From patchwork Fri Jan 22 20:21:35 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Sean Christopherson X-Patchwork-Id: 12040649 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-26.3 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_MED, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8F425C433E0 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2021 21:26:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4C34D23B09 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2021 21:26:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729504AbhAVV0A (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Jan 2021 16:26:00 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:43792 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731111AbhAVUXq (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Jan 2021 15:23:46 -0500 Received: from mail-yb1-xb4a.google.com (mail-yb1-xb4a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::b4a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 13527C0617AA for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:22:02 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-yb1-xb4a.google.com with SMTP id r1so6523969ybd.23 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:22:02 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=sender:reply-to:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references :subject:from:to:cc; bh=EACBA81rA48HC0vzvM1sNbOzKQYdPtj86guoyyxTvpA=; b=Dn7VxB4Wu8BKwcmnIMhYUsZP2+EyurOkh4VCWdD44I6yVacVSSx/420Qfc+l6YAil4 B6+jxiTByvIGgVJoDQbxjAxjrrVrm6QpsnnUlITsS/rTYLLNJDEyxQ/ovhExCZRgPcYf pZV+bPPMR/l6agFFNKO405M5A29A4mhUKYEMOC1x65eUtZsYniLCuk4yjte4dTGcb8RO 7p4vmkHf2dbxbkxdnQMGnrpxijse5SUMOIpZ8MlFn9nL+XNqXvXqUrQiowV3pKlpg5m9 Ta1jaZk4EnKCYcUUl1j+BuX40wHKjH4sJfu1YpsFV21WaiVeacWeEz2wWibZGgH+aSrQ NWpQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:sender:reply-to:date:in-reply-to:message-id :mime-version:references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=EACBA81rA48HC0vzvM1sNbOzKQYdPtj86guoyyxTvpA=; b=XC4K78yUGEBnGEZHIKgdIGVE/dJ5OFvEXRdTbKx/c8xmkKnR/0Tz0ShPszoMaOcn4L BmXH9Kb3OtDHfTQCZ2QceDAPLbyHUzNnksLswj721mSrtcRb7S0mBXG9AVijfAHIBRNB OJCM8lESlz00mJNit+PgUtLLFkINAxZBhiuNSiKLBPkEAEoYGdCkjyfAabJNFCojpFI/ yRrm27PwKVqeNwPauRC1bGAJE8kziG3T9CY+PLug13+PlUz4LLPxzXkAiTC0HVoE1FuV HHC9umcaFDRLU6Ibo/mYPnWvh3lqMqzH0S7o0dhNXHNGjE4isPHtyE4E8CX7Ai7k1u+j eXPA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532NXiAqNTozdf5EWQuynA7NK/+LcO6tgf0yALQIQsGNyZfv/PXR 66KaqJcTHgLeeMlVBgKS2opw5qJqUYM= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxEYTwBxrAhhJ7dDR5evCT/f0oqAZB9IAlB9LE9xBS7xvN1iZ85LdDhRCReEj7VC4QSeU7B1IMedo0= Sender: "seanjc via sendgmr" X-Received: from seanjc798194.pdx.corp.google.com ([2620:15c:f:10:1ea0:b8ff:fe73:50f5]) (user=seanjc job=sendgmr) by 2002:a25:a183:: with SMTP id a3mr8567872ybi.459.1611346921346; Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:22:01 -0800 (PST) Reply-To: Sean Christopherson Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:21:35 -0800 In-Reply-To: <20210122202144.2756381-1-seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210122202144.2756381-5-seanjc@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20210122202144.2756381-1-seanjc@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog Subject: [PATCH v3 04/13] x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled' From: Sean Christopherson To: Paolo Bonzini , Dave Hansen , Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra Cc: Sean Christopherson , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Joerg Roedel , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov , Tom Lendacky , Brijesh Singh Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org Drop the sev_enabled flag and switch its one user over to sev_active(). sev_enabled was made redundant with the introduction of sev_status in commit b57de6cd1639 ("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection"). sev_enabled and sev_active() are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is true iff 'sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version of sev_status). Removing sev_enabled avoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own purposes. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 1 - arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 12 +++++------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index 31c4df123aa0..9c80c68d75b5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ extern u64 sme_me_mask; extern u64 sev_status; -extern bool sev_enabled; void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr, unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr, diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index c79e5736ab2b..bcca8f8f27a7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask); DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key); -bool sev_enabled __section(".data"); - /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); @@ -373,16 +371,16 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV * the trampoline area must be encrypted. */ -bool sme_active(void) -{ - return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled; -} - bool sev_active(void) { return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED; } +bool sme_active(void) +{ + return sme_me_mask && !sev_active(); +} + /* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */ bool noinstr sev_es_active(void) { diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index 6c5eb6f3f14f..0c2759b7f03a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -545,7 +545,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) /* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; - sev_enabled = true; physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask; return; }