From patchwork Fri Jul 15 19:29:49 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Peter Gonda X-Patchwork-Id: 12919610 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5076BCCA480 for ; Fri, 15 Jul 2022 19:30:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230289AbiGOTaW (ORCPT ); Fri, 15 Jul 2022 15:30:22 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:60868 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231297AbiGOTaR (ORCPT ); Fri, 15 Jul 2022 15:30:17 -0400 Received: from mail-yw1-x1149.google.com (mail-yw1-x1149.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1149]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A09205FACB for ; Fri, 15 Jul 2022 12:30:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yw1-x1149.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-31ce88f9ab8so46696997b3.16 for ; Fri, 15 Jul 2022 12:30:13 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=bIijZklVh4BErKC7Xk3qAcNI5ZtgnzrMkDdijeXT1dg=; b=J55ZDewgDhhwMXux806HT61m2y/vP24Ri69c4jBiaDP9crsHAMRLCUwVtjggDePyHU WLMkhmSEVK9mW5IBCTRTQnX+/gkL9kpy77RvWNvgerSEMKKvpKIcMPPzOnvR7l7MCJu8 t2r1RR4899RMhyVQuKvt9GL9QQCHItPFu5cF1nDn+o0OxEc3oqWjXesM7Z0Se7PJAWbE HHiqkC5c1Qzp3MyyIXgBWXJdix8oKG3VBFNdbVm5Sb8WJ5+ZqflDJpFwD8Fr6J4J8Pdo +NCd/0YZrjAWLsQIiG7UHkPboM9cGzOcvHPdBcPKuwHVRT4MHrhsJybcvMb8JT8XyvVK y8cQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=bIijZklVh4BErKC7Xk3qAcNI5ZtgnzrMkDdijeXT1dg=; b=7BhHNo/sJD+8EzRSTETxbOCKWN+e7JlVn06Re/tq3rao8EWlcloWpPFSmXz61BH/t2 sMxMQsURsssjJX5lEaTAhnBLq8OPOJB5NcPjox7IW4NAMQF+bioewn+efOA3EbORMCBH pTZF0nM2TLJIK0zO+CePCl2Nrf/tWNDPahQ67ygG0T8imfnUXHc5iXHDjCTu0Ylgb2zx ChNr3HFtoAbKU9uZTge81eL+xCI0GshLQZbjrQWSSyH/zarcbu8p1rU1YgZ5+CcehdDZ Yr6Ya46sxxEk0fl3F+Vja3jMeDSCvYPqpnZk9KZAjPQXsfEWYc54Z8PGJgl9FEtH1U/e Hv4w== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora+yao5JWWPX9/KvChCAxjPfa8pZYdL9ld+ywh4HvUGBpYDYzmsu UMG3VMmYjsp3iXb07+MlBr/768B78eI+0T62xC6Pj1GE/mnVzaudGNiKS8m7uWKxqIrsWc3EH34 8WUoJI2O01l3LSa+VrPdftoRfHiBIb3E4Qm9TVw2trBljvquzqjjWfX2kBg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1tV7Yq0WJ/pj2dbKQVAvb1sxi48Uimb+yF3RJXIeDq53I6R1rXun5mmgDrNVbT6RfjH4dGx1U7tU+Q= X-Received: from pgonda1.kir.corp.google.com ([2620:15c:29:203:bd4e:b81d:4780:497d]) (user=pgonda job=sendgmr) by 2002:a81:f82:0:b0:31c:f1ae:1ed6 with SMTP id 124-20020a810f82000000b0031cf1ae1ed6mr17477996ywp.249.1657913412751; Fri, 15 Jul 2022 12:30:12 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 12:29:49 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20220715192956.1873315-1-pgonda@google.com> Message-Id: <20220715192956.1873315-5-pgonda@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20220715192956.1873315-1-pgonda@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.0.170.g444d1eabd0-goog Subject: [RFC V1 03/10] KVM: selftests: add hooks for managing encrypted guest memory From: Peter Gonda To: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, marcorr@google.com, seanjc@google.com, michael.roth@amd.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, joro@8bytes.org, mizhang@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, Peter Gonda Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Michael Roth VM implementations that make use of encrypted memory need a way to configure things like the encryption/shared bit position for page table handling, the default encryption policy for internal allocations made by the core library, and a way to fetch the list/bitmap of encrypted pages to do the actual memory encryption. Add an interface to configure these parameters. Also introduce a sparsebit map to track allocations/mappings that should be treated as encrypted, and provide a way for VM implementations to retrieve it to handle operations related memory encryption. Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang Signed-off-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda --- .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h | 17 ++++++ tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h index b78e3c7a2566..3acb1552942b 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ typedef uint64_t vm_vaddr_t; /* Virtual Machine (Guest) virtual address */ struct userspace_mem_region { struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region; struct sparsebit *unused_phy_pages; + struct sparsebit *encrypted_phy_pages; int fd; off_t offset; void *host_mem; @@ -61,6 +62,14 @@ struct userspace_mem_regions { DECLARE_HASHTABLE(slot_hash, 9); }; +/* Memory encryption policy/configuration. */ +struct vm_memcrypt { + bool enabled; + int8_t enc_by_default; + bool has_enc_bit; + int8_t enc_bit; +}; + struct kvm_vm { int mode; unsigned long type; @@ -84,6 +93,7 @@ struct kvm_vm { vm_vaddr_t idt; vm_vaddr_t handlers; uint32_t dirty_ring_size; + struct vm_memcrypt memcrypt; /* Cache of information for binary stats interface */ int stats_fd; @@ -820,4 +830,11 @@ static inline int __vm_disable_nx_huge_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm) return __vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_VM_DISABLE_NX_HUGE_PAGES, 0); } +void vm_set_memory_encryption(struct kvm_vm *vm, bool enc_by_default, bool has_enc_bit, + uint8_t enc_bit); + +const struct sparsebit *vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm, int slot, + vm_paddr_t *gpa_start, + uint64_t *size); + #endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_UTIL_BASE_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c index b07c372b9b37..6f96d1c51f75 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c @@ -529,6 +529,7 @@ static void __vm_mem_region_delete(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION, ®ion->region); sparsebit_free(®ion->unused_phy_pages); + sparsebit_free(®ion->encrypted_phy_pages); ret = munmap(region->mmap_start, region->mmap_size); TEST_ASSERT(!ret, __KVM_SYSCALL_ERROR("munmap()", ret)); @@ -869,6 +870,7 @@ void vm_userspace_mem_region_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, } region->unused_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc(); + region->encrypted_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc(); sparsebit_set_num(region->unused_phy_pages, guest_paddr >> vm->page_shift, npages); region->region.slot = slot; @@ -1084,6 +1086,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu *__vm_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id) * num - number of pages * paddr_min - Physical address minimum * memslot - Memory region to allocate page from + * encrypt - Whether to treat the pages as encrypted * * Output Args: None * @@ -1095,8 +1098,9 @@ struct kvm_vcpu *__vm_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id) * and their base address is returned. A TEST_ASSERT failure occurs if * not enough pages are available at or above paddr_min. */ -vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, - vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot) +static vm_paddr_t +_vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, vm_paddr_t paddr_min, + uint32_t memslot, bool encrypt) { struct userspace_mem_region *region; sparsebit_idx_t pg, base; @@ -1129,12 +1133,22 @@ vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, abort(); } - for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg) + for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg) { sparsebit_clear(region->unused_phy_pages, pg); + if (encrypt) + sparsebit_set(region->encrypted_phy_pages, pg); + } return base * vm->page_size; } +vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, + vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot) +{ + return _vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, num, paddr_min, memslot, + vm->memcrypt.enc_by_default); +} + vm_paddr_t vm_phy_page_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot) { @@ -1718,6 +1732,10 @@ void vm_dump(FILE *stream, struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t indent) region->host_mem); fprintf(stream, "%*sunused_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, ""); sparsebit_dump(stream, region->unused_phy_pages, 0); + if (vm->memcrypt.enabled) { + fprintf(stream, "%*sencrypted_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, ""); + sparsebit_dump(stream, region->encrypted_phy_pages, 0); + } } fprintf(stream, "%*sMapped Virtual Pages:\n", indent, ""); sparsebit_dump(stream, vm->vpages_mapped, indent + 2); @@ -1966,3 +1984,31 @@ void __vm_get_stat(struct kvm_vm *vm, const char *stat_name, uint64_t *data, break; } } + +void vm_set_memory_encryption(struct kvm_vm *vm, bool enc_by_default, bool has_enc_bit, + uint8_t enc_bit) +{ + vm->memcrypt.enabled = true; + vm->memcrypt.enc_by_default = enc_by_default; + vm->memcrypt.has_enc_bit = has_enc_bit; + vm->memcrypt.enc_bit = enc_bit; +} + +const struct sparsebit * +vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm, int slot, vm_paddr_t *gpa_start, + uint64_t *size) +{ + struct userspace_mem_region *region; + + if (!vm->memcrypt.enabled) + return NULL; + + region = memslot2region(vm, slot); + if (!region) + return NULL; + + *size = region->region.memory_size; + *gpa_start = region->region.guest_phys_addr; + + return region->encrypted_phy_pages; +}