| Message ID | 20210114003708.3798992-12-seanjc@google.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups | expand |
On 1/13/21 6:37 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote: > Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way > toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c. > > No functional change intended. > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> > --- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++--------- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + > 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index 1a143340103e..a2c3e2d42a7f 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void) > sev_flush_asids(); > } > > +int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd) > +{ > + if (!svm_sev_enabled()) > + return 0; > + > + sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *), > + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); I saw Tom recommended to use kzalloc.. instead of __GFP_ZERO in previous patch. With that fixed, Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > + if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > /* > * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before > * returning them to the system. > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > index bb7b99743bea..89b95fb87a0c 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > @@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu) > static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) > { > struct svm_cpu_data *sd; > + int ret; > > sd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data), GFP_KERNEL); > if (!sd) > return -ENOMEM; > sd->cpu = cpu; > sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!sd->save_area) > + if (!sd->save_area) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > goto free_cpu_data; > + } > clear_page(page_address(sd->save_area)); > > - if (svm_sev_enabled()) { > - sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, > - sizeof(void *), > - GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); > - if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) > - goto free_save_area; > - } > + ret = sev_cpu_init(sd); > + if (ret) > + goto free_save_area; > > per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd; > > @@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) > __free_page(sd->save_area); > free_cpu_data: > kfree(sd); > - return -ENOMEM; > + return ret; > > } > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > index 8e169835f52a..4eb4bab0ca3e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > @@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, > void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu); > void __init sev_hardware_setup(void); > void sev_hardware_teardown(void); > +int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd); > void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm); > int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
On 1/14/21 3:37 PM, Brijesh Singh wrote: > > On 1/13/21 6:37 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote: >> Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way >> toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c. >> >> No functional change intended. >> >> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> >> --- >> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ >> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++--------- >> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + >> 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c >> index 1a143340103e..a2c3e2d42a7f 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c >> @@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void) >> sev_flush_asids(); >> } >> >> +int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd) >> +{ >> + if (!svm_sev_enabled()) >> + return 0; >> + >> + sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *), >> + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); > > > I saw Tom recommended to use kzalloc.. instead of __GFP_ZERO in previous kcalloc :) Thanks, Tom > patch. With that fixed, > > Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > >> + if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) >> + return -ENOMEM; >> + >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> /* >> * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before >> * returning them to the system. >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c >> index bb7b99743bea..89b95fb87a0c 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c >> @@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu) >> static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) >> { >> struct svm_cpu_data *sd; >> + int ret; >> >> sd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data), GFP_KERNEL); >> if (!sd) >> return -ENOMEM; >> sd->cpu = cpu; >> sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); >> - if (!sd->save_area) >> + if (!sd->save_area) { >> + ret = -ENOMEM; >> goto free_cpu_data; >> + } >> clear_page(page_address(sd->save_area)); >> >> - if (svm_sev_enabled()) { >> - sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, >> - sizeof(void *), >> - GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); >> - if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) >> - goto free_save_area; >> - } >> + ret = sev_cpu_init(sd); >> + if (ret) >> + goto free_save_area; >> >> per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd; >> >> @@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) >> __free_page(sd->save_area); >> free_cpu_data: >> kfree(sd); >> - return -ENOMEM; >> + return ret; >> >> } >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h >> index 8e169835f52a..4eb4bab0ca3e 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h >> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h >> @@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, >> void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu); >> void __init sev_hardware_setup(void); >> void sev_hardware_teardown(void); >> +int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd); >> void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); >> int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm); >> int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
On 1/13/21 6:37 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote: > Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way > toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c. > > No functional change intended. > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > --- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++--------- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + > 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) >
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 1a143340103e..a2c3e2d42a7f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void) sev_flush_asids(); } +int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd) +{ + if (!svm_sev_enabled()) + return 0; + + sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *), + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; +} + /* * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before * returning them to the system. diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index bb7b99743bea..89b95fb87a0c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu) static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) { struct svm_cpu_data *sd; + int ret; sd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sd) return -ENOMEM; sd->cpu = cpu; sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!sd->save_area) + if (!sd->save_area) { + ret = -ENOMEM; goto free_cpu_data; + } clear_page(page_address(sd->save_area)); - if (svm_sev_enabled()) { - sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, - sizeof(void *), - GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); - if (!sd->sev_vmcbs) - goto free_save_area; - } + ret = sev_cpu_init(sd); + if (ret) + goto free_save_area; per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd; @@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu) __free_page(sd->save_area); free_cpu_data: kfree(sd); - return -ENOMEM; + return ret; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 8e169835f52a..4eb4bab0ca3e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu); void __init sev_hardware_setup(void); void sev_hardware_teardown(void); +int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd); void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm); int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++--------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)