From patchwork Tue Jan 12 04:45:02 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gibson X-Patchwork-Id: 12012371 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 565C6C433E9 for ; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 04:46:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E9432250E for ; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 04:46:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732167AbhALEp7 (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Jan 2021 23:45:59 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52506 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732139AbhALEp6 (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Jan 2021 23:45:58 -0500 Received: from ozlabs.org (ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::2]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7226DC06179F for ; Mon, 11 Jan 2021 20:45:18 -0800 (PST) Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4DFJ0R6CY3z9sxS; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:11 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1610426711; bh=oL7fXlBzCaXQOUiYMVz4cHZm2tAgGIgPwAP2LqwdXg0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=mOOTvjLnofjy1wmAisvz4zC6tmZhUUKQdmgbeJiKvZ3lGRuhhPyK9mAKl+Vvq5of+ zWTt2Uk2Ed0bSIFX8tvFLR3JOE4QeGTGHZvF17SkKfLY2Mm+sYw5WxB8cNfr7aRJIo yRGux6xDOZCvIw70uYBJZtSkbiE7Wu2g1mN7FaOA= From: David Gibson To: pasic@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: andi.kleen@intel.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini , Marcelo Tosatti , David Gibson , Greg Kurz , frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, Christian Borntraeger , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, =?utf-8?q?Daniel_P=2E_Be?= =?utf-8?q?rrang=C3=A9?= , Marcel Apfelbaum , Eduardo Habkost , david@redhat.com, Cornelia Huck , mst@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v6 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:02 +1100 Message-Id: <20210112044508.427338-8-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> References: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing confidential guest support may require setup at various points during initialization. Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own initialization calls in arch or machine specific code. However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a common place, relatively late in boot, where we verify that cgs has been initialized if it was requested. This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport base type to accomplish this, which we verify just before the machine specific initialization function. Signed-off-by: David Gibson --- hw/core/machine.c | 8 ++++++++ include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 2 ++ target/i386/sev.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c index 94194ab82d..5a7433332b 100644 --- a/hw/core/machine.c +++ b/hw/core/machine.c @@ -1190,6 +1190,14 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine) } if (machine->cgs) { + /* + * Where confidential guest support is initialized depends on + * the specific mechanism in use. But, we need to make sure + * it's ready by now. If it isn't, that's a bug in the + * implementation of that cgs mechanism. + */ + assert(machine->cgs->ready); + /* * With confidential guests, the host can't see the real * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge diff --git a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h index f9cf170802..5f3e745e20 100644 --- a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h +++ b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ struct ConfidentialGuestSupport { Object parent; + + bool ready; }; typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass { diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index e2b41ef342..3d94635397 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -737,6 +737,8 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify); qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, sev); + cgs->ready = true; + return 0; err: sev_guest = NULL;