From patchwork Wed Sep 12 19:43:08 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Tony Krowiak X-Patchwork-Id: 10598223 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A8B7515E2 for ; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 19:44:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 93A462AA7C for ; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 19:44:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 844E32AA99; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 19:44:48 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E5D892AA7C for ; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 19:44:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728564AbeIMAut (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Sep 2018 20:50:49 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:41320 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728481AbeIMAus (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Sep 2018 20:50:48 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098394.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w8CJYaq5107723 for ; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:44:45 -0400 Received: from e31.co.us.ibm.com (e31.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.149]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2mf7md3x4n-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:44:45 -0400 Received: from localhost by e31.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 12 Sep 2018 13:44:39 -0600 Received: from b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.234]) by b03cxnp08025.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w8CJiarp22282400 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Wed, 12 Sep 2018 12:44:36 -0700 Received: from b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE7496A054; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 13:44:36 -0600 (MDT) Received: from b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id F17B66A04F; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 13:44:33 -0600 (MDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.80.213.181]) by b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 13:44:33 -0600 (MDT) From: Tony Krowiak To: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: freude@de.ibm.com, schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, kwankhede@nvidia.com, bjsdjshi@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, alex.williamson@redhat.com, pmorel@linux.vnet.ibm.com, alifm@linux.vnet.ibm.com, mjrosato@linux.vnet.ibm.com, jjherne@linux.vnet.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, pasic@linux.vnet.ibm.com, berrange@redhat.com, fiuczy@linux.vnet.ibm.com, buendgen@de.ibm.com, akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, Pierre Morel , Tony Krowiak Subject: [PATCH v10 18/26] KVM: s390: vsie: Allow CRYCB FORMAT-2 Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:43:08 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.1 In-Reply-To: <1536781396-13601-1-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1536781396-13601-1-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18091219-8235-0000-0000-00000DFE30F6 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00009709; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000266; SDB=6.01087371; UDB=6.00561489; IPR=6.00867383; MB=3.00023256; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-09-12 19:44:42 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18091219-8236-0000-0000-0000429E5093 Message-Id: <1536781396-13601-19-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-09-12_10:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1809120195 Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Pierre Morel When the guest and the host both use CRYCB FORMAT-2, we copy the guest's FORMAT-1 APCB to a FORMAT-1 shadow APCB. This patch also cleans up the shadow_crycb() function. Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel Signed-off-by: Tony Krowiak --- arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c index e0e6fbf..3a93278 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c @@ -136,14 +136,81 @@ static int prepare_cpuflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) return 0; } -/* +/** + * setup_apcb11 - Copy the FORMAT1 APCB from the guest to the shadow CRYCB + * @vcpu: pointer to the virtual CPU + * @apcb_s: pointer to start of apcb in the shadow crycb + * @apcb_o: pointer to start of original guest apcb + * @apcb_h: pointer to start of apcb in the host + * + * Returns 0 and -EFAULT on error reading guest apcb + */ +static int setup_apcb11(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long *apcb_s, + unsigned long apcb_o, + unsigned long *apcb_h) +{ + if (read_guest_real(vcpu, apcb_o, apcb_s, + sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb1))) + return -EFAULT; + + bitmap_and(apcb_s, apcb_s, apcb_h, sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb1)); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * setup_apcb - Create a shadow copy of the apcb. + * @vcpu: pointer to the virtual CPU + * @crycb_s: pointer to shadow crycb + * @crycb_o: pointer to original guest crycb + * @crycb_h: pointer to the host crycb + * @fmt_o: format of the original guest crycb. + * @fmt_h: format of the host crycb. + * + * Checks the compatibility between the guest and host crycb and calls the + * appropriate copy function. + * + * Return 0 or an error number if the guest and host crycb are incompatible. + */ +static int setup_apcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_s390_crypto_cb *crycb_s, + const u32 crycb_o, + struct kvm_s390_crypto_cb *crycb_h, + int fmt_o, int fmt_h) +{ + struct kvm_s390_crypto_cb *crycb; + + crycb = (struct kvm_s390_crypto_cb *) (unsigned long)crycb_o; + + switch (fmt_o) { + case CRYCB_FORMAT2: + if ((crycb_o & PAGE_MASK) != ((crycb_o + 256) & PAGE_MASK)) + return -EACCES; + if (fmt_h != CRYCB_FORMAT2) + return -EINVAL; + return setup_apcb11(vcpu, (unsigned long *)&crycb_s->apcb1, + (unsigned long) &crycb->apcb1, + (unsigned long *)&crycb_h->apcb1); + } + return -EINVAL; +} + +/** + * shadow_crycb - Create a shadow copy of the crycb block + * @vcpu: a pointer to the virtual CPU + * @vsie_page: a pointer to internal date used for the vSIE + * * Create a shadow copy of the crycb block and setup key wrapping, if * requested for guest 3 and enabled for guest 2. * - * We accept format-1 or format-2, but we treat it as a format-1 (no AP in g2), - * and we convert it into format-2 in the shadow CRYCB. + * We accept format-1 or format-2, but we convert format-1 into format-2 + * in the shadow CRYCB. + * Using format-2 enables the firmware to choose the right format when + * scheduling the SIE. * There is nothing to do for format-0. * + * This function centralize the issuing of set_validity_icpt() for all + * the subfunctions working on the crycb. + * * Returns: - 0 if shadowed or nothing to do * - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2 */ @@ -155,24 +222,42 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) const u32 crycb_addr = crycbd_o & 0x7ffffff8U; unsigned long *b1, *b2; u8 ecb3_flags; + int apie_h; + int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76); + int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK; + int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK; + int ret = 0; scb_s->crycbd = 0; if (!(crycbd_o & vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT1)) return 0; - /* format-1 is supported with message-security-assist extension 3 */ - if (!test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76)) + + apie_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca & ECA_APIE; + if (!apie_h && !key_msk) return 0; - if ((crycb_addr & PAGE_MASK) != ((crycb_addr + 128) & PAGE_MASK)) - return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU); - else if (!crycb_addr) + if (!crycb_addr) return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U); + if (fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT1) + if ((crycb_addr & PAGE_MASK) != + ((crycb_addr + 128) & PAGE_MASK)) + return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU); + + if (apie_h && (scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE)) { + ret = setup_apcb(vcpu, &vsie_page->crycb, crycb_addr, + vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycb, + fmt_o, fmt_h); + if (ret) + goto end; + scb_s->eca |= scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE; + } + /* we may only allow it if enabled for guest 2 */ ecb3_flags = scb_o->ecb3 & vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA); if (!ecb3_flags) - return 0; + goto end; /* copy only the wrapping keys */ if (read_guest_real(vcpu, crycb_addr + 72, @@ -180,7 +265,6 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0035U); scb_s->ecb3 |= ecb3_flags; - scb_s->crycbd = ((__u32)(__u64) &vsie_page->crycb) | CRYCB_FORMAT2; /* xor both blocks in one run */ b1 = (unsigned long *) vsie_page->crycb.dea_wrapping_key_mask; @@ -188,6 +272,16 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask; /* as 56%8 == 0, bitmap_xor won't overwrite any data */ bitmap_xor(b1, b1, b2, BITS_PER_BYTE * 56); +end: + switch (ret) { + case -EINVAL: + return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0020U); + case -EFAULT: + return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0035U); + case -EACCES: + return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU); + } + scb_s->crycbd = ((__u32)(__u64) &vsie_page->crycb) | CRYCB_FORMAT2; return 0; }