > > > > + print_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, cmr_num, "BIOS-CMR"); > > > > + > > sanitize_cmrs already prints the cmrs in case of success. So for valid > cmrs we are going to print them twice. > Would it be better to only print cmrs here in case sanitize_cmrs fails? The "BIOS-CMR" will always have 32 entries. It includes all the *empty* CMRs after the valid CMRs, so the two are different. But yes it seems there's no need to always print "BIOS-CMR".
On Fri, 2022-04-29 at 10:47 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 4/28/22 16:14, Kai Huang wrote: > > On Thu, 2022-04-28 at 07:06 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > > > On 4/27/22 17:15, Kai Huang wrote: > > > > > Couldn't we get rid of that comment if you did something like: > > > > > > > > > > ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(&tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_sysinfo); > > > > > > > > Yes will do. > > > > > > > > > and preferably make the variables function-local. > > > > > > > > 'tdx_sysinfo' will be used by KVM too. > > > > > > In other words, it's not a part of this series so I can't review whether > > > this statement is correct or whether there's a better way to hand this > > > information over to KVM. > > > > > > This (minor) nugget influencing the design also isn't even commented or > > > addressed in the changelog. > > > > TDSYSINFO_STRUCT is 1024B and CMR array is 512B, so I don't think it should be > > in the stack. I can change to use dynamic allocation at the beginning and free > > it at the end of the function. KVM support patches can change it to static > > variable in the file. > > 2k of stack is big, but it isn't a deal breaker for something that's not > nested anywhere and that's only called once in a pretty controlled > setting and not in interrupt context. I wouldn't cry about it. Hi Dave, I got below complaining when I use local variable for TDSYSINFO_STRUCT and CMR array: arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:383:1: warning: the frame size of 3072 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=] 383 | } So I don't think we can use local variable for them. I'll still use static variables to avoid dynamic allocation. In the commit message, I'll explain they are too big to put into the stack, and KVM will need to use TDSYSINFO_STRUCT reported by TDX module anyway. Let me know if you don't agree?
On Wed, 2022-05-25 at 16:47 +1200, Kai Huang wrote: > On Fri, 2022-04-29 at 10:47 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > > On 4/28/22 16:14, Kai Huang wrote: > > > On Thu, 2022-04-28 at 07:06 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > > > > On 4/27/22 17:15, Kai Huang wrote: > > > > > > Couldn't we get rid of that comment if you did something like: > > > > > > > > > > > > ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(&tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_sysinfo); > > > > > > > > > > Yes will do. > > > > > > > > > > > and preferably make the variables function-local. > > > > > > > > > > 'tdx_sysinfo' will be used by KVM too. > > > > > > > > In other words, it's not a part of this series so I can't review whether > > > > this statement is correct or whether there's a better way to hand this > > > > information over to KVM. > > > > > > > > This (minor) nugget influencing the design also isn't even commented or > > > > addressed in the changelog. > > > > > > TDSYSINFO_STRUCT is 1024B and CMR array is 512B, so I don't think it should be > > > in the stack. I can change to use dynamic allocation at the beginning and free > > > it at the end of the function. KVM support patches can change it to static > > > variable in the file. > > > > 2k of stack is big, but it isn't a deal breaker for something that's not > > nested anywhere and that's only called once in a pretty controlled > > setting and not in interrupt context. I wouldn't cry about it. > > Hi Dave, > > I got below complaining when I use local variable for TDSYSINFO_STRUCT and CMR > array: > > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:383:1: warning: the frame size of 3072 bytes is > larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=] > 383 | } > > So I don't think we can use local variable for them. I'll still use static > variables to avoid dynamic allocation. In the commit message, I'll explain they > are too big to put into the stack, and KVM will need to use TDSYSINFO_STRUCT > reported by TDX module anyway. > > Let me know if you don't agree? Btw, CMR array alone can be put into the stack. It will never be used by KVM, so I'll put CMR array as local variable, but keep tdx_sysinfo as static variable.
On Wed, 2022-05-25 at 16:57 +1200, Kai Huang wrote: > On Wed, 2022-05-25 at 16:47 +1200, Kai Huang wrote: > > On Fri, 2022-04-29 at 10:47 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > > > On 4/28/22 16:14, Kai Huang wrote: > > > > On Thu, 2022-04-28 at 07:06 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > > > > > On 4/27/22 17:15, Kai Huang wrote: > > > > > > > Couldn't we get rid of that comment if you did something like: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(&tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_sysinfo); > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes will do. > > > > > > > > > > > > > and preferably make the variables function-local. > > > > > > > > > > > > 'tdx_sysinfo' will be used by KVM too. > > > > > > > > > > In other words, it's not a part of this series so I can't review whether > > > > > this statement is correct or whether there's a better way to hand this > > > > > information over to KVM. > > > > > > > > > > This (minor) nugget influencing the design also isn't even commented or > > > > > addressed in the changelog. > > > > > > > > TDSYSINFO_STRUCT is 1024B and CMR array is 512B, so I don't think it should be > > > > in the stack. I can change to use dynamic allocation at the beginning and free > > > > it at the end of the function. KVM support patches can change it to static > > > > variable in the file. > > > > > > 2k of stack is big, but it isn't a deal breaker for something that's not > > > nested anywhere and that's only called once in a pretty controlled > > > setting and not in interrupt context. I wouldn't cry about it. > > > > Hi Dave, > > > > I got below complaining when I use local variable for TDSYSINFO_STRUCT and CMR > > array: > > > > arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:383:1: warning: the frame size of 3072 bytes is > > larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=] > > 383 | } > > > > So I don't think we can use local variable for them. I'll still use static > > variables to avoid dynamic allocation. In the commit message, I'll explain they > > are too big to put into the stack, and KVM will need to use TDSYSINFO_STRUCT > > reported by TDX module anyway. > > > > Let me know if you don't agree? > > Btw, CMR array alone can be put into the stack. It will never be used by KVM, > so I'll put CMR array as local variable, but keep tdx_sysinfo as static > variable. > Sorry for multiple emails about this. If I put CMR array to the stack, I still sometimes get the build warning. So will use static variables. Also, constructing TDMRs internally needs to use tdx_sysinfo (max_tdmrs, pamt_entry_size, max_rsvd_per_tdmr), so with static variable they don't need to be passed around as function arguments.
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c index ef2718423f0f..482e6d858181 100644 --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c @@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_module_lock); static struct p_seamldr_info p_seamldr_info; +/* Base address of CMR array needs to be 512 bytes aligned. */ +static struct cmr_info tdx_cmr_array[MAX_CMRS] __aligned(CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT); +static int tdx_cmr_num; +static struct tdsysinfo_struct tdx_sysinfo; + static bool __seamrr_enabled(void) { return (seamrr_mask & SEAMRR_ENABLED_BITS) == SEAMRR_ENABLED_BITS; @@ -468,6 +473,127 @@ static int tdx_module_init_cpus(void) return seamcall_on_each_cpu(&sc); } +static inline bool cmr_valid(struct cmr_info *cmr) +{ + return !!cmr->size; +} + +static void print_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int cmr_num, + const char *name) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < cmr_num; i++) { + struct cmr_info *cmr = &cmr_array[i]; + + pr_info("%s : [0x%llx, 0x%llx)\n", name, + cmr->base, cmr->base + cmr->size); + } +} + +static int sanitize_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int cmr_num) +{ + int i, j; + + /* + * Intel TDX module spec, 20.7.3 CMR_INFO: + * + * TDH.SYS.INFO leaf function returns a MAX_CMRS (32) entry + * array of CMR_INFO entries. The CMRs are sorted from the + * lowest base address to the highest base address, and they + * are non-overlapping. + * + * This implies that BIOS may generate invalid empty entries + * if total CMRs are less than 32. Skip them manually. + */ + for (i = 0; i < cmr_num; i++) { + struct cmr_info *cmr = &cmr_array[i]; + struct cmr_info *prev_cmr = NULL; + + /* Skip further invalid CMRs */ + if (!cmr_valid(cmr)) + break; + + if (i > 0) + prev_cmr = &cmr_array[i - 1]; + + /* + * It is a TDX firmware bug if CMRs are not + * in address ascending order. + */ + if (prev_cmr && ((prev_cmr->base + prev_cmr->size) > + cmr->base)) { + pr_err("Firmware bug: CMRs not in address ascending order.\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + } + + /* + * Also a sane BIOS should never generate invalid CMR(s) between + * two valid CMRs. Sanity check this and simply return error in + * this case. + * + * By reaching here @i is the index of the first invalid CMR (or + * cmr_num). Starting with next entry of @i since it has already + * been checked. + */ + for (j = i + 1; j < cmr_num; j++) + if (cmr_valid(&cmr_array[j])) { + pr_err("Firmware bug: invalid CMR(s) among valid CMRs.\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + + /* + * Trim all tail invalid empty CMRs. BIOS should generate at + * least one valid CMR, otherwise it's a TDX firmware bug. + */ + tdx_cmr_num = i; + if (!tdx_cmr_num) { + pr_err("Firmware bug: No valid CMR.\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + + /* Print kernel sanitized CMRs */ + print_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, tdx_cmr_num, "Kernel-sanitized-CMR"); + + return 0; +} + +static int tdx_get_sysinfo(void) +{ + struct tdx_module_output out; + u64 tdsysinfo_sz, cmr_num; + int ret; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct) != TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE); + + ret = seamcall(TDH_SYS_INFO, __pa(&tdx_sysinfo), TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE, + __pa(tdx_cmr_array), MAX_CMRS, NULL, &out); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* + * If TDH.SYS.CONFIG succeeds, RDX contains the actual bytes + * written to @tdx_sysinfo and R9 contains the actual entries + * written to @tdx_cmr_array. Sanity check them. + */ + tdsysinfo_sz = out.rdx; + cmr_num = out.r9; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE((tdsysinfo_sz > sizeof(tdx_sysinfo)) || !tdsysinfo_sz || + (cmr_num > MAX_CMRS) || !cmr_num)) + return -EFAULT; + + pr_info("TDX module: vendor_id 0x%x, major_version %u, minor_version %u, build_date %u, build_num %u", + tdx_sysinfo.vendor_id, tdx_sysinfo.major_version, + tdx_sysinfo.minor_version, tdx_sysinfo.build_date, + tdx_sysinfo.build_num); + + /* Print BIOS provided CMRs */ + print_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, cmr_num, "BIOS-CMR"); + + return sanitize_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, cmr_num); +} + static int init_tdx_module(void) { int ret; @@ -482,6 +608,11 @@ static int init_tdx_module(void) if (ret) goto out; + /* Get TDX module information and CMRs */ + ret = tdx_get_sysinfo(); + if (ret) + goto out; + /* * Return -EFAULT until all steps of TDX module * initialization are done. diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h index b8cfdd6e12f3..2f21c45df6ac 100644 --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h @@ -29,6 +29,66 @@ struct p_seamldr_info { u8 reserved2[88]; } __packed __aligned(P_SEAMLDR_INFO_ALIGNMENT); +struct cmr_info { + u64 base; + u64 size; +} __packed; + +#define MAX_CMRS 32 +#define CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT 512 + +struct cpuid_config { + u32 leaf; + u32 sub_leaf; + u32 eax; + u32 ebx; + u32 ecx; + u32 edx; +} __packed; + +#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE 1024 +#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT 1024 + +struct tdsysinfo_struct { + /* TDX-SEAM Module Info */ + u32 attributes; + u32 vendor_id; + u32 build_date; + u16 build_num; + u16 minor_version; + u16 major_version; + u8 reserved0[14]; + /* Memory Info */ + u16 max_tdmrs; + u16 max_reserved_per_tdmr; + u16 pamt_entry_size; + u8 reserved1[10]; + /* Control Struct Info */ + u16 tdcs_base_size; + u8 reserved2[2]; + u16 tdvps_base_size; + u8 tdvps_xfam_dependent_size; + u8 reserved3[9]; + /* TD Capabilities */ + u64 attributes_fixed0; + u64 attributes_fixed1; + u64 xfam_fixed0; + u64 xfam_fixed1; + u8 reserved4[32]; + u32 num_cpuid_config; + /* + * The actual number of CPUID_CONFIG depends on above + * 'num_cpuid_config'. The size of 'struct tdsysinfo_struct' + * is 1024B defined by TDX architecture. Use a union with + * specific padding to make 'sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct)' + * equal to 1024. + */ + union { + struct cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0]; + u8 reserved5[892]; + }; +} __packed __aligned(TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT); + /* * P-SEAMLDR SEAMCALL leaf function */ @@ -38,6 +98,7 @@ struct p_seamldr_info { /* * TDX module SEAMCALL leaf functions */ +#define TDH_SYS_INFO 32 #define TDH_SYS_INIT 33 #define TDH_SYS_LP_INIT 35 #define TDH_SYS_LP_SHUTDOWN 44
TDX provides increased levels of memory confidentiality and integrity. This requires special hardware support for features like memory encryption and storage of memory integrity checksums. Not all memory satisfies these requirements. As a result, TDX introduced the concept of a "Convertible Memory Region" (CMR). During boot, the firmware builds a list of all of the memory ranges which can provide the TDX security guarantees. The list of these ranges, along with TDX module information, is available to the kernel by querying the TDX module via TDH.SYS.INFO SEAMCALL. Host kernel can choose whether or not to use all convertible memory regions as TDX memory. Before TDX module is ready to create any TD guests, all TDX memory regions that host kernel intends to use must be configured to the TDX module, using specific data structures defined by TDX architecture. Constructing those structures requires information of both TDX module and the Convertible Memory Regions. Call TDH.SYS.INFO to get this information as preparation to construct those structures. Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> --- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+)