| Message ID | 20221214194056.161492-30-michael.roth@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support | expand |
On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:54 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote: > > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the SNP firmware > is in the INIT state. When SNP is in INIT state, all the SEV-legacy > commands that cause the firmware to write to memory must be in the > firmware state before issuing the command.. > > A command buffer may contains a system physical address that the firmware > may write to. There are two cases that need to be handled: > > 1) system physical address points to a guest memory > 2) system physical address points to a host memory > > To handle the case #1, change the page state to the firmware in the RMP > table before issuing the command and restore the state to shared after the > command completes. > > For the case #2, use a bounce buffer to complete the request. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > --- > drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 370 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 12 ++ > 2 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > index 4c12e98a1219..5eb2e8f364d4 100644 > --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > @@ -286,6 +286,30 @@ static int rmp_mark_pages_firmware(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, boo > return rc; > } > > +static int rmp_mark_pages_shared(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) > +{ > + /* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */ > + unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + int rc, n = 0, i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, pfn++, n++) { > + rc = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K); > + if (rc) > + goto cleanup; > + } > + > + return 0; > + > +cleanup: > + /* > + * If failed to change the page state to shared, then its not safe > + * to release the page back to the system, leak it. > + */ > + snp_mark_pages_offline(pfn, npages - n); > + > + return rc; > +} > + > static struct page *__snp_alloc_firmware_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, bool locked) > { > unsigned long npages = 1ul << order, paddr; > @@ -487,12 +511,295 @@ static int sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(int cmd_id) > return sev_write_init_ex_file(); > } > > +static int alloc_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) > +{ > + struct page *page; > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { > + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; > + > + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); > + > + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); > + if (!page) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + map->host = page_address(page); > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static void free_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { > + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; > + > + if (map->host) { > + __free_pages(virt_to_page(map->host), get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); > + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); > + } > + } > +} > + > +static int map_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) > +{ > + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + > + map->active = false; > + > + if (!paddr || !len) > + return 0; > + > + map->paddr = *paddr; > + map->len = len; > + > + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then change the page state to firmwware. */ > + if (guest) { > + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(*paddr, npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + goto done; > + } > + > + if (!map->host) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + /* Check if the pre-allocated buffer can be used to fullfil the request. */ > + if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Transition the pre-allocated buffer to the firmware state. */ > + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* Set the paddr to use pre-allocated firmware buffer */ > + *paddr = __psp_pa(map->host); > + > +done: > + map->active = true; > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int unmap_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) > +{ > + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + > + if (!map->active) > + return 0; > + > + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then restore the page state to hypervisor. */ > + if (guest) { > + if (snp_reclaim_pages(*paddr, npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + goto done; > + } > + > + /* > + * Transition the pre-allocated buffer to hypervisor state before the access. > + * > + * This is because while changing the page state to firmware, the kernel unmaps > + * the pages from the direct map, and to restore the direct map the pages must > + * be transitioned back to the shared state. > + */ > + if (snp_reclaim_pages(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* Copy the response data firmware buffer to the callers buffer. */ > + memcpy(__va(__sme_clr(map->paddr)), map->host, min_t(size_t, len, map->len)); > + *paddr = map->paddr; > + > +done: > + map->active = false; > + return 0; > +} > + > +static bool sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(int cmd) > +{ > + switch (cmd) { > + case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: > + case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS: > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START: > + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START: > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: > + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: > + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: > + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: > + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: > + return true; > + default: > + return false; > + } > +} > + > +#define prep_buffer(name, addr, len, guest, map) \ > + func(&((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->addr, ((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->len, guest, map) > + > +static int __snp_cmd_buf_copy(int cmd, void *cmd_buf, bool to_fw, int fw_err) > +{ > + int (*func)(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map); > + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; > + bool from_fw = !to_fw; > + > + /* > + * After the command is completed, change the command buffer memory to > + * hypervisor state. > + * > + * The immutable bit is automatically cleared by the firmware, so > + * no not need to reclaim the page. > + */ > + if (from_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { > + if (rmp_mark_pages_shared(__pa(cmd_buf), 1)) > + return -EFAULT; If we return here, we will skip calling unmap_firmware_writeable and we will leak some pages in firmware state. > + > + /* No need to go further if firmware failed to execute command. */ > + if (fw_err) > + return 0; > + } > + > + if (to_fw) > + func = map_firmware_writeable; > + else > + func = unmap_firmware_writeable; > + > + /* > + * A command buffer may contains a system physical address. If the address > + * points to a host memory then use an intermediate firmware page otherwise > + * change the page state in the RMP table. > + */ > + switch (cmd) { > + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, pdh_cert_address, > + pdh_cert_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, cert_chain_address, > + cert_chain_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_get_id, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pek_csr, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_data, address, len, > + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa, address, len, > + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_measure, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_secret, guest_address, guest_len, > + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, false, > + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, true, > + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_attestation_report, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_start, session_address, > + session_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, hdr_address, hdr_len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, trans_address, > + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, hdr_address, hdr_len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, trans_address, > + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_data, guest_address, > + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa, guest_address, > + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + default: > + break; > + } > + > + /* The command buffer need to be in the firmware state. */ > + if (to_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { > + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, true)) > + return -EFAULT; This function moves two separate pages to firmware state. First calling map_firmware_writeable and second calling rmp_mark_pages_firmware for cmd_buf. In case rmp_mark_pages_firmware fails for cmd_buf, the page which has already moved to firmware state in map_firmware_writeable should be reclaimed. This is a problem especially if we leak a guest owned page in firmware state. Since this is used only by legacy SEV VMs, these leaked pages will never be reclaimed back when destroying these VMs. > > + } > + > + return 0; > + > +err: > + return -EINVAL; > +} > + > +static inline bool need_firmware_copy(int cmd) > +{ > + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; > + > + /* After SNP is INIT'ed, the behavior of legacy SEV command is changed. */ > + return ((cmd < SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT) && sev->snp_initialized) ? true : false; > +} > + > +static int snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(int cmd, void *data) > +{ > + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, true, 0); > +} > + > +static int snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(int cmd, void *data, int fw_err) > +{ > + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, false, fw_err); > +} > + > static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > { > struct psp_device *psp = psp_master; > struct sev_device *sev; > unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb; > unsigned int reg, ret = 0; > + void *cmd_buf; > int buf_len; > > if (!psp || !psp->sev_data) > @@ -512,12 +819,28 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > * work for some memory, e.g. vmalloc'd addresses, and @data may not be > * physically contiguous. > */ > - if (data) > - memcpy(sev->cmd_buf, data, buf_len); > + if (data) { > + if (sev->cmd_buf_active > 2) > + return -EBUSY; > + > + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf_active ? sev->cmd_buf_backup : sev->cmd_buf; > + > + memcpy(cmd_buf, data, buf_len); > + sev->cmd_buf_active++; > + > + /* > + * The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the > + * SNP firmware is in the INIT state. > + */ > + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, sev->cmd_buf)) > + return -EFAULT; > + } else { > + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf; > + } > > /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */ > - phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; > - phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; > + phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; > + phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; > > dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x timeout %us\n", > cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb, psp_timeout); > @@ -560,15 +883,24 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > ret = sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(cmd); > } > > - print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, > - buf_len, false); > - > /* > * Copy potential output from the PSP back to data. Do this even on > * failure in case the caller wants to glean something from the error. > */ > - if (data) > - memcpy(data, sev->cmd_buf, buf_len); > + if (data) { > + /* > + * Restore the page state after the command completes. > + */ > + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && > + snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf, ret)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + memcpy(data, cmd_buf, buf_len); > + sev->cmd_buf_active--; > + } > + > + print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, > + buf_len, false); > > return ret; > } > @@ -1579,10 +1911,12 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp) > if (!sev) > goto e_err; > > - sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 0); > + sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 1); > if (!sev->cmd_buf) > goto e_sev; > > + sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE; > + > psp->sev_data = sev; > > sev->dev = dev; > @@ -1648,6 +1982,12 @@ static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev) > snp_range_list = NULL; > } > > + /* > + * The host map need to clear the immutable bit so it must be free'd before the > + * SNP firmware shutdown. > + */ > + free_snp_host_map(sev); > + > sev_snp_shutdown(&error); > } > > @@ -1722,6 +2062,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) > dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error); > } > } > + > + /* > + * Allocate the intermediate buffers used for the legacy command handling. > + */ > + if (alloc_snp_host_map(sev)) { > + dev_notice(sev->dev, "Failed to alloc host map (disabling legacy SEV)\n"); > + goto skip_legacy; > + } > } > > /* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */ > @@ -1739,12 +2087,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) > dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x, rc %d\n", > error, rc); > > +skip_legacy: > dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV%s API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->snp_initialized ? > "-SNP" : "", sev->api_major, sev->api_minor, sev->build); > > return; > > err: > + free_snp_host_map(sev); > psp_master->sev_data = NULL; > } > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > index 34767657beb5..19d79f9d4212 100644 > --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > @@ -29,11 +29,20 @@ > #define SEV_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16 > #define SEV_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0) > > +#define MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS 2 > + > struct sev_misc_dev { > struct kref refcount; > struct miscdevice misc; > }; > > +struct snp_host_map { > + u64 paddr; > + u32 len; > + void *host; > + bool active; > +}; > + > struct sev_device { > struct device *dev; > struct psp_device *psp; > @@ -52,8 +61,11 @@ struct sev_device { > u8 build; > > void *cmd_buf; > + void *cmd_buf_backup; > + int cmd_buf_active; > > bool snp_initialized; > + struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS]; > }; > > int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp); > -- > 2.25.1 >
On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:54 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote: > > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the SNP firmware > is in the INIT state. When SNP is in INIT state, all the SEV-legacy > commands that cause the firmware to write to memory must be in the > firmware state before issuing the command.. > > A command buffer may contains a system physical address that the firmware > may write to. There are two cases that need to be handled: > > 1) system physical address points to a guest memory > 2) system physical address points to a host memory > > To handle the case #1, change the page state to the firmware in the RMP > table before issuing the command and restore the state to shared after the > command completes. > > For the case #2, use a bounce buffer to complete the request. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > --- > drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 370 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 12 ++ > 2 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > index 4c12e98a1219..5eb2e8f364d4 100644 > --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > @@ -286,6 +286,30 @@ static int rmp_mark_pages_firmware(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, boo > return rc; > } > > +static int rmp_mark_pages_shared(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) > +{ > + /* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */ > + unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + int rc, n = 0, i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, pfn++, n++) { > + rc = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K); > + if (rc) > + goto cleanup; > + } > + > + return 0; > + > +cleanup: > + /* > + * If failed to change the page state to shared, then its not safe > + * to release the page back to the system, leak it. > + */ > + snp_mark_pages_offline(pfn, npages - n); > + > + return rc; > +} > + > static struct page *__snp_alloc_firmware_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, bool locked) > { > unsigned long npages = 1ul << order, paddr; > @@ -487,12 +511,295 @@ static int sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(int cmd_id) > return sev_write_init_ex_file(); > } > > +static int alloc_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) > +{ > + struct page *page; > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { > + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; > + > + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); > + > + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); > + if (!page) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + map->host = page_address(page); > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static void free_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { > + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; > + > + if (map->host) { > + __free_pages(virt_to_page(map->host), get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); > + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); > + } > + } > +} > + > +static int map_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) > +{ > + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + > + map->active = false; > + > + if (!paddr || !len) > + return 0; > + > + map->paddr = *paddr; > + map->len = len; > + > + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then change the page state to firmwware. */ > + if (guest) { > + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(*paddr, npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + goto done; > + } > + > + if (!map->host) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + /* Check if the pre-allocated buffer can be used to fullfil the request. */ > + if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Transition the pre-allocated buffer to the firmware state. */ > + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* Set the paddr to use pre-allocated firmware buffer */ > + *paddr = __psp_pa(map->host); > + > +done: > + map->active = true; > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int unmap_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) > +{ > + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + > + if (!map->active) > + return 0; > + > + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then restore the page state to hypervisor. */ > + if (guest) { > + if (snp_reclaim_pages(*paddr, npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + goto done; > + } > + > + /* > + * Transition the pre-allocated buffer to hypervisor state before the access. > + * > + * This is because while changing the page state to firmware, the kernel unmaps > + * the pages from the direct map, and to restore the direct map the pages must > + * be transitioned back to the shared state. > + */ > + if (snp_reclaim_pages(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* Copy the response data firmware buffer to the callers buffer. */ > + memcpy(__va(__sme_clr(map->paddr)), map->host, min_t(size_t, len, map->len)); > + *paddr = map->paddr; > + > +done: > + map->active = false; > + return 0; > +} > + > +static bool sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(int cmd) > +{ > + switch (cmd) { > + case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: > + case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS: > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START: > + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START: > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: > + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: > + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: > + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: > + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: > + return true; > + default: > + return false; > + } > +} > + > +#define prep_buffer(name, addr, len, guest, map) \ > + func(&((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->addr, ((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->len, guest, map) > + > +static int __snp_cmd_buf_copy(int cmd, void *cmd_buf, bool to_fw, int fw_err) > +{ > + int (*func)(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map); > + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; > + bool from_fw = !to_fw; > + > + /* > + * After the command is completed, change the command buffer memory to > + * hypervisor state. > + * > + * The immutable bit is automatically cleared by the firmware, so > + * no not need to reclaim the page. > + */ > + if (from_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { > + if (rmp_mark_pages_shared(__pa(cmd_buf), 1)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* No need to go further if firmware failed to execute command. */ > + if (fw_err) > + return 0; > + } > + > + if (to_fw) > + func = map_firmware_writeable; > + else > + func = unmap_firmware_writeable; > + > + /* > + * A command buffer may contains a system physical address. If the address > + * points to a host memory then use an intermediate firmware page otherwise > + * change the page state in the RMP table. > + */ > + switch (cmd) { > + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, pdh_cert_address, > + pdh_cert_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, cert_chain_address, > + cert_chain_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_get_id, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pek_csr, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_data, address, len, > + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa, address, len, > + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_measure, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_secret, guest_address, guest_len, > + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, false, > + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, true, > + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_attestation_report, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_start, session_address, > + session_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, hdr_address, hdr_len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, trans_address, > + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, hdr_address, hdr_len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, trans_address, > + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_data, guest_address, > + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa, guest_address, > + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + default: > + break; > + } > + > + /* The command buffer need to be in the firmware state. */ > + if (to_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { > + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + } > + > + return 0; > + > +err: > + return -EINVAL; > +} > + > +static inline bool need_firmware_copy(int cmd) > +{ > + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; > + > + /* After SNP is INIT'ed, the behavior of legacy SEV command is changed. */ > + return ((cmd < SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT) && sev->snp_initialized) ? true : false; > +} > + > +static int snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(int cmd, void *data) > +{ > + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, true, 0); > +} > + > +static int snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(int cmd, void *data, int fw_err) > +{ > + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, false, fw_err); > +} > + > static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > { > struct psp_device *psp = psp_master; > struct sev_device *sev; > unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb; > unsigned int reg, ret = 0; > + void *cmd_buf; > int buf_len; > > if (!psp || !psp->sev_data) > @@ -512,12 +819,28 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > * work for some memory, e.g. vmalloc'd addresses, and @data may not be > * physically contiguous. > */ > - if (data) > - memcpy(sev->cmd_buf, data, buf_len); > + if (data) { > + if (sev->cmd_buf_active > 2) > + return -EBUSY; > + > + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf_active ? sev->cmd_buf_backup : sev->cmd_buf; > + > + memcpy(cmd_buf, data, buf_len); > + sev->cmd_buf_active++; > + > + /* > + * The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the > + * SNP firmware is in the INIT state. > + */ > + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, sev->cmd_buf)) I believe this should be cmd_buf instead of sev->cmd_buf. snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf) > + return -EFAULT; > + } else { > + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf; > + } > > /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */ > - phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; > - phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; > + phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; > + phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; > > dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x timeout %us\n", > cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb, psp_timeout); > @@ -560,15 +883,24 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > ret = sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(cmd); > } > > - print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, > - buf_len, false); > - > /* > * Copy potential output from the PSP back to data. Do this even on > * failure in case the caller wants to glean something from the error. > */ > - if (data) > - memcpy(data, sev->cmd_buf, buf_len); > + if (data) { > + /* > + * Restore the page state after the command completes. > + */ > + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && > + snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf, ret)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + memcpy(data, cmd_buf, buf_len); > + sev->cmd_buf_active--; > + } > + > + print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, > + buf_len, false); > > return ret; > } > @@ -1579,10 +1911,12 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp) > if (!sev) > goto e_err; > > - sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 0); > + sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 1); > if (!sev->cmd_buf) > goto e_sev; > > + sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE; > + > psp->sev_data = sev; > > sev->dev = dev; > @@ -1648,6 +1982,12 @@ static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev) > snp_range_list = NULL; > } > > + /* > + * The host map need to clear the immutable bit so it must be free'd before the > + * SNP firmware shutdown. > + */ > + free_snp_host_map(sev); > + > sev_snp_shutdown(&error); > } > > @@ -1722,6 +2062,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) > dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error); > } > } > + > + /* > + * Allocate the intermediate buffers used for the legacy command handling. > + */ > + if (alloc_snp_host_map(sev)) { > + dev_notice(sev->dev, "Failed to alloc host map (disabling legacy SEV)\n"); > + goto skip_legacy; > + } > } > > /* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */ > @@ -1739,12 +2087,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) > dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x, rc %d\n", > error, rc); > > +skip_legacy: > dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV%s API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->snp_initialized ? > "-SNP" : "", sev->api_major, sev->api_minor, sev->build); > > return; > > err: > + free_snp_host_map(sev); > psp_master->sev_data = NULL; > } > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > index 34767657beb5..19d79f9d4212 100644 > --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > @@ -29,11 +29,20 @@ > #define SEV_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16 > #define SEV_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0) > > +#define MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS 2 > + > struct sev_misc_dev { > struct kref refcount; > struct miscdevice misc; > }; > > +struct snp_host_map { > + u64 paddr; > + u32 len; > + void *host; > + bool active; > +}; > + > struct sev_device { > struct device *dev; > struct psp_device *psp; > @@ -52,8 +61,11 @@ struct sev_device { > u8 build; > > void *cmd_buf; > + void *cmd_buf_backup; > + int cmd_buf_active; > > bool snp_initialized; > + struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS]; > }; > > int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp); > -- > 2.25.1 >
Hello Alper, On 1/12/2023 2:47 PM, Alper Gun wrote: > On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:54 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote: >> >> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> >> >> The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the SNP firmware >> is in the INIT state. When SNP is in INIT state, all the SEV-legacy >> commands that cause the firmware to write to memory must be in the >> firmware state before issuing the command.. >> >> A command buffer may contains a system physical address that the firmware >> may write to. There are two cases that need to be handled: >> >> 1) system physical address points to a guest memory >> 2) system physical address points to a host memory >> >> To handle the case #1, change the page state to the firmware in the RMP >> table before issuing the command and restore the state to shared after the >> command completes. >> >> For the case #2, use a bounce buffer to complete the request. >> >> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> >> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> >> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> >> --- >> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 370 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- >> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 12 ++ >> 2 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c >> index 4c12e98a1219..5eb2e8f364d4 100644 >> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c >> @@ -286,6 +286,30 @@ static int rmp_mark_pages_firmware(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, boo >> return rc; >> } >> >> +static int rmp_mark_pages_shared(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) >> +{ >> + /* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */ >> + unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; >> + int rc, n = 0, i; >> + >> + for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, pfn++, n++) { >> + rc = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K); >> + if (rc) >> + goto cleanup; >> + } >> + >> + return 0; >> + >> +cleanup: >> + /* >> + * If failed to change the page state to shared, then its not safe >> + * to release the page back to the system, leak it. >> + */ >> + snp_mark_pages_offline(pfn, npages - n); >> + >> + return rc; >> +} >> + >> static struct page *__snp_alloc_firmware_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, bool locked) >> { >> unsigned long npages = 1ul << order, paddr; >> @@ -487,12 +511,295 @@ static int sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(int cmd_id) >> return sev_write_init_ex_file(); >> } >> >> +static int alloc_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) >> +{ >> + struct page *page; >> + int i; >> + >> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { >> + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; >> + >> + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); >> + >> + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); >> + if (!page) >> + return -ENOMEM; >> + >> + map->host = page_address(page); >> + } >> + >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static void free_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) >> +{ >> + int i; >> + >> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { >> + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; >> + >> + if (map->host) { >> + __free_pages(virt_to_page(map->host), get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); >> + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); >> + } >> + } >> +} >> + >> +static int map_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) >> +{ >> + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; >> + >> + map->active = false; >> + >> + if (!paddr || !len) >> + return 0; >> + >> + map->paddr = *paddr; >> + map->len = len; >> + >> + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then change the page state to firmwware. */ >> + if (guest) { >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(*paddr, npages, true)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + goto done; >> + } >> + >> + if (!map->host) >> + return -ENOMEM; >> + >> + /* Check if the pre-allocated buffer can be used to fullfil the request. */ >> + if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> + /* Transition the pre-allocated buffer to the firmware state. */ >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + /* Set the paddr to use pre-allocated firmware buffer */ >> + *paddr = __psp_pa(map->host); >> + >> +done: >> + map->active = true; >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static int unmap_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) >> +{ >> + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; >> + >> + if (!map->active) >> + return 0; >> + >> + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then restore the page state to hypervisor. */ >> + if (guest) { >> + if (snp_reclaim_pages(*paddr, npages, true)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + goto done; >> + } >> + >> + /* >> + * Transition the pre-allocated buffer to hypervisor state before the access. >> + * >> + * This is because while changing the page state to firmware, the kernel unmaps >> + * the pages from the direct map, and to restore the direct map the pages must >> + * be transitioned back to the shared state. >> + */ >> + if (snp_reclaim_pages(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + /* Copy the response data firmware buffer to the callers buffer. */ >> + memcpy(__va(__sme_clr(map->paddr)), map->host, min_t(size_t, len, map->len)); >> + *paddr = map->paddr; >> + >> +done: >> + map->active = false; >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static bool sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(int cmd) >> +{ >> + switch (cmd) { >> + case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: >> + case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS: >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START: >> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START: >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: >> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: >> + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: >> + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: >> + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: >> + return true; >> + default: >> + return false; >> + } >> +} >> + >> +#define prep_buffer(name, addr, len, guest, map) \ >> + func(&((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->addr, ((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->len, guest, map) >> + >> +static int __snp_cmd_buf_copy(int cmd, void *cmd_buf, bool to_fw, int fw_err) >> +{ >> + int (*func)(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map); >> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; >> + bool from_fw = !to_fw; >> + >> + /* >> + * After the command is completed, change the command buffer memory to >> + * hypervisor state. >> + * >> + * The immutable bit is automatically cleared by the firmware, so >> + * no not need to reclaim the page. >> + */ >> + if (from_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_shared(__pa(cmd_buf), 1)) >> + return -EFAULT; > > If we return here, we will skip calling unmap_firmware_writeable and > we will leak some pages in firmware state. Do you mean those (guest) pages which were transitioned to firmware state as part of snp_aware_copy_to_firmware()->_snp_cmd_buf_copy()->map_firmware_writeable()? > >> + >> + /* No need to go further if firmware failed to execute command. */ >> + if (fw_err) >> + return 0; >> + } >> + >> + if (to_fw) >> + func = map_firmware_writeable; >> + else >> + func = unmap_firmware_writeable; >> + >> + /* >> + * A command buffer may contains a system physical address. If the address >> + * points to a host memory then use an intermediate firmware page otherwise >> + * change the page state in the RMP table. >> + */ >> + switch (cmd) { >> + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, pdh_cert_address, >> + pdh_cert_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, cert_chain_address, >> + cert_chain_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_get_id, address, len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pek_csr, address, len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_data, address, len, >> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa, address, len, >> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_measure, address, len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_secret, guest_address, guest_len, >> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, false, >> + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, true, >> + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_attestation_report, address, len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_start, session_address, >> + session_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, hdr_address, hdr_len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, trans_address, >> + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, hdr_address, hdr_len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, trans_address, >> + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_data, guest_address, >> + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa, guest_address, >> + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + default: >> + break; >> + } >> + >> + /* The command buffer need to be in the firmware state. */ >> + if (to_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, true)) >> + return -EFAULT; > > This function moves two separate pages to firmware state. First > calling map_firmware_writeable and second calling > rmp_mark_pages_firmware for cmd_buf. > In case rmp_mark_pages_firmware fails for cmd_buf, the page which has > already moved to firmware state in map_firmware_writeable should be > reclaimed. > This is a problem especially if we leak a guest owned page in firmware > state. Since this is used only by legacy SEV VMs, these leaked pages > will never be reclaimed back when destroying these VMs. > Yes, this looks to be an inherent issue with the original patch, as you mentioned there are two pages - guest owned page and the HV cmd_buf, and failure to transition the cmd_buf back to HV/shared state has no corresponding recovery/reclaim for the transitioned guest page. Thanks, Ashish >> >> + } >> + >> + return 0; >> + >> +err: >> + return -EINVAL; >> +} >> + >> +static inline bool need_firmware_copy(int cmd) >> +{ >> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; >> + >> + /* After SNP is INIT'ed, the behavior of legacy SEV command is changed. */ >> + return ((cmd < SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT) && sev->snp_initialized) ? true : false; >> +} >> + >> +static int snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(int cmd, void *data) >> +{ >> + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, true, 0); >> +} >> + >> +static int snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(int cmd, void *data, int fw_err) >> +{ >> + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, false, fw_err); >> +} >> + >> static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) >> { >> struct psp_device *psp = psp_master; >> struct sev_device *sev; >> unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb; >> unsigned int reg, ret = 0; >> + void *cmd_buf; >> int buf_len; >> >> if (!psp || !psp->sev_data) >> @@ -512,12 +819,28 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) >> * work for some memory, e.g. vmalloc'd addresses, and @data may not be >> * physically contiguous. >> */ >> - if (data) >> - memcpy(sev->cmd_buf, data, buf_len); >> + if (data) { >> + if (sev->cmd_buf_active > 2) >> + return -EBUSY; >> + >> + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf_active ? sev->cmd_buf_backup : sev->cmd_buf; >> + >> + memcpy(cmd_buf, data, buf_len); >> + sev->cmd_buf_active++; >> + >> + /* >> + * The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the >> + * SNP firmware is in the INIT state. >> + */ >> + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, sev->cmd_buf)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + } else { >> + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf; >> + } >> >> /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */ >> - phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; >> - phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; >> + phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; >> + phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; >> >> dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x timeout %us\n", >> cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb, psp_timeout); >> @@ -560,15 +883,24 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) >> ret = sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(cmd); >> } >> >> - print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, >> - buf_len, false); >> - >> /* >> * Copy potential output from the PSP back to data. Do this even on >> * failure in case the caller wants to glean something from the error. >> */ >> - if (data) >> - memcpy(data, sev->cmd_buf, buf_len); >> + if (data) { >> + /* >> + * Restore the page state after the command completes. >> + */ >> + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && >> + snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf, ret)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + memcpy(data, cmd_buf, buf_len); >> + sev->cmd_buf_active--; >> + } >> + >> + print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, >> + buf_len, false); >> >> return ret; >> } >> @@ -1579,10 +1911,12 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp) >> if (!sev) >> goto e_err; >> >> - sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 0); >> + sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 1); >> if (!sev->cmd_buf) >> goto e_sev; >> >> + sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE; >> + >> psp->sev_data = sev; >> >> sev->dev = dev; >> @@ -1648,6 +1982,12 @@ static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev) >> snp_range_list = NULL; >> } >> >> + /* >> + * The host map need to clear the immutable bit so it must be free'd before the >> + * SNP firmware shutdown. >> + */ >> + free_snp_host_map(sev); >> + >> sev_snp_shutdown(&error); >> } >> >> @@ -1722,6 +2062,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) >> dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error); >> } >> } >> + >> + /* >> + * Allocate the intermediate buffers used for the legacy command handling. >> + */ >> + if (alloc_snp_host_map(sev)) { >> + dev_notice(sev->dev, "Failed to alloc host map (disabling legacy SEV)\n"); >> + goto skip_legacy; >> + } >> } >> >> /* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */ >> @@ -1739,12 +2087,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) >> dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x, rc %d\n", >> error, rc); >> >> +skip_legacy: >> dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV%s API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->snp_initialized ? >> "-SNP" : "", sev->api_major, sev->api_minor, sev->build); >> >> return; >> >> err: >> + free_snp_host_map(sev); >> psp_master->sev_data = NULL; >> } >> >> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h >> index 34767657beb5..19d79f9d4212 100644 >> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h >> @@ -29,11 +29,20 @@ >> #define SEV_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16 >> #define SEV_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0) >> >> +#define MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS 2 >> + >> struct sev_misc_dev { >> struct kref refcount; >> struct miscdevice misc; >> }; >> >> +struct snp_host_map { >> + u64 paddr; >> + u32 len; >> + void *host; >> + bool active; >> +}; >> + >> struct sev_device { >> struct device *dev; >> struct psp_device *psp; >> @@ -52,8 +61,11 @@ struct sev_device { >> u8 build; >> >> void *cmd_buf; >> + void *cmd_buf_backup; >> + int cmd_buf_active; >> >> bool snp_initialized; >> + struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS]; >> }; >> >> int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp); >> -- >> 2.25.1 >>
Hello Alper, On 1/12/2023 5:45 PM, Alper Gun wrote: > On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:54 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote: >> >> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> >> >> The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the SNP firmware >> is in the INIT state. When SNP is in INIT state, all the SEV-legacy >> commands that cause the firmware to write to memory must be in the >> firmware state before issuing the command.. >> >> A command buffer may contains a system physical address that the firmware >> may write to. There are two cases that need to be handled: >> >> 1) system physical address points to a guest memory >> 2) system physical address points to a host memory >> >> To handle the case #1, change the page state to the firmware in the RMP >> table before issuing the command and restore the state to shared after the >> command completes. >> >> For the case #2, use a bounce buffer to complete the request. >> >> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> >> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> >> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> >> --- >> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 370 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- >> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 12 ++ >> 2 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c >> index 4c12e98a1219..5eb2e8f364d4 100644 >> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c >> @@ -286,6 +286,30 @@ static int rmp_mark_pages_firmware(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, boo >> return rc; >> } >> >> +static int rmp_mark_pages_shared(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) >> +{ >> + /* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */ >> + unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; >> + int rc, n = 0, i; >> + >> + for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, pfn++, n++) { >> + rc = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K); >> + if (rc) >> + goto cleanup; >> + } >> + >> + return 0; >> + >> +cleanup: >> + /* >> + * If failed to change the page state to shared, then its not safe >> + * to release the page back to the system, leak it. >> + */ >> + snp_mark_pages_offline(pfn, npages - n); >> + >> + return rc; >> +} >> + >> static struct page *__snp_alloc_firmware_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, bool locked) >> { >> unsigned long npages = 1ul << order, paddr; >> @@ -487,12 +511,295 @@ static int sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(int cmd_id) >> return sev_write_init_ex_file(); >> } >> >> +static int alloc_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) >> +{ >> + struct page *page; >> + int i; >> + >> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { >> + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; >> + >> + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); >> + >> + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); >> + if (!page) >> + return -ENOMEM; >> + >> + map->host = page_address(page); >> + } >> + >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static void free_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) >> +{ >> + int i; >> + >> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { >> + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; >> + >> + if (map->host) { >> + __free_pages(virt_to_page(map->host), get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); >> + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); >> + } >> + } >> +} >> + >> +static int map_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) >> +{ >> + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; >> + >> + map->active = false; >> + >> + if (!paddr || !len) >> + return 0; >> + >> + map->paddr = *paddr; >> + map->len = len; >> + >> + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then change the page state to firmwware. */ >> + if (guest) { >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(*paddr, npages, true)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + goto done; >> + } >> + >> + if (!map->host) >> + return -ENOMEM; >> + >> + /* Check if the pre-allocated buffer can be used to fullfil the request. */ >> + if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> + /* Transition the pre-allocated buffer to the firmware state. */ >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + /* Set the paddr to use pre-allocated firmware buffer */ >> + *paddr = __psp_pa(map->host); >> + >> +done: >> + map->active = true; >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static int unmap_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) >> +{ >> + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; >> + >> + if (!map->active) >> + return 0; >> + >> + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then restore the page state to hypervisor. */ >> + if (guest) { >> + if (snp_reclaim_pages(*paddr, npages, true)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + goto done; >> + } >> + >> + /* >> + * Transition the pre-allocated buffer to hypervisor state before the access. >> + * >> + * This is because while changing the page state to firmware, the kernel unmaps >> + * the pages from the direct map, and to restore the direct map the pages must >> + * be transitioned back to the shared state. >> + */ >> + if (snp_reclaim_pages(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + /* Copy the response data firmware buffer to the callers buffer. */ >> + memcpy(__va(__sme_clr(map->paddr)), map->host, min_t(size_t, len, map->len)); >> + *paddr = map->paddr; >> + >> +done: >> + map->active = false; >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static bool sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(int cmd) >> +{ >> + switch (cmd) { >> + case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: >> + case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS: >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START: >> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START: >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: >> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: >> + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: >> + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: >> + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: >> + return true; >> + default: >> + return false; >> + } >> +} >> + >> +#define prep_buffer(name, addr, len, guest, map) \ >> + func(&((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->addr, ((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->len, guest, map) >> + >> +static int __snp_cmd_buf_copy(int cmd, void *cmd_buf, bool to_fw, int fw_err) >> +{ >> + int (*func)(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map); >> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; >> + bool from_fw = !to_fw; >> + >> + /* >> + * After the command is completed, change the command buffer memory to >> + * hypervisor state. >> + * >> + * The immutable bit is automatically cleared by the firmware, so >> + * no not need to reclaim the page. >> + */ >> + if (from_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_shared(__pa(cmd_buf), 1)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + /* No need to go further if firmware failed to execute command. */ >> + if (fw_err) >> + return 0; >> + } >> + >> + if (to_fw) >> + func = map_firmware_writeable; >> + else >> + func = unmap_firmware_writeable; >> + >> + /* >> + * A command buffer may contains a system physical address. If the address >> + * points to a host memory then use an intermediate firmware page otherwise >> + * change the page state in the RMP table. >> + */ >> + switch (cmd) { >> + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, pdh_cert_address, >> + pdh_cert_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, cert_chain_address, >> + cert_chain_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_get_id, address, len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pek_csr, address, len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_data, address, len, >> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa, address, len, >> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_measure, address, len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_secret, guest_address, guest_len, >> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, false, >> + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, true, >> + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_attestation_report, address, len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_start, session_address, >> + session_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, hdr_address, hdr_len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, trans_address, >> + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, hdr_address, hdr_len, >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, trans_address, >> + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_data, guest_address, >> + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA: >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa, guest_address, >> + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >> + goto err; >> + break; >> + default: >> + break; >> + } >> + >> + /* The command buffer need to be in the firmware state. */ >> + if (to_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, true)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + } >> + >> + return 0; >> + >> +err: >> + return -EINVAL; >> +} >> + >> +static inline bool need_firmware_copy(int cmd) >> +{ >> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; >> + >> + /* After SNP is INIT'ed, the behavior of legacy SEV command is changed. */ >> + return ((cmd < SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT) && sev->snp_initialized) ? true : false; >> +} >> + >> +static int snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(int cmd, void *data) >> +{ >> + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, true, 0); >> +} >> + >> +static int snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(int cmd, void *data, int fw_err) >> +{ >> + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, false, fw_err); >> +} >> + >> static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) >> { >> struct psp_device *psp = psp_master; >> struct sev_device *sev; >> unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb; >> unsigned int reg, ret = 0; >> + void *cmd_buf; >> int buf_len; >> >> if (!psp || !psp->sev_data) >> @@ -512,12 +819,28 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) >> * work for some memory, e.g. vmalloc'd addresses, and @data may not be >> * physically contiguous. >> */ >> - if (data) >> - memcpy(sev->cmd_buf, data, buf_len); >> + if (data) { >> + if (sev->cmd_buf_active > 2) >> + return -EBUSY; >> + >> + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf_active ? sev->cmd_buf_backup : sev->cmd_buf; >> + >> + memcpy(cmd_buf, data, buf_len); >> + sev->cmd_buf_active++; >> + >> + /* >> + * The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the >> + * SNP firmware is in the INIT state. >> + */ >> + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, sev->cmd_buf)) > I believe this should be cmd_buf instead of sev->cmd_buf. > snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf) Yes, you are right, this should be cmd_buf instead of sev->cmd_buf, will fix this accordingly. Thanks, Ashish > >> + return -EFAULT; >> + } else { >> + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf; >> + } >> >> /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */ >> - phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; >> - phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; >> + phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; >> + phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; >> >> dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x timeout %us\n", >> cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb, psp_timeout); >> @@ -560,15 +883,24 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) >> ret = sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(cmd); >> } >> >> - print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, >> - buf_len, false); >> - >> /* >> * Copy potential output from the PSP back to data. Do this even on >> * failure in case the caller wants to glean something from the error. >> */ >> - if (data) >> - memcpy(data, sev->cmd_buf, buf_len); >> + if (data) { >> + /* >> + * Restore the page state after the command completes. >> + */ >> + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && >> + snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf, ret)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + memcpy(data, cmd_buf, buf_len); >> + sev->cmd_buf_active--; >> + } >> + >> + print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, >> + buf_len, false); >> >> return ret; >> } >> @@ -1579,10 +1911,12 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp) >> if (!sev) >> goto e_err; >> >> - sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 0); >> + sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 1); >> if (!sev->cmd_buf) >> goto e_sev; >> >> + sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE; >> + >> psp->sev_data = sev; >> >> sev->dev = dev; >> @@ -1648,6 +1982,12 @@ static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev) >> snp_range_list = NULL; >> } >> >> + /* >> + * The host map need to clear the immutable bit so it must be free'd before the >> + * SNP firmware shutdown. >> + */ >> + free_snp_host_map(sev); >> + >> sev_snp_shutdown(&error); >> } >> >> @@ -1722,6 +2062,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) >> dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error); >> } >> } >> + >> + /* >> + * Allocate the intermediate buffers used for the legacy command handling. >> + */ >> + if (alloc_snp_host_map(sev)) { >> + dev_notice(sev->dev, "Failed to alloc host map (disabling legacy SEV)\n"); >> + goto skip_legacy; >> + } >> } >> >> /* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */ >> @@ -1739,12 +2087,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) >> dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x, rc %d\n", >> error, rc); >> >> +skip_legacy: >> dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV%s API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->snp_initialized ? >> "-SNP" : "", sev->api_major, sev->api_minor, sev->build); >> >> return; >> >> err: >> + free_snp_host_map(sev); >> psp_master->sev_data = NULL; >> } >> >> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h >> index 34767657beb5..19d79f9d4212 100644 >> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h >> @@ -29,11 +29,20 @@ >> #define SEV_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16 >> #define SEV_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0) >> >> +#define MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS 2 >> + >> struct sev_misc_dev { >> struct kref refcount; >> struct miscdevice misc; >> }; >> >> +struct snp_host_map { >> + u64 paddr; >> + u32 len; >> + void *host; >> + bool active; >> +}; >> + >> struct sev_device { >> struct device *dev; >> struct psp_device *psp; >> @@ -52,8 +61,11 @@ struct sev_device { >> u8 build; >> >> void *cmd_buf; >> + void *cmd_buf_backup; >> + int cmd_buf_active; >> >> bool snp_initialized; >> + struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS]; >> }; >> >> int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp); >> -- >> 2.25.1 >>
On Fri, Jan 13, 2023 at 2:04 PM Kalra, Ashish <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: > > Hello Alper, > > On 1/12/2023 2:47 PM, Alper Gun wrote: > > On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:54 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote: > >> > >> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > >> > >> The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the SNP firmware > >> is in the INIT state. When SNP is in INIT state, all the SEV-legacy > >> commands that cause the firmware to write to memory must be in the > >> firmware state before issuing the command.. > >> > >> A command buffer may contains a system physical address that the firmware > >> may write to. There are two cases that need to be handled: > >> > >> 1) system physical address points to a guest memory > >> 2) system physical address points to a host memory > >> > >> To handle the case #1, change the page state to the firmware in the RMP > >> table before issuing the command and restore the state to shared after the > >> command completes. > >> > >> For the case #2, use a bounce buffer to complete the request. > >> > >> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > >> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > >> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > >> --- > >> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 370 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > >> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 12 ++ > >> 2 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) > >> > >> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > >> index 4c12e98a1219..5eb2e8f364d4 100644 > >> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > >> @@ -286,6 +286,30 @@ static int rmp_mark_pages_firmware(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, boo > >> return rc; > >> } > >> > >> +static int rmp_mark_pages_shared(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) > >> +{ > >> + /* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */ > >> + unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > >> + int rc, n = 0, i; > >> + > >> + for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, pfn++, n++) { > >> + rc = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K); > >> + if (rc) > >> + goto cleanup; > >> + } > >> + > >> + return 0; > >> + > >> +cleanup: > >> + /* > >> + * If failed to change the page state to shared, then its not safe > >> + * to release the page back to the system, leak it. > >> + */ > >> + snp_mark_pages_offline(pfn, npages - n); > >> + > >> + return rc; > >> +} > >> + > >> static struct page *__snp_alloc_firmware_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, bool locked) > >> { > >> unsigned long npages = 1ul << order, paddr; > >> @@ -487,12 +511,295 @@ static int sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(int cmd_id) > >> return sev_write_init_ex_file(); > >> } > >> > >> +static int alloc_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) > >> +{ > >> + struct page *page; > >> + int i; > >> + > >> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { > >> + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; > >> + > >> + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); > >> + > >> + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); > >> + if (!page) > >> + return -ENOMEM; > >> + > >> + map->host = page_address(page); > >> + } > >> + > >> + return 0; > >> +} > >> + > >> +static void free_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) > >> +{ > >> + int i; > >> + > >> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { > >> + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; > >> + > >> + if (map->host) { > >> + __free_pages(virt_to_page(map->host), get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); > >> + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); > >> + } > >> + } > >> +} > >> + > >> +static int map_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) > >> +{ > >> + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > >> + > >> + map->active = false; > >> + > >> + if (!paddr || !len) > >> + return 0; > >> + > >> + map->paddr = *paddr; > >> + map->len = len; > >> + > >> + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then change the page state to firmwware. */ > >> + if (guest) { > >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(*paddr, npages, true)) > >> + return -EFAULT; > >> + > >> + goto done; > >> + } > >> + > >> + if (!map->host) > >> + return -ENOMEM; > >> + > >> + /* Check if the pre-allocated buffer can be used to fullfil the request. */ > >> + if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) > >> + return -EINVAL; > >> + > >> + /* Transition the pre-allocated buffer to the firmware state. */ > >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) > >> + return -EFAULT; > >> + > >> + /* Set the paddr to use pre-allocated firmware buffer */ > >> + *paddr = __psp_pa(map->host); > >> + > >> +done: > >> + map->active = true; > >> + return 0; > >> +} > >> + > >> +static int unmap_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) > >> +{ > >> + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > >> + > >> + if (!map->active) > >> + return 0; > >> + > >> + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then restore the page state to hypervisor. */ > >> + if (guest) { > >> + if (snp_reclaim_pages(*paddr, npages, true)) > >> + return -EFAULT; > >> + > >> + goto done; > >> + } > >> + > >> + /* > >> + * Transition the pre-allocated buffer to hypervisor state before the access. > >> + * > >> + * This is because while changing the page state to firmware, the kernel unmaps > >> + * the pages from the direct map, and to restore the direct map the pages must > >> + * be transitioned back to the shared state. > >> + */ > >> + if (snp_reclaim_pages(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) > >> + return -EFAULT; > >> + > >> + /* Copy the response data firmware buffer to the callers buffer. */ > >> + memcpy(__va(__sme_clr(map->paddr)), map->host, min_t(size_t, len, map->len)); > >> + *paddr = map->paddr; > >> + > >> +done: > >> + map->active = false; > >> + return 0; > >> +} > >> + > >> +static bool sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(int cmd) > >> +{ > >> + switch (cmd) { > >> + case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: > >> + case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS: > >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START: > >> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START: > >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: > >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: > >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: > >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: > >> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: > >> + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: > >> + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: > >> + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: > >> + return true; > >> + default: > >> + return false; > >> + } > >> +} > >> + > >> +#define prep_buffer(name, addr, len, guest, map) \ > >> + func(&((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->addr, ((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->len, guest, map) > >> + > >> +static int __snp_cmd_buf_copy(int cmd, void *cmd_buf, bool to_fw, int fw_err) > >> +{ > >> + int (*func)(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map); > >> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; > >> + bool from_fw = !to_fw; > >> + > >> + /* > >> + * After the command is completed, change the command buffer memory to > >> + * hypervisor state. > >> + * > >> + * The immutable bit is automatically cleared by the firmware, so > >> + * no not need to reclaim the page. > >> + */ > >> + if (from_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { > >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_shared(__pa(cmd_buf), 1)) > >> + return -EFAULT; > > > > If we return here, we will skip calling unmap_firmware_writeable and > > we will leak some pages in firmware state. > > Do you mean those (guest) pages which were transitioned to firmware > state as part of > snp_aware_copy_to_firmware()->_snp_cmd_buf_copy()->map_firmware_writeable()? yes, if we return here, these guest pages will be left in firmware state. > > > > >> + > >> + /* No need to go further if firmware failed to execute command. */ > >> + if (fw_err) > >> + return 0; Same thing also here, we are possibly leaving guest pages in the firmware state. > >> + } > >> + > >> + if (to_fw) > >> + func = map_firmware_writeable; > >> + else > >> + func = unmap_firmware_writeable; > >> + > >> + /* > >> + * A command buffer may contains a system physical address. If the address > >> + * points to a host memory then use an intermediate firmware page otherwise > >> + * change the page state in the RMP table. > >> + */ > >> + switch (cmd) { > >> + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, pdh_cert_address, > >> + pdh_cert_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, cert_chain_address, > >> + cert_chain_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_get_id, address, len, > >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pek_csr, address, len, > >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_data, address, len, > >> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa, address, len, > >> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_measure, address, len, > >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_secret, guest_address, guest_len, > >> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, false, > >> + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, true, > >> + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_attestation_report, address, len, > >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_start, session_address, > >> + session_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, hdr_address, hdr_len, > >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, trans_address, > >> + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, hdr_address, hdr_len, > >> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, trans_address, > >> + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_data, guest_address, > >> + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA: > >> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa, guest_address, > >> + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > >> + goto err; > >> + break; > >> + default: > >> + break; > >> + } > >> + > >> + /* The command buffer need to be in the firmware state. */ > >> + if (to_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { > >> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, true)) > >> + return -EFAULT; > > > > This function moves two separate pages to firmware state. First > > calling map_firmware_writeable and second calling > > rmp_mark_pages_firmware for cmd_buf. > > In case rmp_mark_pages_firmware fails for cmd_buf, the page which has > > already moved to firmware state in map_firmware_writeable should be > > reclaimed. > > This is a problem especially if we leak a guest owned page in firmware > > state. Since this is used only by legacy SEV VMs, these leaked pages > > will never be reclaimed back when destroying these VMs. > > > > Yes, this looks to be an inherent issue with the original patch, as you > mentioned there are two pages - guest owned page and the HV cmd_buf, and > failure to transition the cmd_buf back to HV/shared state has no > corresponding recovery/reclaim for the transitioned guest page. > > Thanks, > Ashish > > >> > >> + } > >> + > >> + return 0; > >> + > >> +err: > >> + return -EINVAL; > >> +} > >> + > >> +static inline bool need_firmware_copy(int cmd) > >> +{ > >> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; > >> + > >> + /* After SNP is INIT'ed, the behavior of legacy SEV command is changed. */ > >> + return ((cmd < SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT) && sev->snp_initialized) ? true : false; > >> +} > >> + > >> +static int snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(int cmd, void *data) > >> +{ > >> + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, true, 0); > >> +} > >> + > >> +static int snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(int cmd, void *data, int fw_err) > >> +{ > >> + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, false, fw_err); > >> +} > >> + > >> static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > >> { > >> struct psp_device *psp = psp_master; > >> struct sev_device *sev; > >> unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb; > >> unsigned int reg, ret = 0; > >> + void *cmd_buf; > >> int buf_len; > >> > >> if (!psp || !psp->sev_data) > >> @@ -512,12 +819,28 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > >> * work for some memory, e.g. vmalloc'd addresses, and @data may not be > >> * physically contiguous. > >> */ > >> - if (data) > >> - memcpy(sev->cmd_buf, data, buf_len); > >> + if (data) { > >> + if (sev->cmd_buf_active > 2) > >> + return -EBUSY; > >> + > >> + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf_active ? sev->cmd_buf_backup : sev->cmd_buf; > >> + > >> + memcpy(cmd_buf, data, buf_len); > >> + sev->cmd_buf_active++; > >> + > >> + /* > >> + * The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the > >> + * SNP firmware is in the INIT state. > >> + */ > >> + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, sev->cmd_buf)) > >> + return -EFAULT; > >> + } else { > >> + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf; > >> + } > >> > >> /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */ > >> - phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; > >> - phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; > >> + phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; > >> + phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; > >> > >> dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x timeout %us\n", > >> cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb, psp_timeout); > >> @@ -560,15 +883,24 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > >> ret = sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(cmd); > >> } > >> > >> - print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, > >> - buf_len, false); > >> - > >> /* > >> * Copy potential output from the PSP back to data. Do this even on > >> * failure in case the caller wants to glean something from the error. > >> */ > >> - if (data) > >> - memcpy(data, sev->cmd_buf, buf_len); > >> + if (data) { > >> + /* > >> + * Restore the page state after the command completes. > >> + */ > >> + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && > >> + snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf, ret)) > >> + return -EFAULT; > >> + > >> + memcpy(data, cmd_buf, buf_len); > >> + sev->cmd_buf_active--; > >> + } > >> + > >> + print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, > >> + buf_len, false); > >> > >> return ret; > >> } > >> @@ -1579,10 +1911,12 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp) > >> if (!sev) > >> goto e_err; > >> > >> - sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 0); > >> + sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 1); > >> if (!sev->cmd_buf) > >> goto e_sev; > >> > >> + sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE; > >> + > >> psp->sev_data = sev; > >> > >> sev->dev = dev; > >> @@ -1648,6 +1982,12 @@ static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev) > >> snp_range_list = NULL; > >> } > >> > >> + /* > >> + * The host map need to clear the immutable bit so it must be free'd before the > >> + * SNP firmware shutdown. > >> + */ > >> + free_snp_host_map(sev); > >> + > >> sev_snp_shutdown(&error); > >> } > >> > >> @@ -1722,6 +2062,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) > >> dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error); > >> } > >> } > >> + > >> + /* > >> + * Allocate the intermediate buffers used for the legacy command handling. > >> + */ > >> + if (alloc_snp_host_map(sev)) { > >> + dev_notice(sev->dev, "Failed to alloc host map (disabling legacy SEV)\n"); > >> + goto skip_legacy; > >> + } > >> } > >> > >> /* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */ > >> @@ -1739,12 +2087,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) > >> dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x, rc %d\n", > >> error, rc); > >> > >> +skip_legacy: > >> dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV%s API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->snp_initialized ? > >> "-SNP" : "", sev->api_major, sev->api_minor, sev->build); > >> > >> return; > >> > >> err: > >> + free_snp_host_map(sev); > >> psp_master->sev_data = NULL; > >> } > >> > >> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > >> index 34767657beb5..19d79f9d4212 100644 > >> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > >> @@ -29,11 +29,20 @@ > >> #define SEV_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16 > >> #define SEV_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0) > >> > >> +#define MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS 2 > >> + > >> struct sev_misc_dev { > >> struct kref refcount; > >> struct miscdevice misc; > >> }; > >> > >> +struct snp_host_map { > >> + u64 paddr; > >> + u32 len; > >> + void *host; > >> + bool active; > >> +}; > >> + > >> struct sev_device { > >> struct device *dev; > >> struct psp_device *psp; > >> @@ -52,8 +61,11 @@ struct sev_device { > >> u8 build; > >> > >> void *cmd_buf; > >> + void *cmd_buf_backup; > >> + int cmd_buf_active; > >> > >> bool snp_initialized; > >> + struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS]; > >> }; > >> > >> int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp); > >> -- > >> 2.25.1 > >>
On 1/13/2023 4:42 PM, Alper Gun wrote: > On Fri, Jan 13, 2023 at 2:04 PM Kalra, Ashish <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote: >> >> Hello Alper, >> >> On 1/12/2023 2:47 PM, Alper Gun wrote: >>> On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:54 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> >>>> >>>> The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the SNP firmware >>>> is in the INIT state. When SNP is in INIT state, all the SEV-legacy >>>> commands that cause the firmware to write to memory must be in the >>>> firmware state before issuing the command.. >>>> >>>> A command buffer may contains a system physical address that the firmware >>>> may write to. There are two cases that need to be handled: >>>> >>>> 1) system physical address points to a guest memory >>>> 2) system physical address points to a host memory >>>> >>>> To handle the case #1, change the page state to the firmware in the RMP >>>> table before issuing the command and restore the state to shared after the >>>> command completes. >>>> >>>> For the case #2, use a bounce buffer to complete the request. >>>> >>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> >>>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> >>>> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> >>>> --- >>>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 370 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- >>>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 12 ++ >>>> 2 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) >>>> >>>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c >>>> index 4c12e98a1219..5eb2e8f364d4 100644 >>>> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c >>>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c >>>> @@ -286,6 +286,30 @@ static int rmp_mark_pages_firmware(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, boo >>>> return rc; >>>> } >>>> >>>> +static int rmp_mark_pages_shared(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) >>>> +{ >>>> + /* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */ >>>> + unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; >>>> + int rc, n = 0, i; >>>> + >>>> + for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, pfn++, n++) { >>>> + rc = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K); >>>> + if (rc) >>>> + goto cleanup; >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + return 0; >>>> + >>>> +cleanup: >>>> + /* >>>> + * If failed to change the page state to shared, then its not safe >>>> + * to release the page back to the system, leak it. >>>> + */ >>>> + snp_mark_pages_offline(pfn, npages - n); >>>> + >>>> + return rc; >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> static struct page *__snp_alloc_firmware_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, bool locked) >>>> { >>>> unsigned long npages = 1ul << order, paddr; >>>> @@ -487,12 +511,295 @@ static int sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(int cmd_id) >>>> return sev_write_init_ex_file(); >>>> } >>>> >>>> +static int alloc_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) >>>> +{ >>>> + struct page *page; >>>> + int i; >>>> + >>>> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { >>>> + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; >>>> + >>>> + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); >>>> + >>>> + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); >>>> + if (!page) >>>> + return -ENOMEM; >>>> + >>>> + map->host = page_address(page); >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + return 0; >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> +static void free_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) >>>> +{ >>>> + int i; >>>> + >>>> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { >>>> + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; >>>> + >>>> + if (map->host) { >>>> + __free_pages(virt_to_page(map->host), get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); >>>> + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); >>>> + } >>>> + } >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> +static int map_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) >>>> +{ >>>> + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; >>>> + >>>> + map->active = false; >>>> + >>>> + if (!paddr || !len) >>>> + return 0; >>>> + >>>> + map->paddr = *paddr; >>>> + map->len = len; >>>> + >>>> + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then change the page state to firmwware. */ >>>> + if (guest) { >>>> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(*paddr, npages, true)) >>>> + return -EFAULT; >>>> + >>>> + goto done; >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + if (!map->host) >>>> + return -ENOMEM; >>>> + >>>> + /* Check if the pre-allocated buffer can be used to fullfil the request. */ >>>> + if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) >>>> + return -EINVAL; >>>> + >>>> + /* Transition the pre-allocated buffer to the firmware state. */ >>>> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) >>>> + return -EFAULT; >>>> + >>>> + /* Set the paddr to use pre-allocated firmware buffer */ >>>> + *paddr = __psp_pa(map->host); >>>> + >>>> +done: >>>> + map->active = true; >>>> + return 0; >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> +static int unmap_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) >>>> +{ >>>> + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; >>>> + >>>> + if (!map->active) >>>> + return 0; >>>> + >>>> + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then restore the page state to hypervisor. */ >>>> + if (guest) { >>>> + if (snp_reclaim_pages(*paddr, npages, true)) >>>> + return -EFAULT; >>>> + >>>> + goto done; >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + /* >>>> + * Transition the pre-allocated buffer to hypervisor state before the access. >>>> + * >>>> + * This is because while changing the page state to firmware, the kernel unmaps >>>> + * the pages from the direct map, and to restore the direct map the pages must >>>> + * be transitioned back to the shared state. >>>> + */ >>>> + if (snp_reclaim_pages(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) >>>> + return -EFAULT; >>>> + >>>> + /* Copy the response data firmware buffer to the callers buffer. */ >>>> + memcpy(__va(__sme_clr(map->paddr)), map->host, min_t(size_t, len, map->len)); >>>> + *paddr = map->paddr; >>>> + >>>> +done: >>>> + map->active = false; >>>> + return 0; >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> +static bool sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(int cmd) >>>> +{ >>>> + switch (cmd) { >>>> + case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: >>>> + case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS: >>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START: >>>> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START: >>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: >>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: >>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: >>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: >>>> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: >>>> + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: >>>> + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: >>>> + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: >>>> + return true; >>>> + default: >>>> + return false; >>>> + } >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> +#define prep_buffer(name, addr, len, guest, map) \ >>>> + func(&((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->addr, ((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->len, guest, map) >>>> + >>>> +static int __snp_cmd_buf_copy(int cmd, void *cmd_buf, bool to_fw, int fw_err) >>>> +{ >>>> + int (*func)(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map); >>>> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; >>>> + bool from_fw = !to_fw; >>>> + >>>> + /* >>>> + * After the command is completed, change the command buffer memory to >>>> + * hypervisor state. >>>> + * >>>> + * The immutable bit is automatically cleared by the firmware, so >>>> + * no not need to reclaim the page. >>>> + */ >>>> + if (from_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { >>>> + if (rmp_mark_pages_shared(__pa(cmd_buf), 1)) >>>> + return -EFAULT; >>> >>> If we return here, we will skip calling unmap_firmware_writeable and >>> we will leak some pages in firmware state. >> >> Do you mean those (guest) pages which were transitioned to firmware >> state as part of >> snp_aware_copy_to_firmware()->_snp_cmd_buf_copy()->map_firmware_writeable()? > > yes, if we return here, these guest pages will be left in firmware state. >> >>> >>>> + >>>> + /* No need to go further if firmware failed to execute command. */ >>>> + if (fw_err) >>>> + return 0; > Same thing also here, we are possibly leaving guest pages in the firmware state. > Yes, i agree, both are inhererent bugs in the original patch and need to be fixed. Thanks, Ashish >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + if (to_fw) >>>> + func = map_firmware_writeable; >>>> + else >>>> + func = unmap_firmware_writeable; >>>> + >>>> + /* >>>> + * A command buffer may contains a system physical address. If the address >>>> + * points to a host memory then use an intermediate firmware page otherwise >>>> + * change the page state in the RMP table. >>>> + */ >>>> + switch (cmd) { >>>> + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, pdh_cert_address, >>>> + pdh_cert_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, cert_chain_address, >>>> + cert_chain_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_get_id, address, len, >>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pek_csr, address, len, >>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_data, address, len, >>>> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa, address, len, >>>> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_measure, address, len, >>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_secret, guest_address, guest_len, >>>> + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, false, >>>> + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, true, >>>> + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_attestation_report, address, len, >>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_start, session_address, >>>> + session_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, hdr_address, hdr_len, >>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, trans_address, >>>> + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, hdr_address, hdr_len, >>>> + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, trans_address, >>>> + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_data, guest_address, >>>> + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA: >>>> + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa, guest_address, >>>> + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) >>>> + goto err; >>>> + break; >>>> + default: >>>> + break; >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + /* The command buffer need to be in the firmware state. */ >>>> + if (to_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { >>>> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, true)) >>>> + return -EFAULT; >>> >>> This function moves two separate pages to firmware state. First >>> calling map_firmware_writeable and second calling >>> rmp_mark_pages_firmware for cmd_buf. >>> In case rmp_mark_pages_firmware fails for cmd_buf, the page which has >>> already moved to firmware state in map_firmware_writeable should be >>> reclaimed. >>> This is a problem especially if we leak a guest owned page in firmware >>> state. Since this is used only by legacy SEV VMs, these leaked pages >>> will never be reclaimed back when destroying these VMs. >>> >> >> Yes, this looks to be an inherent issue with the original patch, as you >> mentioned there are two pages - guest owned page and the HV cmd_buf, and >> failure to transition the cmd_buf back to HV/shared state has no >> corresponding recovery/reclaim for the transitioned guest page. >> >> Thanks, >> Ashish >> >>>> >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + return 0; >>>> + >>>> +err: >>>> + return -EINVAL; >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> +static inline bool need_firmware_copy(int cmd) >>>> +{ >>>> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; >>>> + >>>> + /* After SNP is INIT'ed, the behavior of legacy SEV command is changed. */ >>>> + return ((cmd < SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT) && sev->snp_initialized) ? true : false; >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> +static int snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(int cmd, void *data) >>>> +{ >>>> + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, true, 0); >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> +static int snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(int cmd, void *data, int fw_err) >>>> +{ >>>> + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, false, fw_err); >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) >>>> { >>>> struct psp_device *psp = psp_master; >>>> struct sev_device *sev; >>>> unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb; >>>> unsigned int reg, ret = 0; >>>> + void *cmd_buf; >>>> int buf_len; >>>> >>>> if (!psp || !psp->sev_data) >>>> @@ -512,12 +819,28 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) >>>> * work for some memory, e.g. vmalloc'd addresses, and @data may not be >>>> * physically contiguous. >>>> */ >>>> - if (data) >>>> - memcpy(sev->cmd_buf, data, buf_len); >>>> + if (data) { >>>> + if (sev->cmd_buf_active > 2) >>>> + return -EBUSY; >>>> + >>>> + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf_active ? sev->cmd_buf_backup : sev->cmd_buf; >>>> + >>>> + memcpy(cmd_buf, data, buf_len); >>>> + sev->cmd_buf_active++; >>>> + >>>> + /* >>>> + * The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the >>>> + * SNP firmware is in the INIT state. >>>> + */ >>>> + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, sev->cmd_buf)) >>>> + return -EFAULT; >>>> + } else { >>>> + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf; >>>> + } >>>> >>>> /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */ >>>> - phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; >>>> - phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; >>>> + phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; >>>> + phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; >>>> >>>> dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x timeout %us\n", >>>> cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb, psp_timeout); >>>> @@ -560,15 +883,24 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) >>>> ret = sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(cmd); >>>> } >>>> >>>> - print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, >>>> - buf_len, false); >>>> - >>>> /* >>>> * Copy potential output from the PSP back to data. Do this even on >>>> * failure in case the caller wants to glean something from the error. >>>> */ >>>> - if (data) >>>> - memcpy(data, sev->cmd_buf, buf_len); >>>> + if (data) { >>>> + /* >>>> + * Restore the page state after the command completes. >>>> + */ >>>> + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && >>>> + snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf, ret)) >>>> + return -EFAULT; >>>> + >>>> + memcpy(data, cmd_buf, buf_len); >>>> + sev->cmd_buf_active--; >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, >>>> + buf_len, false); >>>> >>>> return ret; >>>> } >>>> @@ -1579,10 +1911,12 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp) >>>> if (!sev) >>>> goto e_err; >>>> >>>> - sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 0); >>>> + sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 1); >>>> if (!sev->cmd_buf) >>>> goto e_sev; >>>> >>>> + sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE; >>>> + >>>> psp->sev_data = sev; >>>> >>>> sev->dev = dev; >>>> @@ -1648,6 +1982,12 @@ static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev) >>>> snp_range_list = NULL; >>>> } >>>> >>>> + /* >>>> + * The host map need to clear the immutable bit so it must be free'd before the >>>> + * SNP firmware shutdown. >>>> + */ >>>> + free_snp_host_map(sev); >>>> + >>>> sev_snp_shutdown(&error); >>>> } >>>> >>>> @@ -1722,6 +2062,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) >>>> dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error); >>>> } >>>> } >>>> + >>>> + /* >>>> + * Allocate the intermediate buffers used for the legacy command handling. >>>> + */ >>>> + if (alloc_snp_host_map(sev)) { >>>> + dev_notice(sev->dev, "Failed to alloc host map (disabling legacy SEV)\n"); >>>> + goto skip_legacy; >>>> + } >>>> } >>>> >>>> /* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */ >>>> @@ -1739,12 +2087,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) >>>> dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x, rc %d\n", >>>> error, rc); >>>> >>>> +skip_legacy: >>>> dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV%s API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->snp_initialized ? >>>> "-SNP" : "", sev->api_major, sev->api_minor, sev->build); >>>> >>>> return; >>>> >>>> err: >>>> + free_snp_host_map(sev); >>>> psp_master->sev_data = NULL; >>>> } >>>> >>>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h >>>> index 34767657beb5..19d79f9d4212 100644 >>>> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h >>>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h >>>> @@ -29,11 +29,20 @@ >>>> #define SEV_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16 >>>> #define SEV_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0) >>>> >>>> +#define MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS 2 >>>> + >>>> struct sev_misc_dev { >>>> struct kref refcount; >>>> struct miscdevice misc; >>>> }; >>>> >>>> +struct snp_host_map { >>>> + u64 paddr; >>>> + u32 len; >>>> + void *host; >>>> + bool active; >>>> +}; >>>> + >>>> struct sev_device { >>>> struct device *dev; >>>> struct psp_device *psp; >>>> @@ -52,8 +61,11 @@ struct sev_device { >>>> u8 build; >>>> >>>> void *cmd_buf; >>>> + void *cmd_buf_backup; >>>> + int cmd_buf_active; >>>> >>>> bool snp_initialized; >>>> + struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS]; >>>> }; >>>> >>>> int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp); >>>> -- >>>> 2.25.1 >>>>
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c index 4c12e98a1219..5eb2e8f364d4 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c @@ -286,6 +286,30 @@ static int rmp_mark_pages_firmware(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, boo return rc; } +static int rmp_mark_pages_shared(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) +{ + /* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */ + unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + int rc, n = 0, i; + + for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, pfn++, n++) { + rc = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K); + if (rc) + goto cleanup; + } + + return 0; + +cleanup: + /* + * If failed to change the page state to shared, then its not safe + * to release the page back to the system, leak it. + */ + snp_mark_pages_offline(pfn, npages - n); + + return rc; +} + static struct page *__snp_alloc_firmware_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, bool locked) { unsigned long npages = 1ul << order, paddr; @@ -487,12 +511,295 @@ static int sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(int cmd_id) return sev_write_init_ex_file(); } +static int alloc_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) +{ + struct page *page; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; + + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); + + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); + if (!page) + return -ENOMEM; + + map->host = page_address(page); + } + + return 0; +} + +static void free_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; + + if (map->host) { + __free_pages(virt_to_page(map->host), get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); + } + } +} + +static int map_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) +{ + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + map->active = false; + + if (!paddr || !len) + return 0; + + map->paddr = *paddr; + map->len = len; + + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then change the page state to firmwware. */ + if (guest) { + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(*paddr, npages, true)) + return -EFAULT; + + goto done; + } + + if (!map->host) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Check if the pre-allocated buffer can be used to fullfil the request. */ + if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Transition the pre-allocated buffer to the firmware state. */ + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) + return -EFAULT; + + /* Set the paddr to use pre-allocated firmware buffer */ + *paddr = __psp_pa(map->host); + +done: + map->active = true; + return 0; +} + +static int unmap_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) +{ + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + if (!map->active) + return 0; + + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then restore the page state to hypervisor. */ + if (guest) { + if (snp_reclaim_pages(*paddr, npages, true)) + return -EFAULT; + + goto done; + } + + /* + * Transition the pre-allocated buffer to hypervisor state before the access. + * + * This is because while changing the page state to firmware, the kernel unmaps + * the pages from the direct map, and to restore the direct map the pages must + * be transitioned back to the shared state. + */ + if (snp_reclaim_pages(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) + return -EFAULT; + + /* Copy the response data firmware buffer to the callers buffer. */ + memcpy(__va(__sme_clr(map->paddr)), map->host, min_t(size_t, len, map->len)); + *paddr = map->paddr; + +done: + map->active = false; + return 0; +} + +static bool sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(int cmd) +{ + switch (cmd) { + case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: + case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS: + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START: + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START: + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + +#define prep_buffer(name, addr, len, guest, map) \ + func(&((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->addr, ((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->len, guest, map) + +static int __snp_cmd_buf_copy(int cmd, void *cmd_buf, bool to_fw, int fw_err) +{ + int (*func)(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map); + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; + bool from_fw = !to_fw; + + /* + * After the command is completed, change the command buffer memory to + * hypervisor state. + * + * The immutable bit is automatically cleared by the firmware, so + * no not need to reclaim the page. + */ + if (from_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { + if (rmp_mark_pages_shared(__pa(cmd_buf), 1)) + return -EFAULT; + + /* No need to go further if firmware failed to execute command. */ + if (fw_err) + return 0; + } + + if (to_fw) + func = map_firmware_writeable; + else + func = unmap_firmware_writeable; + + /* + * A command buffer may contains a system physical address. If the address + * points to a host memory then use an intermediate firmware page otherwise + * change the page state in the RMP table. + */ + switch (cmd) { + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, pdh_cert_address, + pdh_cert_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, cert_chain_address, + cert_chain_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_get_id, address, len, + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pek_csr, address, len, + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_data, address, len, + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa, address, len, + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_measure, address, len, + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_secret, guest_address, guest_len, + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, false, + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, true, + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_attestation_report, address, len, + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_start, session_address, + session_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, hdr_address, hdr_len, + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, trans_address, + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, hdr_address, hdr_len, + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, trans_address, + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_data, guest_address, + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA: + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa, guest_address, + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) + goto err; + break; + default: + break; + } + + /* The command buffer need to be in the firmware state. */ + if (to_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, true)) + return -EFAULT; + } + + return 0; + +err: + return -EINVAL; +} + +static inline bool need_firmware_copy(int cmd) +{ + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; + + /* After SNP is INIT'ed, the behavior of legacy SEV command is changed. */ + return ((cmd < SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT) && sev->snp_initialized) ? true : false; +} + +static int snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(int cmd, void *data) +{ + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, true, 0); +} + +static int snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(int cmd, void *data, int fw_err) +{ + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, false, fw_err); +} + static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) { struct psp_device *psp = psp_master; struct sev_device *sev; unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb; unsigned int reg, ret = 0; + void *cmd_buf; int buf_len; if (!psp || !psp->sev_data) @@ -512,12 +819,28 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) * work for some memory, e.g. vmalloc'd addresses, and @data may not be * physically contiguous. */ - if (data) - memcpy(sev->cmd_buf, data, buf_len); + if (data) { + if (sev->cmd_buf_active > 2) + return -EBUSY; + + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf_active ? sev->cmd_buf_backup : sev->cmd_buf; + + memcpy(cmd_buf, data, buf_len); + sev->cmd_buf_active++; + + /* + * The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the + * SNP firmware is in the INIT state. + */ + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, sev->cmd_buf)) + return -EFAULT; + } else { + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf; + } /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */ - phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; - phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; + phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; + phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x timeout %us\n", cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb, psp_timeout); @@ -560,15 +883,24 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) ret = sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(cmd); } - print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, - buf_len, false); - /* * Copy potential output from the PSP back to data. Do this even on * failure in case the caller wants to glean something from the error. */ - if (data) - memcpy(data, sev->cmd_buf, buf_len); + if (data) { + /* + * Restore the page state after the command completes. + */ + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && + snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf, ret)) + return -EFAULT; + + memcpy(data, cmd_buf, buf_len); + sev->cmd_buf_active--; + } + + print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, + buf_len, false); return ret; } @@ -1579,10 +1911,12 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp) if (!sev) goto e_err; - sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 0); + sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 1); if (!sev->cmd_buf) goto e_sev; + sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE; + psp->sev_data = sev; sev->dev = dev; @@ -1648,6 +1982,12 @@ static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev) snp_range_list = NULL; } + /* + * The host map need to clear the immutable bit so it must be free'd before the + * SNP firmware shutdown. + */ + free_snp_host_map(sev); + sev_snp_shutdown(&error); } @@ -1722,6 +2062,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error); } } + + /* + * Allocate the intermediate buffers used for the legacy command handling. + */ + if (alloc_snp_host_map(sev)) { + dev_notice(sev->dev, "Failed to alloc host map (disabling legacy SEV)\n"); + goto skip_legacy; + } } /* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */ @@ -1739,12 +2087,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x, rc %d\n", error, rc); +skip_legacy: dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV%s API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->snp_initialized ? "-SNP" : "", sev->api_major, sev->api_minor, sev->build); return; err: + free_snp_host_map(sev); psp_master->sev_data = NULL; } diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h index 34767657beb5..19d79f9d4212 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h @@ -29,11 +29,20 @@ #define SEV_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16 #define SEV_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0) +#define MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS 2 + struct sev_misc_dev { struct kref refcount; struct miscdevice misc; }; +struct snp_host_map { + u64 paddr; + u32 len; + void *host; + bool active; +}; + struct sev_device { struct device *dev; struct psp_device *psp; @@ -52,8 +61,11 @@ struct sev_device { u8 build; void *cmd_buf; + void *cmd_buf_backup; + int cmd_buf_active; bool snp_initialized; + struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS]; }; int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp);