| Message ID | 20231212204647.2170650-8-sagis@google.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | TDX KVM selftests | expand |
On Tue, Dec 12, 2023 at 12:46:22PM -0800, Sagi Shahar wrote: > From: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com> > > If guest memory is backed by restricted memfd > > + UPM is being used, hence encrypted memory region has to be > registered > + Can avoid making a copy of guest memory before getting TDX to > initialize the memory region > > Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Ryan Afranji <afranji@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com> > --- > .../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c | 41 +++++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c > index 6b995c3f6153..063ff486fb86 100644 > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c > @@ -192,6 +192,21 @@ static void tdx_td_finalizemr(struct kvm_vm *vm) > tdx_ioctl(vm->fd, KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM, 0, NULL); > } > > +/* > + * Other ioctls > + */ > + > +/** > + * Register a memory region that may contain encrypted data in KVM. > + */ > +static void register_encrypted_memory_region( > + struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region) > +{ > + vm_set_memory_attributes(vm, region->region.guest_phys_addr, > + region->region.memory_size, > + KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE); > +} > + > /* > * TD creation/setup/finalization > */ > @@ -376,30 +391,38 @@ static void load_td_memory_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, > if (!sparsebit_any_set(pages)) > return; > > + > + if (region->region.guest_memfd != -1) > + register_encrypted_memory_region(vm, region); > + > sparsebit_for_each_set_range(pages, i, j) { > const uint64_t size_to_load = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size; > const uint64_t offset = > (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size; > const uint64_t hva = hva_base + offset; > const uint64_t gpa = gpa_base + offset; > - void *source_addr; > + void *source_addr = (void *)hva; > > /* > * KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION ioctl cannot encrypt memory in place, > * hence we have to make a copy if there's only one backing > * memory source > */ > - source_addr = mmap(NULL, size_to_load, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, > - MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); > - TEST_ASSERT( > - source_addr, > - "Could not allocate memory for loading memory region"); > - > - memcpy(source_addr, (void *)hva, size_to_load); > + if (region->region.guest_memfd == -1) { > + source_addr = mmap(NULL, size_to_load, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, > + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); > + TEST_ASSERT( > + source_addr, > + "Could not allocate memory for loading memory region"); > + > + memcpy(source_addr, (void *)hva, size_to_load); > + memset((void *)hva, 0, size_to_load); > + } > > tdx_init_mem_region(vm, source_addr, gpa, size_to_load); > > - munmap(source_addr, size_to_load); > + if (region->region.guest_memfd == -1) > + munmap(source_addr, size_to_load); > } For memslot 0, 1, 2, when guest_memfd != -1, is it possible to also munmap(mmap_start, mmap_size) after finish loading? > } > > -- > 2.43.0.472.g3155946c3a-goog > >
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c index 6b995c3f6153..063ff486fb86 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c @@ -192,6 +192,21 @@ static void tdx_td_finalizemr(struct kvm_vm *vm) tdx_ioctl(vm->fd, KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM, 0, NULL); } +/* + * Other ioctls + */ + +/** + * Register a memory region that may contain encrypted data in KVM. + */ +static void register_encrypted_memory_region( + struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region) +{ + vm_set_memory_attributes(vm, region->region.guest_phys_addr, + region->region.memory_size, + KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE); +} + /* * TD creation/setup/finalization */ @@ -376,30 +391,38 @@ static void load_td_memory_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, if (!sparsebit_any_set(pages)) return; + + if (region->region.guest_memfd != -1) + register_encrypted_memory_region(vm, region); + sparsebit_for_each_set_range(pages, i, j) { const uint64_t size_to_load = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size; const uint64_t offset = (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size; const uint64_t hva = hva_base + offset; const uint64_t gpa = gpa_base + offset; - void *source_addr; + void *source_addr = (void *)hva; /* * KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION ioctl cannot encrypt memory in place, * hence we have to make a copy if there's only one backing * memory source */ - source_addr = mmap(NULL, size_to_load, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, - MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); - TEST_ASSERT( - source_addr, - "Could not allocate memory for loading memory region"); - - memcpy(source_addr, (void *)hva, size_to_load); + if (region->region.guest_memfd == -1) { + source_addr = mmap(NULL, size_to_load, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + TEST_ASSERT( + source_addr, + "Could not allocate memory for loading memory region"); + + memcpy(source_addr, (void *)hva, size_to_load); + memset((void *)hva, 0, size_to_load); + } tdx_init_mem_region(vm, source_addr, gpa, size_to_load); - munmap(source_addr, size_to_load); + if (region->region.guest_memfd == -1) + munmap(source_addr, size_to_load); } }