From patchwork Wed Oct 25 20:52:58 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Pawan Gupta X-Patchwork-Id: 13436781 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC5ACC25B6B for ; Wed, 25 Oct 2023 20:53:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234957AbjJYUxR (ORCPT ); Wed, 25 Oct 2023 16:53:17 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:43854 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234816AbjJYUxH (ORCPT ); Wed, 25 Oct 2023 16:53:07 -0400 Received: from mgamail.intel.com (mgamail.intel.com [134.134.136.24]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 78DCB18B; Wed, 25 Oct 2023 13:53:04 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1698267184; x=1729803184; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references: mime-version:in-reply-to; bh=KI9R1ykioS10T+zkw0Cw1ATpow7yvlFUWGh3i+Y0oPk=; b=O8hipnOIeYo9aSZqmLQaUd78Iv8mPL7gxnkozwNG5tpLu2jpSnt6AGk9 Gu/EazGF8lsjzQQKqIvnrHf6KXd66/h0rTEDa4QsEY8NCYVWUxEDK7Zgc ptUgtlmxDT7rQO5Dt4VKXfuBSzz6Iq3lHqgdcI3dFpZCK97qSMjkAy9sB yO/8DxTvatxcJLJ+nmvGEu6pbzDusJILFPcnpllLPmH3TJXXcFh/xzi+1 HPRgHVTL6iPd1wgsMz5oSh77ae8m1jmptnV3b6Tm/Ct7TI64kIm9HgTdc Y+j2r7FF26F0TPZ8wyr8U/P0uDGWXpqi3PCJGgwGp04Une6xdeo0JFC/v g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10874"; a="390255502" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.03,250,1694761200"; d="scan'208";a="390255502" Received: from fmviesa002.fm.intel.com ([10.60.135.142]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Oct 2023 13:53:01 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.03,250,1694761200"; d="scan'208";a="259627" Received: from kkomeyli-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO desk) ([10.251.29.139]) by fmviesa002-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Oct 2023 13:52:50 -0700 Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2023 13:52:58 -0700 From: Pawan Gupta To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Peter Zijlstra , Josh Poimboeuf , Andy Lutomirski , Jonathan Corbet , Sean Christopherson , Paolo Bonzini , tony.luck@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com, tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Alyssa Milburn , Daniel Sneddon , antonio.gomez.iglesias@linux.intel.com, Pawan Gupta , Dave Hansen Subject: [PATCH v3 2/6] x86/entry_64: Add VERW just before userspace transition Message-ID: <20231025-delay-verw-v3-2-52663677ee35@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: b4 0.12.3 References: <20231025-delay-verw-v3-0-52663677ee35@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20231025-delay-verw-v3-0-52663677ee35@linux.intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org Mitigation for MDS is to use VERW instruction to clear any secrets in CPU Buffers. Any memory accesses after VERW execution can still remain in CPU buffers. It is safer to execute VERW late in return to user path to minimize the window in which kernel data can end up in CPU buffers. There are not many kernel secrets to be had after SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3. Add support for deploying VERW mitigation after user register state is restored. This helps minimize the chances of kernel data ending up into CPU buffers after executing VERW. Note that the mitigation at the new location is not yet enabled. Corner case not handled ======================= Interrupts returning to kernel don't clear CPUs buffers since the exit-to-user path is expected to do that anyways. But, there could be a case when an NMI is generated in kernel after the exit-to-user path has cleared the buffers. This case is not handled and NMI returning to kernel don't clear CPU buffers because: 1. It is rare to get an NMI after VERW, but before returning to userspace. 2. For an unprivileged user, there is no known way to make that NMI less rare or target it. 3. It would take a large number of these precisely-timed NMIs to mount an actual attack. There's presumably not enough bandwidth. 4. The NMI in question occurs after a VERW, i.e. when user state is restored and most interesting data is already scrubbed. Whats left is only the data that NMI touches, and that may or may not be of any interest. Suggested-by: Dave Hansen Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 1 + 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 43606de22511..9f97a8bd11e8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret: SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR swapgs + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS sysretq SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR @@ -663,6 +664,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* Restore RDI. */ popq %rdi swapgs + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS jmp .Lnative_iret @@ -774,6 +776,8 @@ native_irq_return_ldt: */ popq %rax /* Restore user RAX */ + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS + /* * RSP now points to an ordinary IRET frame, except that the page * is read-only and RSP[31:16] are preloaded with the userspace @@ -1502,6 +1506,12 @@ nmi_restore: std movq $0, 5*8(%rsp) /* clear "NMI executing" */ + /* + * Skip CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS here, since it only helps in rare cases like + * NMI in kernel after user state is restored. For an unprivileged user + * these conditions are hard to meet. + */ + /* * iretq reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI stack in a * single instruction. We are returning to kernel mode, so this @@ -1520,6 +1530,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(ignore_sysret) UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK ENDBR mov $-ENOSYS, %eax + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS sysretl SYM_CODE_END(ignore_sysret) #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index 70150298f8bd..245697eb8485 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) xorl %r9d, %r9d xorl %r10d, %r10d swapgs + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS sysretl SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR