diff mbox series

[v1,03/11] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations for protected guests

Message ID 20210517200758.22593-4-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series KVM: s390: pv: implement lazy destroy | expand

Commit Message

Claudio Imbrenda May 17, 2021, 8:07 p.m. UTC
With upcoming patches, protected guests will be able to trigger secure
storage violations in normal operation.

This patch adds handling of secure storage violations for protected
guests.

Pages that trigger the exception will be made non-secure before
attempting to use them again.

Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
---
 arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h |  1 +
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c      | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/s390/mm/fault.c       | 10 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
index 9aa621e84745..c6fe6a42e79b 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@  static inline int is_prot_virt_host(void)
 }
 
 int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb);
+int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr);
 int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr);
 int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr);
 int uv_convert_owned_from_secure(unsigned long paddr);
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index 3d94760c0371..b19b1a1444ec 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -338,6 +338,49 @@  int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_convert_to_secure);
 
+int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	unsigned long uaddr;
+	struct page *page;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = -EFAULT;
+	mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm);
+
+	uaddr = __gmap_translate(gmap, gaddr);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(uaddr))
+		goto out;
+	vma = find_vma(gmap->mm, uaddr);
+	if (!vma)
+		goto out;
+	/*
+	 * Huge pages should not be able to become secure
+	 */
+	if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = 0;
+	/* we take an extra reference here */
+	page = follow_page(vma, uaddr, FOLL_WRITE | FOLL_GET);
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page))
+		goto out;
+	rc = uv_destroy_owned_page(page_to_phys(page));
+	/*
+	 * Fault handlers can race; it is possible that one CPU will destroy
+	 * and import the page, at which point the second CPU handling the
+	 * same fault will not be able to destroy. In that case we do not
+	 * want to terminate the process, we instead try to export the page.
+	 */
+	if (rc)
+		rc = uv_convert_owned_from_secure(page_to_phys(page));
+	put_page(page);
+out:
+	mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_destroy_page);
+
 /*
  * To be called with the page locked or with an extra reference! This will
  * prevent gmap_make_secure from touching the page concurrently. Having 2
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/fault.c b/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
index e30c7c781172..efdef35bc415 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
@@ -846,6 +846,16 @@  NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_non_secure_storage_access);
 
 void do_secure_storage_violation(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	unsigned long gaddr = regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
+	struct gmap *gmap = (struct gmap *)S390_lowcore.gmap;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the VM has been rebooted, its address space might still contain
+	 * secure pages from the previous boot.
+	 * Clear the page so it can be reused.
+	 */
+	if (!gmap_destroy_page(gmap, gaddr))
+		return;
 	/*
 	 * Either KVM messed up the secure guest mapping or the same
 	 * page is mapped into multiple secure guests.