| Message ID | 20190710201244.25195-4-brijesh.singh@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add AMD SEV guest live migration support | expand |
On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 08:13:03PM +0000, Singh, Brijesh wrote: > The command is used to finailize the encryption context created with > KVM_SEV_SEND_START command. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > --- > .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 8 +++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index 060ac2316d69..9864f9215c43 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -289,6 +289,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > __u32 trans_len; > }; > > +12. KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH > +------------------------ > + > +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command can be > +issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context. > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > index 8e815a53c420..be73a87a8c4f 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -7168,6 +7168,26 @@ static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_send_finish *data; > + int ret; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -ENOTTY; Almost all sev_ command functions do that check, except sev_guest_init(). You could pull up that check, into svm_mem_enc_op() and save yourself the repeated pattern: --- diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 273ad624b23d..950282c8c4f7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -7225,6 +7225,11 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd))) return -EFAULT; + if (sev_cmd.id != KVM_SEV_INIT) { + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + } + mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); switch (sev_cmd.id) { --- > + > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); Btw, since 1ec696470c86 ("kvm: svm: Add memcg accounting to KVM allocations") gfp flags should be GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT now.
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index 060ac2316d69..9864f9215c43 100644 --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -289,6 +289,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error __u32 trans_len; }; +12. KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH +------------------------ + +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command can be +issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context. + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 8e815a53c420..be73a87a8c4f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -7168,6 +7168,26 @@ static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_send_finish *data; + int ret; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + data->handle = sev->handle; + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, data, &argp->error); + + kfree(data); + return ret; +} + static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -7215,6 +7235,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH: + r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out;
The command is used to finailize the encryption context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START command. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> --- .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 8 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)