From patchwork Wed May 8 14:43:52 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com" X-Patchwork-Id: 10935989 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A817C924 for ; Wed, 8 May 2019 14:49:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 989DC28928 for ; Wed, 8 May 2019 14:49:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 8C2AB28969; Wed, 8 May 2019 14:49:56 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0299228928 for ; Wed, 8 May 2019 14:49:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727995AbfEHOtl (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 May 2019 10:49:41 -0400 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:59507 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728322AbfEHOor (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 May 2019 10:44:47 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga003.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.27]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 May 2019 07:44:45 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 Received: from black.fi.intel.com ([10.237.72.28]) by orsmga003.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 08 May 2019 07:44:41 -0700 Received: by black.fi.intel.com (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 441E5B47; Wed, 8 May 2019 17:44:30 +0300 (EEST) From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" To: Andrew Morton , x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , Andy Lutomirski , David Howells Cc: Kees Cook , Dave Hansen , Kai Huang , Jacob Pan , Alison Schofield , linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kirill A . Shutemov" Subject: [PATCH, RFC 32/62] keys/mktme: Store MKTME payloads if cmdline parameter allows Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 17:43:52 +0300 Message-Id: <20190508144422.13171-33-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> References: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Alison Schofield MKTME (Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption) key payloads may include data encryption keys, tweak keys, and additional entropy bits. These are used to program the MKTME encryption hardware. By default, the kernel destroys this payload data once the hardware is programmed. However, in order to fully support Memory Hotplug, saving the key data becomes important. The MKTME Key Service cannot allow a new memory controller to come online unless it can program the Key Table to match the Key Tables of all existing memory controllers. With CPU generated keys (a.k.a. random keys or ephemeral keys) the saving of user key data is not an issue. The kernel and MKTME hardware can generate strong encryption keys without recalling any user supplied data. With USER directed keys (a.k.a. user type) saving the key programming data (data and tweak key) becomes an issue. The data and tweak keys are required to program those keys on a new physical package. In preparation for adding support for onlining new memory: Add an 'mktme_key_store' where key payloads are stored. Add 'mktme_storekeys' kernel command line parameter that, when present, allows the kernel to store user type key payloads. Add 'mktme_bitmap_user_type' to recall when USER type keys are in use. If no USER type keys are currently in use, new memory may be brought online, despite the absence of 'mktme_storekeys'. Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 ++++ security/keys/mktme_keys.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst index b8d0bc07ed0a..1b62b86d0666 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ parameter is applicable:: Documentation/m68k/kernel-options.txt. MDA MDA console support is enabled. MIPS MIPS architecture is enabled. + MKTME Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption is enabled. MOUSE Appropriate mouse support is enabled. MSI Message Signaled Interrupts (PCI). MTD MTD (Memory Technology Device) support is enabled. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 2b8ee90bb644..38ea0ace9533 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2544,6 +2544,17 @@ in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git + mktme_storekeys [X86, MKTME] When CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME is set + this parameter allows the kernel to store the user + specified MKTME key payload. Storing this payload + means that the MKTME Key Service can always allow + the addition of new physical packages. If the + mktme_storekeys parameter is not present, users key + data will not be stored, and new physical packages + may only be added to the system if no user type + MKTME keys are programmed. + See Documentation/x86/mktme.rst + mminit_loglevel= [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for diff --git a/security/keys/mktme_keys.c b/security/keys/mktme_keys.c index 4b2d3dc1843a..bcd68850048f 100644 --- a/security/keys/mktme_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/mktme_keys.c @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mktme_lock); struct kmem_cache *mktme_prog_cache; /* Hardware programming cache */ unsigned long *mktme_target_map; /* Pconfig programming targets */ cpumask_var_t mktme_leadcpus; /* One lead CPU per pconfig target */ +static bool mktme_storekeys; /* True if key payloads may be stored */ +unsigned long *mktme_bitmap_user_type; /* Shows presence of user type keys */ +struct mktme_payload *mktme_key_store; /* Payload storage if allowed */ /* 1:1 Mapping between Userspace Keys (struct key) and Hardware KeyIDs */ struct mktme_mapping { @@ -124,6 +127,27 @@ struct mktme_payload { u8 tweak_key[MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE]; }; +void mktme_store_payload(int keyid, struct mktme_payload *payload) +{ + /* Always remember if this key is of type "user" */ + if ((payload->keyid_ctrl & 0xff) == MKTME_KEYID_SET_KEY_DIRECT) + set_bit(keyid, mktme_bitmap_user_type); + /* + * Always store the control fields to program newly + * onlined packages with RANDOM or NO_ENCRYPT keys. + */ + mktme_key_store[keyid].keyid_ctrl = payload->keyid_ctrl; + + /* Only store "user" type data and tweak keys if allowed */ + if (mktme_storekeys && + ((payload->keyid_ctrl & 0xff) == MKTME_KEYID_SET_KEY_DIRECT)) { + memcpy(mktme_key_store[keyid].data_key, payload->data_key, + MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE); + memcpy(mktme_key_store[keyid].tweak_key, payload->tweak_key, + MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE); + } +} + struct mktme_hw_program_info { struct mktme_key_program *key_program; int *status; @@ -270,9 +294,10 @@ int mktme_instantiate_key(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) 0, GFP_KERNEL)) goto err_out; - if (!mktme_program_keyid(keyid, payload)) + if (!mktme_program_keyid(keyid, payload)) { + mktme_store_payload(keyid, payload); return MKTME_PROG_SUCCESS; - + } percpu_ref_exit(&encrypt_count[keyid]); err_out: spin_lock_irqsave(&mktme_lock, flags); @@ -487,10 +512,25 @@ static int __init init_mktme(void) if (!encrypt_count) goto free_targets; + /* Detect presence of user type keys */ + mktme_bitmap_user_type = bitmap_zalloc(mktme_nr_keyids, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!mktme_bitmap_user_type) + goto free_encrypt; + + /* Store key payloads if allowable */ + mktme_key_store = kzalloc(sizeof(mktme_key_store[0]) * + (mktme_nr_keyids + 1), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!mktme_key_store) + goto free_bitmap; + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_mktme); if (!ret) return ret; /* SUCCESS */ + kfree(mktme_key_store); +free_bitmap: + bitmap_free(mktme_bitmap_user_type); +free_encrypt: kvfree(encrypt_count); free_targets: free_cpumask_var(mktme_leadcpus); @@ -504,3 +544,10 @@ static int __init init_mktme(void) } late_initcall(init_mktme); + +static int mktme_enable_storekeys(char *__unused) +{ + mktme_storekeys = true; + return 1; +} +__setup("mktme_storekeys", mktme_enable_storekeys);