From patchwork Tue Sep 28 19:10:07 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Borislav Petkov X-Patchwork-Id: 12523639 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3AC5EC433FE for ; Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:10:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 28DBD6135E for ; Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:10:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S242439AbhI1TMW (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Sep 2021 15:12:22 -0400 Received: from mail.skyhub.de ([5.9.137.197]:41284 "EHLO mail.skyhub.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S242404AbhI1TMI (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Sep 2021 15:12:08 -0400 Received: from zn.tnic (p200300ec2f13b20078349fd04295260b.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [IPv6:2003:ec:2f13:b200:7834:9fd0:4295:260b]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.skyhub.de (SuperMail on ZX Spectrum 128k) with ESMTPSA id D73F01EC0758; Tue, 28 Sep 2021 21:10:23 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=alien8.de; s=dkim; t=1632856224; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=xuBkPqpCyWNevmjV3bnFgYXgef5NjlBoPtZLL0ekMdo=; b=cg+k4SGFGxEbKI8CV0vT1wiATRXzFrE1+YP3SiLZh58JiMB8hwzIVyPVwP6jZKAVfX8fDQ 0cfbR4Pxt8ydhPdF32dRpK9PPsAKSvfcJ1FebN0Za5Vsx7w52Q2WefRdjf2msTdPZTZoKu UvpFb3DAoRHJGV01hdmU6SoZTGUfZ3Y= From: Borislav Petkov To: LKML Cc: Andi Kleen , Andy Lutomirski , Ard Biesheuvel , Baoquan He , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Christian Borntraeger , Daniel Vetter , Dave Young , David Airlie , Heiko Carstens , Joerg Roedel , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" , Maarten Lankhorst , Maxime Ripard , Michael Ellerman , Paul Mackerras , Tom Lendacky , Thomas Zimmermann , Vasily Gorbik , VMware Graphics , Will Deacon , Christoph Hellwig , x86@kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, amd-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org Subject: [PATCH 6/8] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with cc_platform_has() Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 21:10:07 +0200 Message-Id: <20210928191009.32551-7-bp@alien8.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20210928191009.32551-1-bp@alien8.de> References: <20210928191009.32551-1-bp@alien8.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Tom Lendacky Replace uses of sev_active() with the more generic cc_platform_has() using CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT. If future support is added for other memory encryption technologies, the use of CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT can be updated, as required. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 -- arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c | 4 +++- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 21 ++++++++------------- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 9 +++++---- 9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index 63c5b99ccae5..a5a58ccd1ee3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); -bool sev_active(void); bool sev_es_active(void); #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted") @@ -75,7 +74,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { } static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { } static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { } -static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; } static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; } static inline int __init diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c index 045e82e8945b..a7f617a3981d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static ssize_t __copy_oldmem_page(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize, unsigned long offset, int userbuf, @@ -73,5 +74,6 @@ ssize_t copy_oldmem_page_encrypted(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize, ssize_t elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos) { - return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, sev_active()); + return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, + cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c index b656456c3a94..8863d1941f1b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -418,7 +419,7 @@ static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void) { int cpu; - if (!sev_active()) + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c index ad273e5861c1..fc3930c5db1b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c @@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include -#include #include #include @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static void __init kvmclock_init_mem(void) * hvclock is shared between the guest and the hypervisor, must * be mapped decrypted. */ - if (sev_active()) { + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { r = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long) hvclock_mem, 1UL << order); if (r) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c index 7040c0fa921c..f5da4a18070a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd) } pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr); - if (sev_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC; set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot)); @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable) level4p = (pgd_t *)__va(start_pgtable); clear_page(level4p); - if (sev_active()) { + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { info.page_flag |= _PAGE_ENC; info.kernpg_flag |= _PAGE_ENC; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 05e8d4d27969..a2f78a8cfdaa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -455,7 +456,7 @@ static int has_svm(void) return 0; } - if (sev_active()) { + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n"); return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c index a7250fa3d45f..b59a5cbc6bc5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res) */ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res) { - if (!sev_active()) + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return 0; switch (res->desc) { @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res) */ static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc) { - if (!sev_active()) + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)) @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr, case E820_TYPE_NVS: case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE: /* For SEV, these areas are encrypted */ - if (sev_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) break; fallthrough; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 2163485a74e1..932007a6913b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void) for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++) protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]); - if (sev_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE; } @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ void __init sev_setup_arch(void) phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size(); unsigned long size; - if (!sev_active()) + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; /* @@ -364,8 +364,8 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) /* * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The - * sme_active() and sev_active() functions are used for this. When a - * distinction isn't needed, the mem_encrypt_active() function can be used. + * cc_platform_has() function is used for this. When a distinction isn't + * needed, the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute can be used. * * The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement. Before * paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV @@ -373,11 +373,6 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV * the trampoline area must be encrypted. */ -bool sev_active(void) -{ - return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active); /* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */ bool noinstr sev_es_active(void) @@ -391,7 +386,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) /* * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. */ - if (sev_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return true; /* @@ -450,7 +445,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void) } /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ - if (sev_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) pr_cont(" SEV"); /* Encrypted Register State */ @@ -473,7 +468,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions, * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler. */ - if (sev_active() && !sev_es_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && !sev_es_active()) static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key); print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); @@ -481,6 +476,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void) { - return sev_active(); + return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access); diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c index 7515e78ef898..1f3675453a57 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include @@ -284,7 +284,8 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va) if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB)) flags |= _PAGE_PCD; - if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && + md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO) flags |= _PAGE_ENC; pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; @@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *m if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO)) pf |= _PAGE_RW; - if (sev_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) pf |= _PAGE_ENC; return efi_update_mappings(md, pf); @@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void) (md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)) pf |= _PAGE_RW; - if (sev_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) pf |= _PAGE_ENC; efi_update_mappings(md, pf);