From patchwork Sat Mar 16 10:23:19 2013 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jan Kiszka X-Patchwork-Id: 2281791 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-kvm@patchwork.kernel.org Delivered-To: patchwork-process-083081@patchwork2.kernel.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by patchwork2.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0DFC0DFE75 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2013 10:23:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755389Ab3CPKXd (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2013 06:23:33 -0400 Received: from mout.web.de ([212.227.15.3]:51181 "EHLO mout.web.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754715Ab3CPKXc (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2013 06:23:32 -0400 Received: from localhost.localdomain ([95.157.56.37]) by smtp.web.de (mrweb003) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0MXpaR-1UC7rM0jup-00WOUf; Sat, 16 Mar 2013 11:23:27 +0100 From: Jan Kiszka To: Gleb Natapov , Marcelo Tosatti Cc: kvm , Paolo Bonzini , Nadav Har'El Subject: [PATCH v2 5/5] KVM: nVMX: Fix conditions for NMI injection Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2013 11:23:19 +0100 Message-Id: <1acd442745b812f5fdf387d39581a373d83ad303.1363429383.git.jan.kiszka@web.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.3.4 In-Reply-To: References: In-Reply-To: References: X-Provags-ID: V02:K0:EOxMo7tr+VOf9a1ZqiI2ztEysGCoH/TJm+b6PkXW4pe +KhSgVk1uMALV03LnXTOlPTjxDTRxsOBz7tI04eW9Al5Z9c+bL E9lH0peu5XjfPTurE9/7HDJiYeUJaEWlHbzDrDPF8OU9V/5nBt jiZXO4dy6foRUksCNLNZgkm01wJmnguO4e8mFPTwNB/QEHBE6L B1/ra4aZUvLsD5g/6B0Wg== Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Jan Kiszka The logic for checking if interrupts can be injected has to be applied also on NMIs. The difference is that if NMI interception is on these events are consumed and blocked by the VM exit. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index 27e7e59..83a57b7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -4189,6 +4189,12 @@ static bool nested_exit_on_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK; } +static bool nested_exit_on_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + return get_vmcs12(vcpu)->pin_based_vm_exec_control & + PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING; +} + static void enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { u32 cpu_based_vm_exec_control; @@ -4314,6 +4320,35 @@ static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked) static int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) { + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); + + if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending || + vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE) == + GUEST_ACTIVITY_WAIT_SIPI) + return 0; + if (nested_exit_on_nmi(vcpu)) { + /* + * Check if the idt_vectoring_info_field is free. We + * cannot raise EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI if it isn't. + */ + if (vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field & + VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) + return 0; + nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu); + vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI; + vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = NMI_VECTOR | + INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK; + /* + * The NMI-triggered VM exit counts as injection: + * clear this one and block further NMIs. + */ + vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0; + vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true); + return 0; + } + } + if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && to_vmx(vcpu)->soft_vnmi_blocked) return 0;